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The Ontology of Finance:  
Price, Power, and the Arkhéderivative
Suhail Malik
.  
e  financial crisis presented two overt lessons: 
Lesson One is that the derivatives markets presents 
a systemic risk to national and world economies; Les-
son Two is that the relative size of these markets is a 
fundamental risk to geopolitical as well as economic 
security. e numbers are indeed remarkable: the 
notional total value of the derivatives market at the 
end of ­ was $. trillion. Compare this to the 
$­.tn global market value of the ‘real economy’ of 
goods and services, Gross Domestic Product (), 
for ­—just over one-tenth of the face value of the 
1. Bank of International Settlements (BIS), ‘Table 23A: Derivative 
financial instruments traded on organised exchanges’, June 2013 [www.bis.
org/statistics/extderiv.htm] and ‘Table 19: Amounts outstanding of over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives’, May 2013, www.bis.org/statistics/dt1920a.pdf.
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derivatives market, give or take a couple of trillion 
dollars.§ e notional value of directly-traded off-
exchange derivative markets—Over-the-Counter () 
trading—alone amounted to $.­tn, a sum about 
seven times greater than global .¬ While impres-
sive, these headline figures need to be qualified: they 
represent the sum total of claims traded on the market, 
not how much would have to be paid were everyone in 
the market to immediately cash-out. is latter ‘gross 
market value’ at end-­ is estimated at $.tn,° just 
under four percent of the notional value of the market 
or just under a third of global ; or, for further 
comparison, slightly more than the combined  
of the two largest national economies that year, the 
 ($­´.tn) and China ($.tn). Furthermore, since 
contracts on the derivatives markets o¶en cancel each 
other out, for reasons presented later, the net credit 
exposure of the  derivatives market and its ‘cash’ 
value is estimated to be $·.tn at end-­—about . 
2. e World Bank, ‘World Development Indicators: Gross domestic 
product 2012’, databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf.
3. International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), OTC 
Derivatives Market Analysis Year-End 2012, June 2013 (Updated 9 August 
2013), www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/studies/. Removing 
foreign exchange (FX) contracts and accounting for double reporting, ISDA 
reports that the net face value of the global OTC derivatives market at end-
2012 was $417.4tn. e notional value for options and futures exchanges for 
2012 are estimated to be $35.8tn and $26tn respectively.
4. BIS, ‘Table 19’.
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percent of the notional value; a sum comparable with 
Germany’s $·.tn , the fourth largest in the world.¿
ese figures and comparisons are striking. What 
they index is a key feature of the derivatives market: 
that the notional value of traded contracts amplifies 
their credit exposure by two orders of magnitude. is 
multiplication is in part explained by the trade being 
one of contracts of ownership claims rather than direct 
ownership at full cost: similar to buying a lottery ticket 
for a multi-million jackpot at the price of a couple of 
local currency units, the claimed or notional worth of 
a derivatives contract can be any multiple of its cost.À 
Yet, even at this latter amount of net ‘exposure’, the 
political issue brought into relief by these figures is that 
the pecuniary magnitude of derivatives markets in total 
is on a par with all but the most economically power-
ful national jurisdictions in which they are nominally 
located and which, assuming the power supremacy of 
state sovereignty, legislate over them.
To return to Lesson One, however, that final author-
ity is precisely what is weakened—if it is not in fact 
5. O. Kaya, ‘Reforming OTC derivatives markets’, Deutsche Bank 
Research, 7 August 2013, 14, www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_
INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000318054.pdf. 
6. e analogy follows Stephen Figlewski’s popularising explanation: 
‘Saying there’s $668 trillion in derivatives floating out there [in 2008] is like 
saying every lottery ticket sold is worth the full value of the jackpot. If the 
jackpot is $100 million and lottery organizers sell 2 million tickets, “that’s 
$200 trillion worth of lottery wealth that’s circulating!” jokes Figlewski’ 
(B. Sheridan, ‘600,000,000,000,000?’, Newsweek, 17 Oct 2008, www.newsweek.
com/600-trillion-derivatives-market-92275.
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upended (as this article will demonstrate)—by these 
markets’ systemic risk. Two moments of the  
financial crisis exemplify the systemic reach of that 
risk. Firstly, according to the now-standard narrative 
of the causes of that crisis, the complexity of derivative 
instruments distributing the risk of interest-bearing 
loans across the international financial architecture led 
to systemic and uncontained uncertainty in the credit-
worthiness of such instruments as well as the guarantees 
against their defaulting.Ì Because financial instruments 
and their risk could not be securely priced across the 
sector or even per firm, financial institutions withdrew 
credit and liquidity from interfinancial trading from 
, culminating in the collapse of major financial 
corporations in . Credit also shrunk back in the 
wider economy of production, services, and consump-
tion from ; sectors which, in the Euro-American 
economies from the s onward, had themselves been 
increasingly sustained by a growing debt-dependency 
rather than by revenue.Í Consequently, the uncertainty 
7. M. Hudson, e Bubble and Beyond (Dresden: ISLET, 2012); J. C. Hull, 
‘e Credit Crunch of 2007: What Went Wrong? Why? What Lessons Can 
Be Learned?’, Journal of Credit Risk, 5.2, 2009, 3–18; C. Lapavitsas, Profiting 
Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All (London: Verso, 2013), 277-81; 
N. Roubini & S. Mihm, Crisis Economics (New York: Penguin, 2010), Ch.3; E. 
Stockhammer, ‘Neoliberalism, Income Distribution and the Causes of the 
Crisis’, investigación económica, LXXI.279, enero-marzo, esp. 42–5, eprints.
kingston.ac.uk/23226/1/Stockhammer-E-23226.pdf.
8. About 80 percent of the global derivatives market is in the jurisdictions 
of the US and the EU (Kaya, ‘Reforming’, 4). On increasing household and 
corporate debt see M. Hudson, ‘Government Debt and Deficits Are Not 
the Problem. Private Debt Is’, Remarks at e Atlantic’s Economy Summit, 
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as to the creditworthiness of all financial institu-
tions led in  to a rapid contraction not only of 
that sector but of the overall economy. e resulting 
severe economic downturn, exacerbated by ‘austerity’ 
measures in several regions, exposed the systemic 
centrality of modern financial arrangements to the 
nonfinancial economy. 
e second demonstration of the systemic integra-
tion of financial markets is provided by the transna-
tional response by states to the financial crisis. e 
pecuniary amounts involved pushed the crisis outside 
of the conventional scales and terms of operation of 
state financial institutions.Ò e transnational state 
13 March 2013, Washington DC [michael-hudson.com/2013/03/government- 
debt-and-deficits-are-not-the-problem-private-debt-is/]; S. Keen, Debunking 
Economics, Second Edition (London: Zed, 2011), Ch.13; Stockhammer, 
‘Neoliberalism’, 59–63.
9. Namely, Quantitative Easing (QE) in the US and UK, and 
the combination of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and 
Securities Market Programme (SMP) for the Eurozone. ese policies 
are unconventional in terms of both magnitude and policy. With regard 
to magnitude, QE has resulted in a 450 percent increase in ‘the Federal 
Reserve’s balance sheet […] rising from $920bn at the end of December 
2007 to over $4.2tn at the end of February 2014’—continuing with $65bn 
per month rolling forward indefinitely from September 2013 (quoting 
from T.I. Palley, ‘Monetary policy a¶er quantitative easing: e case for 
asset based reserve requirements (ABRR)’, PERI Working Paper Series 
350, May 2014, www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/
working_papers_301-350/WP350.pdf). e ESM has facilitated a reserve 
of €500bn (about five percent of Eurozone GDP) since October 2012 for 
bond buy-outs and loan-provision by the EU (‘Gearing up for business’, 
e Economist, 12 October 2013). In addition the SMP established by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) in May 2010 provides unlimited purchases 
of government bonds via secondary markets. While both measures seem to 
contravene the prohibition against any form of central monetary financing 
of governments stipulated by the 1992 Maastricht treaty founding the EU, 
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the SMP circumvents this core injunction by providing a guarantee for 
markets of government debt (and their concomitant fiscal policies) such 
that the ECB’s monetary provision does not directly underwrite any state’s 
fiscal policy. Similarly, the EMS constructs a Eurowide monetary provision 
by centrally formalising a set of bilateral loan guarantees channeled through 
the EU and IMF via a dedicated Luxembourg-based finance institution. On 
the EMS, see C. Panico and F. Purificato, ‘e Debt Crisis and the European 
Central Bank’s Role of Lender of Last Resort’, January 2013, PERI Working 
Papers Series 306, www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/
working_papers_301-350/WP306.pdf. For the SMP, see D. Gros and T. 
Mayer, ‘Liquidity in times of crisis: Even the ESM needs it’, CEPS Policy 
Brief 265 (March 2012), www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_
DE-PROD/PROD0000000000287245/Liquidity+in+times+of+crisis%3A+Ev
en+the+ESM+needs+it.PDF; a detailed analysis of the ‘bounded rationality’ 
(250) of institutional constraints and mobility in the transnational state 
construction of these unprecedented provisions is given in L. Gocaj and 
S. Meunier, ‘Ùme Will Tell: e EFSF, the ESM, and the Euro Crisis’, 
European Integration, 35.3 (2013), 239–253. 
Unconstrained by the Eurozone’s institutional distinction between 
monetary authority and fiscal policy, QE in the US and UK follows the model 
set by the Bank of Japan in the early 2000s, which faced similar conditions 
to those confronting the central banks of major Euro-American economies 
a¶er 2008: shrinking demand lowers prices, and that deflation itself leads to 
an effective increase in the price of debt (because deflation means the cost 
of pecuniary assets including debts increases in real terms, as then does the 
size of debt-servicing as a proportion of the overall economy, in turn further 
reducing demand and exacerbating the initial problem). With interest rates 
at close to zero in order to reduce bank liabilities (effectively a state subsidy 
for commercial banks [Lapavitsas, Profiting, 282]), central banks cannot 
further encourage lending via this mechanism and so look to stimulate 
the economy by direct purchasing of highly-graded financial assets such as 
sovereign debt bonds (also issued by the state) in order to reduce their yield 
and shi¶ private credit and liquidity to elsewhere in the economy, such as 
equities in firms thereby providing investment. Alongside this intervention 
the US Fed reduced federal funds rate for borrowing by commercial banks 
from over five percent in mid-2007 to near-zero in December 2008 in order 
to stimulate market liquidity. However, because commercial banks were 
cautious about further downturns and credit exposure risks a¶er the 2008 
crisis, their reserves at the Fed increased from a 2001–07 level of around 
$19bn to $860bn in 2007–08 to $1.6tn by 2011, or ‘more than 10 percent 
of US annual GDP’ for that year compared to reserve levels of less that 
two percent of GDP in previous crises since the 1970s (R. Pollin, ‘e 
Great U.S. Liquidity Trap of 2009–11: Are We Stuck Pushing on Strings?’, 
Review of Keynesian Economics 1.0 (2012), 55–76, www.peri.umass.edu/
fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_251-300/WP284.pdf]). 
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directives formulated by the G in  sought to 
systematise transparency and reduce scalar risk by 
requiring greater capital reserves for financial institu-
tions or, equally, capping market exposure for firms 
dealing with  contracts.Ú But these stipulations only 
serve to capture and organize better the operational 
framework of the derivatives markets’ ‘efficient’ alloca-
tion of capital without proscribing or fundamentally 
inhibiting their operations. And the reason is clear: with 
credit rather than revenues providing the conditions 
for economic expansion, finance markets are now a 
condition of national . While the official sanction 
for the growth of finance markets is framed in terms 
While that reserve reduced the Fed’s balance sheet at the time of its own rapid 
expenditure thanks to QE, the 0.25 percent interest rate on such deposits 
it offered for the first time on such reserves meant that these accounts 
provided a direct annual subsidy of $400bn annually for commercial 
banks borrowing Fed funds on the one hand and parking it back in the 
Fed with the other. e channeling of state-generated funds to the financial 
sector extends beyond banking institutions: because QE mainly supports 
the prices of financial assets while keeping interest rates at near-zero and 
relying on banks to provide liquidity to business in a contracted economy 
with small if any increases in wages, employment levels, and savings, the 
net effect is a relative increase in income to those holding financial assets—
preponderantly the wealthiest five percent of the population, and more 
emphatically so for riskier asset portfolios than for conservative ones. QE 
thereby sustained the primary dynamic of neoliberalism since the late-1990s 
of increasing concentration of income-share towards the very wealthiest 
via financialization (Bank of England, ‘e Distributional Effects of 
Asset Purchases’, 12 July 2012, www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/
Documents/news/2012/nr073.pdf; M.A. Gayed, ‘What Wealth Effect? 
QE Has Helped the Rich More an the Poor’, 21 October 2013, www.
minyanville.com/articles/print.php?a=52334).
10. Financial Stability Board (FSB), OTC Derivatives Market Reforms: Fi¶h 
Progress Report on Implementation, 15 April 2013, www.financialstabilityboard.
org/publications/r_130415.pdf. Cf. also Kaya, ‘Reforming’, 4–6.
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of risk-management and the provision of liquidity to 
all markets, what the crisis itself made palpable was 
that it is financial markets themselves that impose the 
systemic entrenchment and expansion of uncontained 
financial risk—contagion, as it is called—and in the 
service of that systemic requirement the reduction 
of liquidity within those markets in the  crisis 
required significant intervention by state agencies in 
order to maintain their general economic functioning. 
For example, Euro-American state support for banks 
in the year – alone amounted to $­tn (about ´ 
percent of global ). Furthermore, these quantitative 
factors have a categorial corollary: whereas sovereign 
monarchs presented the greatest threat to banks in the 
early capitalist banking system (that of defaulting on 
war loans), ‘today, perhaps the biggest risk to the sov-
ereign comes from the banks. Causality has reversed’.§ 
States are now subject to the distinct power of finance 
in a way they are to no other terrestrial entity (apart 
from other states, and climate change). 
Even as finance and the state system constitute a 
nexus of power, it is nonetheless internally riven by 
the threat presented by the power of finance against 
state sovereignty. 
11. FSB, Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, 25 October 2010, 8, 
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf.
12. A. Haldane and P. Alessandri, ‘Banking on the state’, first presented 
at e International Financial Crisis: Have the Rules of Finance Changed?, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago twel¶h annual International Banking 
Conference, Chicago, 25 September 2009, www.bis.org/review/r091111e.pdf.
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If finance (represented by banking or derivatives mar-
kets) presents a threat to states, the leading questions 
are: Why? What is finance power distinct from modern 
state sovereignty? Since ‘finance’ here is a euphemism 
for a systemic market-led dynamic organization of capi-
tal accumulation, these questions cannot be taken up 
in terms of the motivations, gains, and losses of those 
individuals who effectuate financial power and its vicis-
situdes. Such accounts render opaque the structural 
and consistent operations of capital accumulation via 
financial markets by personifying and pathologising 
the logic and imperatives of capital accumulation, 
looking past the particular technical and juridical 
innovations in structure and operation that advance 
market capitalization. What is required is instead a 
power theory of finance that must take its lead from the 
operational complexity of financial markets. Most of 
the following article is devoted to constructing such 
a theory by synthesising several heterodox theories of 
pricing, modifying each to fabricate a nonstandard 
general theory of price and of the political economy 
of finance. e primary matrix of the argument is 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshom Bichler’s identifica-
tion of capital as power, the outline of which is followed 
by a mainly descriptive summary of basic derivatives 
construction and operations sufficient to explain how 
derivatives structures led to the  financial crisis 
and, specifically, to the two Lessons elaborated above. 
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at overview also presents the primary features of 
derivatives operations in general, leading to the pri-
mary contention here, which is the identification of 
the schematic logic of derivative pricing as a variant 
of Jacques Derrida’s quasiconcept of différance. e 
theory of derivative pricing thereby formulated is then 
contrasted to a series of other accounts which serve 
to elaborate and give specificity to the historical and 
operational institutionalization of derivatives markets 
which mobilise a différantial logic, not least via the 
praxis of capitalization they inaugurate by constructing 
time and price relations through one another. Most 
significant here is the reorganization of the relation 
to the future via price in general—not just within 
the circumscribed arena of derivatives markets, but 
across the entire social order. e comparative analysis 
also serves to modify the Derridean determination of 
différance, the theorization mutating with the increas-
ingly specific elaboration of derivative operation. In 
particular, derivatives are shown to systemically opera-
tionalise an unprecedented modality of the wager that 
is intrinsic to the standard notion of betting but is 
theoretically and practically unavailable upon the basis 
of that standard notion. e specific determination of 
the financial condition of price returns to the initial 
power theory of price as instance of capitalization, 
therewith providing a comprehensive theory of the 
real of price determined not in relation to subjective or 
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sectorial terms but according to the universalising yet 
différantiating logic of capital-order’s construction and 
operation of power—finance-power. e general theory 
of price requires the theoretical articulation of the 
arkhéderivative, on which basis the basic categories of 
modern political economy are then reverse-engineered 
as manifestations of finance-power, concluding with 
the redetermination of the state-finance nexus and of 
political futurity in terms of price magnitudes.
In the identification of the complex practices, mech-
anisms, and institutions of contemporary capitalism in 
order to revector them purposefully out of it, the argu-
ment is broadly sympathetic to Le¶ Accelerationism.¬ 
at said, the general theory of price developed here is 
largely dedicated to the identification of capital-power’s 
complex constitution and organization, formulating its 
predication on finance, and to what that entails. e 
revectoring required to provide the requisite political 
tasks is le¶ to another occasion. Moreover, in addition 
to providing the comprehensive theory of capital-power 
necessary for any adequate formulation of a politics 
of Le¶ Accelerationism (or, indeed, any politics at 
all adequate to capital-power now), the following 
argument stipulates two significant reservations as to 
its current formulation that together serve to retrieve 
13. See R. Mackay and A. Avanessian (eds.), #Accelerate: e Accelerationist 
Reader (Falmouth and Berlin: Urbanomic and Merve, 2014). e premises 
and ambitions of Le¶ Accelerationism are proposed by Alex Williams and 
Nick Srnicek in ‘#Accelerate: Manifesto for Accelerationist Politics’ (347–62).
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Le¶ Accelerationism from its neohumanist tendencies: 
firstly, that Le¶ Accelerationism must abandon its 
(admittedly ambivalent) attachment to Marxian and 
labour-based determinations of capitalism and political 
economy, because these are not the prerequisites of 
capital-power in general but tendentious misapprehen-
sions of it (if such positions are not wholly incorrect 
with regard to the anthropological concerns they serve 
to articulate, nevertheless they are only incidental and 
partial consequences of capitalization, and not at all 
its operative or theoretical truth).° e proposition 
advanced here is rather that the routes to postcapital-
ism, and what that condition and its political economy 
can be, need to be instead determined in relation to 
‘the most advanced theoretical tools available today’. 
In practical terms, this now means finance in general, 
and derivatives in particular—not Marxism.¿ 
Secondly, though more ambivalently, the follow-
ing theorization of the extirpation of social norms by 
capital-power (a normativity that does not entail the 
destruction of social order but the chronic reinstitution-
alisation of a risk order) casts significant doubt upon 
the political and theoretical adequacy of a ‘neorational-
ist’ programme to the ambitions of Le¶ Accelerationism. 
at is, if neorationalism contends that social and 
14. Accelerationism’s ambivalence towards Marx(ism) is clearly presented 
in Mackay and Avanessian’s ‘Introduction’ to #Accelerate (37–42).
15. Quote from Williams and Srnicek, ‘Manifesto’, #Accelerate, 353, in 
reference to Marx.
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subjective norms can be progressively transformed 
by the pragmatic universalism of self-revising rational 
norms, that contention supposes both the authority 
of reason not only over conceptual thought but also 
over social norms, and also the revisability of social 
norms.À Yet, for reasons deduced below under the 
name of the risk-order as capitalization, both of these 
neorationalist prerequisites are at best questionable: 
for capital-power, though certainly not directed by 
theoretical reason, revises social norms to the point at 
which social norms lose efficacy altogether; authority 
of any kind is not a prevalent power-modality in the 
risk-order; and risk itself proscribes any tendential 
organization or universalist determination, however 
rationally determined and revisable, other than that of 
greater capitalization (whose rationality is not that of 
theoretical reason). In other words, without an accu-
rate and complex enough account of the transform-
ability of social norms on the side of the social itself, 
neorationalism is le¶ propounding a doctrine without 
traction. is is not to dismiss the neorationalist propo-
sition altogether, but it does effect an injunction: that 
neorationalism substantiate the relation between the 
construction and implementation of rational norms 
on the one side, and the vitiation of normativity on 
16. e neorationalist position is espoused notably by R. Brassier, 
‘Prometheanism and Its Critics’ (#Accelerate, 467–87) and R. Negarestani, 
‘e Labor of the Inhuman’ (ibid., 425–66) and, elsewhere, by Peter 
Wolfendale. See n.89 and 133 below.
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the other side—the side of the social order constituted 
by capital-power. If that articulation can be made, the 
argument here provides a basis for it.
.      
e power determination of finance sought here is 
theorized by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshom Bichler. 
In broad terms, Nitzan and Bichler propose that capital 
is directly power because it is ‘neither a material entity, 
nor a productive process, but rather the very ability 
of absentee owners to control, shape, and restructure 
society more broadly’—a control of productivity that 
involves the ‘entire spectrum of power institutions’, 
not least because the absentee ownership at its core 
requires complex and enforceable institutional struc-
tures across a society.Ì Capital accumulation is at once 
and necessarily a political fact. However, crucially for 
Nitzan and Bichler, the ‘spectrum of power institutions’ 
controlling productivity are not a well-organized and 
unified capitalist class, as a caricatural notion of a 
bourgeoisie might propose. On the contrary, the main 
conflict and power struggle in capitalism is between 
those accumulating capital, each of whom looks to 
do better than the other owners of capital. Capitalists 
do not just seek to accumulate capital nor (as liberal 
17. J. Nitzan and S. Bichler, e Global Political Economy of Israel (London: 
Pluto, 2002), 10.
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business dogma has it) to maximize profits, but rather 
to ‘beat the average’ represented by the normal rate 
of return.Í at rate is set not just by the standard 
instruments such as interest rates, but also by the rate 
of accumulation of every company and absentee owner, 
who are therefore competitors for capital. Nitzan and 
Bichler’s shorthand for accumulation by intracapitalist 
rivalry is differential accumulation, which also posits 
that accumulation for any one firm is locked into 
the spectrum of institutional arrangements at local, 
sectorial, or global scales.Ò e normal rate of return 
represents the last-mentioned global benchmark for 
differential accumulation, the index against which 
any capitalist can measure whether they are ‘beating 
the average’ or not. And, to return to its necessarily 
political dimension, it also indexes how the ‘economic’ 
activity of capital accumulation requires broad social 
cohesion: a normal rate of return supposes that ‘the 
underlying power institutions […] remain stable; the 
more stable these institutions, the more normal the 
rate of return, and vice versa’.§Ú 
Differential accumulation is a deceptively minimal 
axiom for what capitalism is extensively—as a system 
and method of capital accumulation, how it operates 
18. Ibid., 11.
19. For a summary of differential accumulation, see S. Bichler and J. Nitzan, 
‘Differential Accumulation’, in Dissident Voice, 28 December 2011 [bnarchives.
yorku.ca/324/02/20111228_bn_da_¶_lexicon_dv.htm].
20. Nitzan and Bichler, Israel, 13.
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systemically and in its aggregate or micro tenden-
cies—as well as intensively, per transaction and in 
the sectorial and individual (corporate or personal) 
instantiations of intracapitalist conflict. e general 
explanatory theory and logic it provides for capitaliza-
tion is however mostly based on geospatially organized 
and historical industrial-corporate capital accumula-
tion and power agglomeration, formations to which 
Nitzan and Bichler’s analyses are mostly dedicated. 
e question of the types and magnitudes of power 
combinations between financially-formulated capital 
and state sovereignty requires that this analysis and 
its terms be extended to the current operations and 
structures of finance markets. Nitzan and Bichler’s 
framework accommodates such an extension because, 
as noted above, for them capital is determined through 
absentee ownership, and this institutionally organized 
claim underpins not only bonds and corporate stock 
but also the derivatives contract. However, a more 
exact determination of the power theory of finance 
requires specification of the operational conditions of 
the logic of intracapitalist conflict on the basis of the 
two primary aspects of its systemic ordering: price and 
sabotage. Taking these in turn:
Price. Following orstein Veblen, Nitzan and 
Bichler propose that capitalists’ primary grasp of capi-
tal is only in relation to anticipated business earnings, 
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‘the discounted value of future earnings capacity’.§ 
Future earnings capacity is the expected flow of future 
revenues; the price paid now for that future income 
against the normal rate of return ‘discount[s] this 
flow into present value’. As already noted, the normal 
rate of return is set by ‘the entire spectrum of power 
institutions’, while future earnings capacity is ‘the 
consequence not of productivity as such, but of the 
control [emphasis added] of productivity’, which in 
turn relies upon the particular historical and legal 
configuration of that power spectrum. e discount 
price formula thus reformulates differential accumula-
tion as a specific magnitude, given as a price. Irving 
Fisher’s (­) generalisation of discounting formulas 
provides this last identification: price is the ‘abstract 
financial magnitude’ of a ‘pecuniary asset’, the latter 
being ‘merely a claim on earnings’. In short, price 
‘tells us how much a capitalist would be prepared to 
pay now to receive a flow of money later’.§§
Price, then, is core to the capitalist cosmology 
as an organising index of differential accumulation. 
It is ‘merely the unit with which capitalism is ordered’, 
capitalization being the pattern of that order. is 
cosmology is not just ordered but moreover constituted 
21. is and two following quotations are from Nitzan and Bichler, Israel, 10–
11. e outline of Veblen’s argument from the early 1900s is from Israel, 31–34.
22. is quotation and those following in this subsection are from J. Nitzan 
and S. Bichler, Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder (London: 
Routledge, 2009), 151–6. 
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by price and pricing rather than being the substantial 
source of the revenue that is priced: ‘bonds, corporate 
shares, preferred stocks, mortgages, bank accounts, 
personal loans, or the registered ownership of an apart-
ment block are simply different incarnations of the same 
thing: they are all income-generating entities’, as is 
production capacity, fixed or variable capital, corporate 
structures, and other material terms. Capital accumula-
tion is on each occasion organized only by and for its 
final cause: anticipated earnings. (‘Final cause’ is not 
Nitzan and Bichler’s formulation.) All conditions for 
those earnings are primarily apprehended as pecuniary 
assets. e fungibility of the pecuniary asset as condi-
tion for capitalization will be taken up below in the 
elaboration of derivatives contracts. More immediately, 
Nitzan and Bichler’s theory of price explains three 
primary characteristics of capitalization central to the 
political economy of derivatives and their markets:
(i) Indexing the power of ownership indifferently to 
the specifics of what is owned, prices qua abstract 
financial magnitudes are ‘uniform across space and 
time’: prices from one region at one time can be 
compared and translated to prices from another time 
and place. anks to the fungibility of what is thereby 
priced, price provides a universal and transhistorical 
equivalence; and, in thereby presenting a ‘single 
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quantitative architecture that cuts across time and 
space’, capitalization is world-historical.
(ii) As the measure of an ownership claim on future 
revenues, price is an exact index of differential accu-
mulation, which is to say: of social power. rough 
price, capitalists understand their exact place in the 
order of power, which is thereby quantitatively organ-
ized: price is the ordering element of capitalization. 
Such ordering should not, however, be confused with 
stasis or structural fixity. To the contrary: because 
what matters in capitalization is not what is priced 
but rather increasing the magnitude of price qua 
financial abstraction, for all its ordering and uni-
versality price structures the dynamic reordering 
of power, countermanding traditional (notions of) 
social order:
Prices enable entirely new ways of reordering soci-
ety. What previously required military conquest can 
now be done through currency devaluation[…]. 
[T]he highly malleable nature of prices—i.e., their 
remarkable ability to go up and down—makes 
capitalism by far the most dynamic of all histori-
cal orders. In fact, in capitalism change itself has 
become the key moment of order.§¬
23. Nitzan and Bichler, Power, 153.
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(iii) Price is then the medium of power in capitalism. 
Capitalism is, in short, a dynamic power-ordering 
organized through price as its measure/medium of 
order and reordering (a doubling that Nitzan and 
Bichler call capitalism’s creative order or ‘creorder’). 
Put otherwise, price is the index and medium of 
a transformative power-rationality whose specific 
historical organization is a result of intracapitalist 
conflict. at always sociohistorically specific strug-
gle is fought through the abstracting universality of 
price as much as through given and sought-for social 
arrangements, all of which are therefore transitional.
In every instance, the delocalising and dematerialising 
abstraction wrought by capitalization is the condition 
for, and the effect of, the universal and dynamic social 
reordering of power qua differential accumulation. On 
this account, ‘all that is solid’ does not ‘melt into air’, 
but is ordered via abstract financial magnitudes in 
and as a power-rationality that is the political real of 
capitalization.§° All political mobilisation consequently 
24. ‘All that is solid’ refers to the characterization of capitalism’s abstracting 
and deracinating effects in e Communist Manifesto, Ch.1. Capitalism’s 
abstraction of material conditions is characterized as the spiritualization or 
ghost dance of fetishism in the commodity analysis presented in Capital 1, 
Ch.1 §4. While both instances exemplify at source a general Marxist 
tendency, explicitly articulated in this section of Capital 1, to accuse 
capitalism of mystifying the labour theory of value that is its concrete truth, 
such theories are in fact themselves obfuscations of capitalization qua 
pricing. e tendentiously spectral-literary characterization of capitalism 
has been revived in relation to Marx by Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx, 
tr. P. Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994 [1993]), and in relation to finance 
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has to determine its real and its own capacity with 
regard to the quantification of power as price—an 
initial indication of how the power theory of capitali-
zation adapted here takes leave of Marxian doctrine, 
a divergence that will become more emphatic as the 
analysis proceeds through the specifics of derivative 
structures and operations.
Sabotage. Differential accumulation names the logic 
and dynamic of intracapitalist conflicts, more colloqui-
ally formulated as ‘beating the average’. ere are two 
effectively equivalent ways to meet this imperative: 
increasing ownership over future earnings—which is 
what pricing does—and/or ensuring that other firms 
do not accumulate as much as they otherwise could. 
e latter operation happens in two ways: sectorially, 
by J. Vogl, Specter of Capital, tr. J. Reder and R. Savage (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2015 [2010]).
Alfred Sohn-Rethel proposes that capitalism is a ‘real abstraction’ or 
‘real subsumption’ constituting a material-social-cognitive real that it also 
indifferently deracinates. See Intellectual and Manual Labour, tr. M. Sohn-
Rethel (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:  Humanities Press, 1979), a thesis extended 
by Maurizio Lazzarato in the mid-1990s to affect (‘Immaterial Labor’, tr. P. 
Colilli and E. Emory, in P. Virno and M. Hardt [eds.], Radical ought in 
Italy [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996]), and influentially 
taken up by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 254ff. A variant of the formal abstraction 
thesis—in which capitalism transforms a preexisting reality that is more 
authentically constituted in other, more immediate terms—is upheld by 
Nitzan and Bichler themselves in their affirmation of Cornelius Castoriadis’s 
notion of the ‘magma’ of human creativity irreducible to capitalization as 
the condition for a political counterpower to the latter (Power, 20ff.). at 
said, it is however also Castoriadis’s theorization of the nomos as the 
semantically organized institutional order of a society that provides the 
basis for identifying capitalization axiomatically rather than by material 
particularities, labour, or consumption (Power, 148–50).
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competing firms’ capital accumulation has to be dimin-
ished compared to one’s own; globally, it requires 
‘limiting the average rate of growth of profit’ in order 
to secure a differentially greater accumulation per firm 
against the average rate. Nitzan and Bichler identify this 
intrinsic and necessary diminution of overall growth 
as the sabotage wrought by business, the latter term 
meaning ownership of capital accumulation.§¿ 
Sabotage is the socioindustrial correlate to pricing, 
a systemic characteristic of capitalization, which now 
has to be understood as the diminishing of aggregate 
social productivity (that Veblen calls ‘industry’): for 
example, taking out competitors or limiting technical 
or institutional capacities with patent restrictions. is 
holds for interfirm rivalry per sector as it does in the 
global and sectorial dimensions, which are all thereby 
interlinked: sabotage is a determinant of the normal 
rate of return, which indexes the systemic organiza-
tion of the spectrum of power. Extending sabotage to 
encompass broader social organization and pricing: 
the very existence of this ‘normal’ [rate of return] 
enables even the most insignificant actors to exercise 
their ‘natural right’ for universal sabotage. Since indi-
vidual capitalists, however small, can always earn the 
normal rate of return by simply owning a diversified 
portfolio, they have no reason to produce at less than 
25. Nitzan and Bichler, Power, 246–7.
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that rate. […] In accepting the normal rate of return 
as a minimum yardstick below which production 
should not be extended, they effectively propagate 
sabotage—even when they themselves do not have the 
differential power to back it up. Sabotage becomes 
invisible, ‘business as usual’ as they say.§À
As a systemic condition, differential sabotage mani-
fests itself in diverse social arrangements including 
unemployment, inflation, wage restraint, social fragil-
ity, education policy, immigration regulation, etc. In 
general terms, the normal rate of return indexes the 
fact that, contra Marxist and Neoclassical accounts, 
capitalists do not accumulate capital by seeking to 
maximize profits by increasing production, innovation, 
and consumption, but that differential accumulation 
requires compromising production as such. Business 
is then not just unproductive but, moreover, necessar-
ily counterproductive—as are capitalist societies overall 
and in general.§Ì
Price and sabotage, then, are respectively the finan-
cial and industrial operators of differential accumulation. 
It is core to Nitzan and Bichler’s theorization that these 
aspects are not held apart as distinct dimensions of 
the social totality, with the first being treated by eco-
nomics and the second under the banner of a politics 
26. Nitzan and Bichler, Israel, 38.
27. Nitzan and Bichler, Power, 249.
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incommensurate with the former. Rather, price and 
sabotage are coeval and mutually determining, directly 
constituting the organization of power across society at 
every scale as a necessarily integrated political economy.§Í 
is point will prove to be a primary determinant of the 
ontology of finance and so requires further attention. 
Nitzan and Bichler establish that price directly 
indexes the political economy of capitalization by 
generalising Gardiner Means’s observations of how 
businesses fared in the Great Depression.§Ò Means 
demonstrated that concentrated industries, which 
are inflexible and set ‘administered prices’ relatively 
unresponsive to market conditions, increase their share 
of differential accumulation against competitive firms, 
whose ‘market prices’ are more responsive to changing 
market conditions. is because the prices and profits 
of the former ’respond[ed] only partly or not at all to 
market conditions’, instead fixing a ‘long-term target 
rate of profit and then back-calculat[ing] the mark-up 
necessary to realize this rate of return over the long 
haul’. Consequently, prices and profit for such firms 
during the Great Depression resulted in relatively small 
declines in prices correlated to sharp drops in produc-
tivity and employment. In contrast, firms setting ‘mar-
ket prices’ had smaller relative drops in employment 
28. Distinct in this to both Neoclassical liberalism and Marxism: cf. Nitzan 
and Bichler, Power, 13 and Ch.8.
29. is paragraph paraphrases Nitzan and Bichler, Power, 241–2.
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and productivity, but took a larger hit on profits. For 
Nitzan and Bichler, this demonstration of differential 
accumulation via price-setting strategies makes explicit 
that the administering price according to mark-ups 
‘already embodies the power to incapacitate’ the social 
order. at power of fiat pricing can be identified with 
Michal Kalecki’s notion of a ‘degree of monopoly’, 
which ‘measures the consequence for relative profit 
margins of monopolistic institutions and forces’, that is, 
the degree of power concentrated in a firm relative to 
the entire spectrum of social institutions.¬Ú e mark-up 
of ‘administered prices’ is then not only directly the 
power to incapacitate by competition and the ability or 
not to own at a given price; it is also the direct measure 
of the firm’s concentration of power in the entire social 
spectrum. e key theoretical consequence is that if 
price-setting advances differential accumulation via 
both accumulation and the concentration of social 
power, then prices set the market. 
.     
Administered prices make explicit that price is the 
medium of capital accumulation qua power-ordering. 
Accumulation/sabotage is organized by the absen-
tee ownership of assets, which is not ownership of 
production but of price-setting. is is what power 
30. See too Nitzan and Bichler, Israel, 39n.11
Collapse 8.indb   653 27/11/2014   15:40
COLLAPSE VIII
654
is in capitalism. By definition, such power is held by 
capitalists; more salient than this sociological truism 
is the fact that finance is the structural and constitu-
tive condition for that power. Determined initially as 
the absentee ownership and pricing of assets, finance 
is also the basis for capitalism’s durable yet dynamic 
revision of ownership and pricing of assets, as well as 
the broader institutional structures of capitalization, 
at three levels simultaneously:
at the most basic level, it allows owners to lever tech-
nical change […] as a tool of power. At a higher level 
it lets them use the monetary symbols of prices and 
inflation to restructure power. And at a still higher 
level, and perhaps most importantly, it permits them 
to reorganize power directly, by buying and selling 
vendible ownership claims.¬
In contrast to other manifestations of social power, the 
market of vendible ownership claims—financial mar-
kets, whether or not they are explicitly characterized as 
such—structure institutions according to the primary 
‘generative order’ of capitalization, a ‘formula [that] is 
special in that it doesn’t specify what [capital-power] 
should look like’. Indifferent to the specifics and quali-
tative particularities of how power is organized, mar-
kets and pricing predicated on finance enable social 
31. Quotes in this paragraph are from Nitzan and Bichler, Power, 306–7.
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reshaping and reformatting ‘in innumerable ways’ that 
‘no other ruling class has ever been able’ to undertake. 
It is thanks to finance that the market is the condition, 
instantiation, and medium of the indefinitely variable, 
anonymising, and fungible capital-power. Or: finance 
is the condition and means of capital-power, and capi-
tal ‘is finance, and only finance’.¬§ 
As the structural condition of capitalization, finance 
logically precedes it; and capitalization itself precedes 
(and exceeds) economics as the constitutive and neces-
sary politics of that restricted regime. Or, inversely: 
economic practice is a restricted theoretical and practi-
cal rendition of capitalization, and capitalism is only 
a particular order of financialisation, meaning that it 
is not the only possible one. e analysis and politics of 
capitalization advanced here requires that it is finance 
that is the a priori of all historical and theoretical 
determinations of ‘industrial capital’. Contrary to 
how Marxian and Neoclassical doctrines determine 
prices to be set by interfirm rivalry given exogenous 
conditions (such as supply-demand, labour and capital 
costs, consumption, etc.),¬¬ such that the supposed 
priority of the latter casts finance capital as parasitical, 
supplementary, or ‘fictitious’,¬° according to the power 
32. Nitzan and Bichler, Power, 262; see too Israel, 36.
33. Nitzan and Bichler, Power, 239.
34. Marx adopted the common if ill-defined mid-nineteenth century term 
‘fictitious capital’ in his notes from the 1860s–80s, edited by Engels as Capital 
3 (M. Perelman, Marx’s Crises eory: Scarcity, Labor, and Finance [New York: 
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theory of price, financially-set prices are the primary 
elements for the dynamic organization of capital-power. 
Praeger, 1987], Ch.6). Introduced in Chapter 25 of Capital 3 to designate 
bills of exchange contrasted against trade or exchange, fictitious capital 
is distinguished in kind from real capital via the paradigmatic example of 
interest-bearing capital (Ch.21). e owner of an interest-bearing loan does 
not transform the lent money into productive capital via commoditization 
or trade, nor is ownership of the money transferred to the borrower who 
makes use of it. Without commodity or monetary ‘metamorphosis’ in the 
M–C–M’ concatenation, or the promulgation of social reproduction (that 
is, channeled through labour), for Marx the initial sum ‘ceases to function 
as capital’ in its ‘reflux’ back to its original owner with interest. As such, 
even if the borrowed money is real capital because it is transformed via 
commoditization, the initial loaned money is but a fictitious capital (which 
is also why money itself is not necessarily capital but only when it is in 
the process of social reproduction). Marx generalises the distinction to all 
prognostications of future income that do not proceed via the commodity 
form under the name ‘capitalization’, which is the ‘formation of fictional 
capital’ (Ch.29). e danger of capitalization for Marx is that the money-
owner does not recognize that income is accrued from social processes 
but takes it wholly formally, ‘something with automatic self-expansion 
properties’. Accordingly, Lapavitsas follows Marx in differentiating 
between interest-bearing loanable capital, which is ‘a hard reality of the 
capitalist economy’, and fictitious capital, by which he takes Marx to 
mean capitalization via the discount price formula (Profiting, 28–9, 161), 
but he also thereby discards that either route is an equally valid modality 
of capitalization for the money-owner seeking returns primarily with a view 
to where greater returns can be made—a process that, pace Marx, is not 
desocialised but, precisely, sociohistorically immersed in differential 
accumulation. Loren Goldner, for whom capitalization is the current value 
of future income, argues that fictitious capital is the primary determination 
of capitalism since the 1970s because of the effective marginalization of 
labour in dominant economies over the period. Consequently, overcoming 
capitalism requires not a labour-based struggle but the abolition of 
fictitious capital and the value-form, a proposal shared with Endnotes’ 
call for communization (n.129 below) despite Goldner’s other theoretical 
disagreements with them (‘Fictitious Capital and the Transition Out of 
Capitalism’, 2005, home.earthlink.net/~lrgoldner/ and ‘Once Again, On 
Fictitious Capital’, 2003, home.earthlink.net/~lrgoldner/onceagain.html). 
While not a Marxist, Hudson deploys the notion of fictitious capital mainly 
to describe the growth of ‘paper wealth’ over the interests of the capitalism 
of industrial production (‘From Marx to Goldman Sachs: e Fictions of 
Fictitious Capital’, 30 July 2010, michael-hudson.com/2010/07/from-marx-
to-goldman-sachs-the-fictions-of-fictitious-capital1/).
Collapse 8.indb   656 27/11/2014   15:40
Malik—Ontology of Finance
657
at this renders untenable any distinction between 
finance capital and a putative ‘real capital’ ostensibly 
predicated on conditions exogenous to finance does 
not prevent analysis of how the financial sector impacts 
the nonfinancial sector. Quite the opposite, in fact: 
finance necessarily promulgates sabotage in general, 
meaning that it is an inherently counterproductive 
power. e capitalization of business earnings ‘rep-
resents nothing but incapacitation’; or, contrasted to 
price as an abstract financial magnitude, ‘capital is a 
negative industrial magnitude’.¬¿ To extend Nitzan 
and Bichler’s formulation, the positive determination 
of price qua ‘abstract financial magnitude’ is on the 
other hand that it directly indexes capital-power’s 
ordering and reordering. 
Taking  to be a proxy of the aggregate repre-
sentation of earnings at a state scale, the comparisons 
presented in the introduction above indicate that the 
power magnitude of derivatives markets as a whole 
have now exceeded that of most nation-states. States 
have of course been the principal matrix of politi-
cal modernity since the establishment of the power 
supremacy of state sovereignty with the ­ Treaty 
of Westphalia. If derivatives markets and states are 
now of the same order of magnitude of capital-power, 
this signals that sovereignty is no longer the supreme 
power in the quantitative regime of capitalization, but 
35. Nitzan and Bichler, Power, 249.
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must contend with finance power on a more or less 
equal footing—and states are increasingly outpriced. 
As Haldane and Allessandri recognise, at this histori-
cal juncture dominant power consists in the power of 
finance-markets as much as (if not more than) in state 
sovereignty (the ‘as much as’ here is meant literally: 
their respective capital-powers can be gauged by the 
magnitude of each as aggregate ‘pecuniary assets’). 
at combination forms an organizational and opera-
tional nexus of dominant power that can, for ease of 
recognition, be called neoliberal governmentality. Such 
governmentality is a quasi-statist power formation 
which, while it is in part constituted by the established 
configuration of modern statehood, at the same time 
corrodes its primacy, as exemplified by two interrelated 
transformations in its primary structures: firstly, the 
size of contemporary finance capital, as well as its 
‘interconnectedness’, require a transnational organiza-
tion of legislative and regulatory conditions for finance. 
Consequently, territory as the spatial extension of 
state power is not an adequate basis upon which to 
contend with finance-power today. Put otherwise, the 
jurisdictional powers of nation-states are interlocked 
with the transnationality of contemporary finance 
power, corroding the boundedness and autonomy of 
their sovereignty (hence the importance of interstate 
organizations such as the Bank of International Set-
tlements and the Financial Stability Board, which are 
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at the forefront of these transformations). Secondly, 
the power supremacy of sovereignty in authority, up 
to and including military and police powers, is now 
subject to the reordering wrought by capital-power 
and conditioned by finance. e magnitudes of this 
latter power are now large enough to substantially 
supervene on sovereignty as the final term of statehood 
and regulatory institutions.
e state-capital nexus transforming modern 
statehood is but one consequence of the dynamic 
power-rationality wrought by capitalization. Finance, 
to repeat, is the structural and operational a priori of 
capital-power’s reordering—an aprioricity here called 
capitalization’s financiality, operationally tantamount 
to prices being set only as a mark-up against other 
prices. e trading of contracts for future exchange of 
the ‘absentee ownership of assets’ in financial deriva-
tives markets explicitly demonstrates this condition. 
While it therefore seems that the operations of finance 
markets concretely instantiate the a priori financiality 
of capital-power, now transactionally liberated from 
the alibi or convention of the commodity, service, or 
income stream as exogenous condition for pricing, any 
such identification has to be cautiously made. While 
the a priori financiality of capital-power is the systemic 
condition for capitalization, the finance markets are 
practical and institutional operating mechanisms and 
facts of capital accumulation. at is, though finance 
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markets are certainly constituted by the financiality 
that conditions capitalization and its power-rationality 
(its transcendental condition, in critical philosophical 
terminology), finance markets cannot be directly identi-
fied with financiality in general without category error 
or subreption, because the former are an institutionally 
specific sector of capitalization. However, maintain-
ing the distinction between financiality as condition 
of capitalization and financial operations presents a 
problem for the argument regarding the redistribution 
of power between finance markets and states: the cat-
egorical distinction between financiality and financial 
operations advanced here means that the shi¶s in the 
relative power magnitudes between the finance markets 
and states do not necessarily index transformations in 
what power is, in power types. Consequently, the state-
finance nexus could be deemed to be wholly coherent 
and to mark no significant change in power: just more 
of the same in another guise. But the caution here is 
not a proscription: the task of this essay is to articulate 
and integrate the two dimensions of finance—as a priori 
condition and as a historical fact—without directly 
identifying them. Yet it also seeks to demonstrate that 
finance markets and derivatives in particular are the 
truth of capital-power as endogenous capitalization 
made explicit in practice. And it is on this basis that 
the typological mutations of dominant power between 
finance markets and states can be explicitly identified. 
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In order to do that, more detailed elaboration of the 
operations, logic, and structure of derivatives markets 
is required.
.. :  
e myriad derivatives structures prevalent in finance 
markets are of course only constructed and deployed 
in the service of accumulation by trading. Apprehend-
ing the principal strategies of trading provides an 
operational basis for understanding their construction, 
outlined in the next section, leading in turn to the 
determination of the specific logic that has reordered 
political economy and power ontology in the wake of 
the growth of finance markets since the early ­s. But 
in advance of that, some basic structure and terminol-
ogy need to be elaborated. 
In their simplest standard (Neoclassical) formula-
tion, derivatives are contracts between two parties 
whereby one side pays out a mutually agreed amount 
(the ‘delivery price’) if circumstances specified in 
the contract take place at a designated termination 
date (‘maturity’ or ‘expiration’).¬À e eventualities 
may be those of prices (of a commodity, company 
stock, interest rates) at some determined point in the 
36. e technical account in this section paraphrases elements of the 
leading derivatives textbook in English:  J. C. Hull, Options, Futures, and 
Other Derivatives: Seventh Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice 
Hall, 2009), Ch.1.
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future, of cash flows or payment defaults, or other 
non-monetary eventualities—for example, the weather 
(snowfall determining skiing conditions and therefore 
revenue for a resort, a month of rain for agricultural 
production), livestock populations and disease, tech-
nological innovations, and so on. e contracted claim 
is contingent in a double sense: firstly, it depends upon 
an eventuality independent from and external to the 
contracted price, which is known as the underlying 
asset (sometimes reduced to ‘the underlying’); secondly, 
in the prevalent sense in which the term is understood 
in derivatives markets, the eventuality upon which the 
payout depends may or may not be occasioned, mean-
ing that the contract will lead to a gain or a loss by one 
party or another, but without certainty as to who will 
be the gaining/losing party. Gains or losses are made 
dependent on whether the price agreed in the contract, 
the delivery price, is higher or lower than the market 
price of the underlying (the ‘spot price’) at maturity.
ere are three principal distinct strategies of deriva-
tives trading: arbitrage, hedging, and speculating.
Arbitrage is trading across markets in order to secure 
riskless gains. For example, buying an asset in one coun-
try to sell in another to take advantage of the price dif-
ferentials and exchange rate across the markets. ere 
are no costs for the arbitrageur other than transaction 
costs. Such trading, however, quickly eliminates the 
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differentials from which gains can be made, meaning 
that arbitrage opportunities are self-limiting. 
Hedging reduces risks on a given investment either 
by locking down prices of assets on a future transac-
tion with a ‘forward contract’, or by offsetting risks of 
price movement of owned assets in one direction by 
making gains from counter-movements of price. Hedg-
ing insures against variations in fluctuating financial 
rates and contingencies in supply-demand levels (crop 
yields, fuel prices, interest rates, monetary instability, 
etc.) and stabilizes contract prices.¬Ì Hedging also 
introduces a risk, because the delivery price set by the 
forward contract may not be equal to the spot price at 
maturity, to the cost of one of the signatories.
Speculation, by contrast, is accumulation by trading 
on market-generated price movements. e speculator 
buys or sells derivatives contracts in view of the gains 
to be made on the interplay of the current prices of 
the underlying, a corresponding derivative, and the 
difference between the delivery price and the spot price 
at expiration (the ‘strike price’), doing so sometimes to 
acquire assets at less than market price. e latter strat-
egy gives the speculator much greater leverage than 
the investor or shareholder who trades in the under-
lying asset or security at market price. Furthermore, 
because speculators make gains by market trading, 
37. For hedging as a market-based insurance mechanism see R.L. McDonald, 
Fundamentals of Derivative Markets (Boston: Pearson Addison Wesley, 2009), §2.5.
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their primary interest is in the prices of the assets and 
financial instruments rather than the underlying assets, 
the latter being immediately resold in order to realize 
them as only ‘pecuniary assets’. 
As speculation demonstrates especially clearly, 
derivatives markets in general are not markets for 
vending underlying assets external to them at their ‘live’ 
price, nor for investment, which looks to make gains 
by taking a share of profits or revenues made by the 
underlying asset as an element of industry, agriculture, 
and production (in short, in the ‘real economy’). is is 
o¶en the basis for criticism of speculation, along with 
its maximising market leverage of financial instruments 
over the non-financial sector, leading to distortions in 
pricing across all markets as well as a disregard for the 
fate of the underlying asset and ‘the real economy’ it 
represents. Defenses of speculation are based on its 
‘absorption of risk’ since (i) the vending of financial 
instruments is based on anticipating higher returns, 
and (ii) speculation is the other side of hedging: the 
hedge that anticipates and insures against prices move-
ment presumes a speculator who accepts the risk of the 
differential between spot and delivery prices as worth 
bearing. Moreover, since speculation exploits the price 
differentials (spreads) over time as well as between 
buyers and sellers prices, speculation ‘bridges’ these 
differentials, providing liquidity to markets where 
exchange and trade would otherwise diminish.
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What is important here is that the derivative contract 
and therefore its market is dependent on the underly-
ing in one regard only: whether or not the conditions 
stipulated in the contract are met. While the prices of 
the shares or equities of a company—and therefore 
investment in it—depend on the history and pathway 
of its profitability, productivity, growth, energy and 
resource costs, and so on, the payout of a derivative 
is determined solely by the terms set up by the con-
tract. Unlike in investment, in speculation gains can 
be made from decreasing profits, a market crash, or a 
food shortage, if that is what the contract stipulates 
and regardless of any other consequences. Moreover, 
the underlying is but an occasion for drawing up 
derivatives contracts, their anonymous material. e 
historical, material, or qualitative particularity of the 
underlying is irrelevant beyond the price conditions set 
in the contract, as is its fate once the contract expires. 
By virtue of this endogeneity of accumulation by pric-
ing contracts, and despite the frequent use of the 
terms ‘investor’ or ‘hedge fund’ to designate activity 
on derivatives markets, ultimately it is speculation that 
is the defining category for all derivatives contracts 
and their markets.
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.. : 
Trading in derivatives markets relies on the opera-
tionalisation of financial instruments that practically 
compose them. is section presents a rudimentary 
elaboration of the primary mechanisms of derivative 
contracts, from which the general operational logic of 
finance markets can be extracted. It is this latter logic 
that will permit the institutional operation of finance 
markets to be articulated with financiality as the a 
priori condition for capitalization, in turn allowing the 
transformation of power wrought by these markets to 
be grasped. Four basic structures are presented here 
in order of increasing complexity: forward contracts, 
futures, options, and swaps. ough swaps were key 
instruments in the systemic dynamics leading to the 
 financial crisis, for reasons given below, the specu-
lative logic of finance is most evidently demonstrated 
by forward contracts and options, which will therefore 
be the main analytical focus.
A forward contract is the most straightforward finan-
cial derivative mechanism: the agreement to buy or sell 
an asset at a certain price in the future.¬Í e contract 
itself is traded off-exchange and costs are borne at 
maturity. Agreeing to buy the asset is called the long 
position, while agreeing to sell it is the short position. 
e agreed price is called the delivery price (denoted K); 
38. Hull, Options, Ch.2.
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the actual price of the asset at maturity, when it will be 
traded, is the forward price (denoted S). In its standard 
account, the contract is made in view of the likely dif-
ference between delivery and forward prices yielding 
a profit or loss for one of the parties. In general, if 
the spot price is more than the delivery price then the 
long position makes a gain and the short position a 
loss. e gains and losses are reversed if the spot price 
is less than the delivery price. Put schematically, if the 
spot price of the asset at time t is St, then:
—the long position (having agreed to buy the asset) 
at time t is worth St – K
—the short position (having agreed to sell the asset) 
at time t is worth K – St
Illustration
Imagine the cover price of C is set in response to demand. 
A forward contract is made at time tÚ for delivery of §¿ copies 
of C with a delivery price of ¿ÚÚ Local Currency Units 
(lcu), anticipating a market price of §Úlcu on its long-awaited 
publication.
Over time t the spot price St of C increases from §Úlcu 
to §°lcu because that issue of C will include a new essay 
by Quentin Meillassoux.
At maturity, the long position immediately sells all §¿ copies at 
the market price at time t, making a gain of §¿ × (§°−§Ú) = ÚÚlcu, 
a profit of §Ú percent (excluding transaction costs for setting up 
the contract).
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is straightforward illustration demonstrates that 
derivatives are so-called because they stipulate a price 
in relation to the spot price which is itself set by the 
market in the underlying (here, the impending issue of 
C). What the relative simplicity of the forward 
contract also exposes is the exogeneity of the underly-
ing to speculative accumulation: while the cover price 
of C in the illustration is set by content-related 
demand, the speculator taking the long position has no 
interest in Meillassoux’s essay itself, as demonstrated 
by her immediately selling the acquired copies of C-
 at the market rate at maturity. is is a necessity 
of speculative accumulation: there is no pecuniary gain 
unless the acquired asset is converted into revenue 
(taking an interest in the content of the publication by 
holding a copy of C back from the market to 
read it reduces the overall income). at is, while in this 
case it is Meillassoux’s reputation that drives up the 
price of the underlying of the forward contract in the 
imagined competitive market, the speculator is inter-
ested only in the increase in price for whatever reason. 
For example, increases in printing costs could lead to 
the same gains for the speculator even if they mean a 
reduced net income for Urbanomic. e derivative is 
Equally, at maturity the short position sells an asset then priced 
at ÀÚÚlcus for the forward price of ¿ÚÚlcus, bearing a loss of ÚÚlcu 
at the current market rate.
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exogenous to the causes for price movements of the 
underlying other than how they shape the pricing of 
the underlying. Speculation by derivatives is in gen-
eral content-indifferent, which, again, is why it is not 
investment. It depends only on the spread between the 
forward price and the spot price at maturity, the latter 
being set by the market for the underlying.
Futures contracts are forward contracts whose trade 
is guaranteed not by the counterparties but by the 
exchange on which the contract is made, as is delivery 
date (to the month). Traded on an exchange, prices of 
futures contracts vary according to ‘market forces’:¬Ò 
the delivery price of an asset (K) goes up if more 
traders take a long position (that is, agree to buy an 
asset at a future date at delivery price) than short 
positions on it. e contract is then less profitable for 
the long position in relation to an anticipated increase 
in the spot price (St−K decreases or is negative), but 
more profitable for the short position (K−St increases). 
Equally, the preponderance of short over long positions 
(i.e., more selling than buying of contracts at a given 
delivery price in expectation that K is too high) drives 
the delivery price down. 
In other words, futures markets price forward 
contracts according to the derivative markets’ price 
movements as well as those of the underlying in its own 
market. Because of this ‘self-correction’, the futures 
39. Hull, Options, §2.3.
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market is speculative in the sense that it ‘rewards’ 
risk-taking on contingent claims: greater gains are to 
be made betting on a delivery price before there is a 
preponderant view that it is set too low and before the 
price of the underlying asset rises to meet it. In the 
standard account (which will be usurped below), both 
long and short positions are taken in their respective 
expectations of making a gain by advantage of this 
spread. As for forward contracts, these anticipations 
are obviously contradictory (they cannot both be right), 
but their common condition is that the eventuality 
upon which a gain or loss is occasioned depends upon 
the strike price which is necessarily and constitutively 
unknown at the time the contract is made. Insofar as 
that unknown comes to be determined by the pricing 
of the underlying in its primary market, the derivative’s 
exogenous relation to that price is that of a traditionally-
conceived wager: the throw of the dice does not depend 
on the bet made upon it, nor does the speed of the 
raindrop dripping down a window. By this account, 
derivatives are then but wagers on a price differential 
over time, an interpersonal and subjectively-constituted 
reckoning on circumstances external to the wager itself, 
predicated upon the non-knowledge of the future.°Ú 
40. See J.M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London: Macmillan, 1921), 
Ch.2, for probability as a determination of the degree of rationality of 
a subjective ‘belief’ in an as-yet-uncertain proposition given known 
propositions (evidence). Following the early analytical philosophy of his 
immediate milieu, probability for Keynes is however the degree of rational 
belief between propositions (as ‘objects of knowledge and belief’) and not, 
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e endogenous price movement of the futures mar-
kets is akin to odds on a bet getting shorter or longer 
depending on what other bets are placed.
As will be seen below, whether derivatives are 
wagers and, if so, what kind of wagers they are, is a pri-
mary determinant of the power ontology concomitant 
to capitalization’s financiality. By way of previewing 
that extended discussion, it need only be noted that 
condemnation of derivatives markets as nothing but 
‘wagers on the movement of prices’, prevalent a¶er the 
 crisis, was common enough at the time of the 
establishment of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
() and its institutionalisation of futures trading in 
­· (elaborated further below).° Gambling—legally 
defined as a contract settled in cash only—was however 
proscribed in Illinois at the time, a restriction circum-
vented with paradigmatic consequences by specifying 
that any futures contract must be able to be settled 
by physical delivery of the underlying itself, even if 
in practice ‘delivery was seldom demanded’.°§ at is, 
derivatives were legally sanctioned by securing them 
as with the wager on future contingencies proposes, between propositions 
and events.
41. D. MacKenzie, An Engine Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape 
Markets (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 14–15, 144–5, and 252 for the 
quoted characterisation.
42. MacKenzie, Engine, 145. e vicissitudes of establishing institutional 
derivatives market in the United States and the struggles of its proponents—
notably, founder of the CME Leo Melamed—to differentiate it from 
gambling is presented in MacKenzie, Engine, Ch.6.
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as an attenuated mode of trade in the underlying to 
which they refer, thereby recusing the exogeneity of the 
derivatives contract to the trade in the underlying. is 
inhibition to the development of derivatives markets 
was removed in the  with a ­ Senate ruling that 
it was precisely the cash settlement of derivatives trad-
ing that demarcated futures contracts from trading on 
stock indices such as the Dow Jones, a distinction cor-
relative to their regulation by the Commodity Futures 
Commission rather than the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (), which itself cleared the way for the 
regulatory variances between derivatives markets and 
stock markets.°¬
Options are contracts for the right to buy (call) or 
sell (put) underlying assets without necessarily hav-
ing to trade the underlying asset at the agreed price 
(now called the ‘exercise price’ or ‘strike price’) by 
the agreed date (the ‘exercise date’ or expiration).°° 
Unlike forward contracts, there is a contract fee for 
making an option which is lost if the option is not 
taken. Options are primarily instruments for hedging. 
e call option (the right to buy) on the underlying is 
purchased (long position) in anticipation of the price 
of the underlying asset increasing from the strike price. 
If it does not, the trader has to make the calculation 
as to whether the loss from taking the long position is 
43. MacKenzie, Engine, 172.
44. Hull, Options, Ch.1.
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greater or less than the loss made from the difference 
between the spot price and the strike price. e put 
option (the right to sell) is purchased anticipating a 
fall in price. To take the short position—to sell either 
call or put option at a later date—is to write the option: 
cash is taken upfront in exchange for the counterparty’s 
right to buy/sell the option, taking the consequence of 
losing out on the gains (or not taking what would be 
losses) of the underlying at the option’s expiration. For 
the trader writing the option, it is more profitable to 
sell the option for a gain then hold on to the security 
and sell it at a lower price. However, it may be that if 
the increase in the price of the security is less than that 
in making the initial option trade, the option is not 
exercised and the trader writing the option holds both 
the initial contract fee and the asset at an increased 
price, which they can then immediately sell.
Illustration
Anticipating C will publish a new essay by Quentin 
Meillassoux in three months and generate an upward surge in 
Urbanomic’s share prices (listed as URB), a trader takes a long 
position on ÚÚ call options (that is, purchases the right to buy) 
for URB shares at a strike price of ¿Úlcu a share. e exercise date 
is four months from taking the position.
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URB’s current share price is °¿lcu and the option price is 
§lcu. e notional value of the option is ¿ÚÚÚlcu but the actual 
credit exposure of the derivative contract—the price of the option 
itself—is §ÚÚlcu. 
Four months later:  Meillassoux’s article proves to be of great 
importance and URB’s equity price rises to ¿¿lcu per share at the 
option’s expiration date. 
Exercising the right to buy URB shares at the exercise date  
(and immediately selling them on the market on which it is  
listed) results in a gain of ¿ÚÚlcu (the gain per share is ¿¿−¿Ú = 
¿lcu × ÚÚ shares). Subtracting the option price of §ÚÚlcu and 
excluding transaction costs, the net gain for the trader taking  
the long position on the call option on URB is ¬ÚÚlcu. at is,  
the trader makes a ¿Ú percent profit on the option a¶er  
four months. 
e counter scenario is that if, say, Meillassoux’s article is 
superannuated before the option’s expiration by the publication 
of a devastating pre-critique of his long-anticipated L’Inexistence 
Divine, URB’s equity price drops to °¬lcu per share. 
Having taken the long position on the call option with a strike 
price of ¿Úlcu per share, the trader faces the prospect of then 
making °¬−¿Ú = −Ìlcu per share. 
With the option having been taken for ÚÚ shares, this would 
lead to a net loss of ÌÚÚlcu. At that point, it is a smaller loss for 
the trader to not exercise the call option and just lose the initial 
outlay of §ÚÚlcu.
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is illustration is formulated with the trader taking 
the long position on the right to buy the security (the 
call option), but there are four basic combinations for 
option positions: long or short positions on call or put 
options on the underlying. 
ough fully established as financial instruments 
since the inauguration of derivatives exchange trad-
ing in mid-seventeenth century Amsterdam and in 
London half a century later, option pricing was the key 
instrument for sanctioning the institutionalization of 
derivatives markets with the establishment of the Chi-
cago Board Options Exchange in ­· and the stand-
ardisation of pricing with the Black-Scholes-Merton 
If the loss from exercising the call option is less than the 
loss from not doing so, then it is still worth exercising the  
call option:
Even though Meillassoux’s article is theoretically redundant, 
continuing interest in it and other material in C leads to 
URB’s share price climbing to ¿.§¿lcu by the expiration date.
e trader then makes §¿lcu (¿.§¿−¿Ú = .§¿ per share × ÚÚ 
shares) if the call option is exercised.
ough this is less than the §ÚÚlcu to take the long position 
on the call option, the net loss of Ì¿lcu (§¿lcu from exercising 
the call option at a market price of ¿.§¿lcu less the §ÚÚlcu for 
taking the long position) is still a smaller loss than not exercising 
the call option (§ÚÚlcu).
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model (elaborated in §´ below). at institutional 
consolidation overcame the ‘close correspondence 
between option contracts and gambling’, wherein 
legislation on the latter, dating as far back as the 
Romans, set precedent for legislation on the former.°¿ 
e multiple routes for payout on the option are initial 
indications of the multiplying paths constructible with 
this class of derivative, the fabrication of which broadly 
constitutes the field of financial engineering. Options 
with straightforward payoff schedules are designated 
‘plain vanilla’; ‘exotic options’ have more complex 
payoff structures structured by more or less elaborate 
composite of sequenced expiration dates, conditional 
45. G. Poitras, ‘e Early History of Options Contracts’, in W. Hafner 
and H. Zimmermann (eds.), Vinzenz Bronzin’s Option Pricing Models (Berlin: 
Springer, 2009); see also MacKenzie, Engine, Ch. 5. e first modern 
legislation on options was passed in 1697 to address various manipulations 
of price-setting on exchanges in London, and to distinguish it as a regulated 
market against its Amsterdam rival. e history of these derivatives can 
however be tracked back to before these modern mercantile institutions to 
ales of Miletus who, in Aristotle’s account (Politics 1259a), demonstrated 
that rational philosophy at its origin could generate wealth if the 
philosopher so chose. ales reserved olive presses in the winter ahead of 
what he predicted by the rational calculation of astronomy would be a large 
harvest, renting them in the subsequent harvest ‘on what terms he liked’ 
thanks to the indeed bounteous yield of olives. For ales, the purpose 
of this early demonstration of speculative hedging was that philosophers 
have other interests than wealth generation, a lesson that continues to be 
observed in the hostility to instrumental rationality; for Aristotle, precursor 
here to Kalecki, it serves as an example of ‘taking an opportunity to secure 
a monopoly [that] is a universal principle of business’, a determination that 
gives priority to the political economic result of ales’s demonstration 
and overlooks his primary lesson that reason is posits a contingent 
relation to the future qua financialisation in the service of capital-power, 
exposing at the origin of philosophy the latter’s identity with instrumental 
reason from which philosophy is then only contingently and not 
necessarily distinguished.
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expirations, linkages between different assets, options, 
and criteria, the locking in and out of exit routes from 
the option, and so on.°À
Swaps are highly complex off-exchange () 
futures contracts whose underlying is not asset prices 
but cashflows.°Ì Invented in the early ­s, swaps 
exchange advantageous rates in different markets 
to hedge income streams by each party effectively 
paying for the other’s cashflow via an intermediary 
financial institution. Example: a firm able to obtain 
preferential terms in fixed interest rate markets wants 
to borrow funds at a variable rate or for a shorter term 
than is available in the fixed-rate market. Swapping 
the preferential loan in the fixed-rate market for a 
loan obtained by another agency in the variable-rate 
market advantages not only the first company but also 
a counterparty seeking what, for it, is a preferable rate 
on the fixed-rate market. Because both comparative 
advantages are compounded in a swap, the net cost of 
the swap is less than that of the total notional amount; 
in the example above, both parties pay a lower rate 
of interest than that on the loans each has originated, 
46. e vanilla/exotic terminology is attributed to Marc Rubinstein and 
Eric Reiner’s 1992 detailed inventory of complexly structured options. 
See Exotic Options, Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-220 
(Stanford: University of California at Berkeley), www.haas.berkeley.edu/
groups/finance/WP/rpf220.pdf.
47. Hull, Options, Ch.5. See also M. Greenberger ‘e Role of Derivatives in 
the Financial Crisis’, Testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
Hearing, US Senate, 30 June 2010, fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/
fcic-testimony/2010-0630-Greenberger.pdf.
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resulting in an effective saving or income equal to 
the difference between the preswap cashflow and the 
swapped cashflows. is gain is split between the 
swap’s counterparties. Currency swaps similarly take 
advantage of varying terms in different currencies, and 
swap contracts extend also to commodity markets, 
exchanging variable spot prices over a duration with 
a stable fixed price. 
Calculated only in terms of their notional amount, 
swaps are detached from any relation to nonfinan-
cial assets. Swaps make explicit qua market instru-
ments the abstraction and exogeneity of derivatives 
from the nonfinancial dimension of the underlying, 
a structural condition of the  financial crisis. 
Exchanging repayments across financial markets, swaps 
interconnect those markets at the point of their pri-
mary revenue: a credit-based income stream into the 
future. Unlike forward contracts or options, the loan 
generating the cashflow of one party of the swap has 
to be in place before the swap is made. A position in a 
swap can be ‘warehoused’ by the intermediary financial 
institution until a suitable counterparty is secured as 
its second ‘leg’. A default on that initial loan by one of 
the counterparties transfers liability of the credit risk 
to the financial intermediary. e intermediary institu-
tion, which takes on a structural role, also composes 
the swap, thereby providing an ersatz insurance to 
either party in case of a default in the cashflow of the 
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counterparty, and taking a systemic role in the emer-
gence and consolidation of the swaps market. 
Despite the exchange-like properties of the swaps 
markets, their insurance-like operation, and the 
‘financial calamities’ generated by unregulated swaps 
markets, including the default of California’s Orange 
County in ­ and the collapse of the Long-Term 
Capital Management hedge fund in ­,°Í extensive 
political pressure in the  leading to the Commodities 
Futures Modernization Act of  exempted swaps 
48. Orange County, California, declared bankruptcy in 1994 a¶er suffering 
losses to its various funds from large, unhedged positions in interest rate 
derivatives (Mackenzie, Engine, 223; the following account paraphrases 
Ch.8 of Mackenzie’s book). Long Term Capital management (LTCM) 
was the poster-child of financial trading in the mid-90s, boasting Scholes 
and Merton on its Board and generating annualized returns of up to 40 
percent (a¶er fees) via arbitrage of small differentials between fixed-income 
long-term bonds such as government debt. e Russian financial crisis of 
Summer 1998 caused a market-wide ‘flight to safety’, to ‘safe’ long-term 
government and corporate bonds that formed the backbone of LTCM’s 
trading strategy. Its positions were pressured both by extant widespread 
mimicry of its strategies across the financial sector, reducing its trading 
advantage, and by self-replicating divestments across the market in response 
to the crisis. Despite advanced hedging and risk-diversification strategies, 
the combination of these factors led to highly correlated losses across 
its portfolio. Providing liquidity to cover those losses from a leveraged 
position—that is, borrowing money to make trades and returning it (with 
interest) upon their completion—of about 27:1 (which, while large, was 
typical of large investment banks at the time) required it to divest from other 
positions at the wrong moment in the structured portfolio. Counterparty 
trading and divestment by LTCM’s clients (which included most of the 
large investment banks) led to yet further losses. By late-September 1998, 
LTCM’s capitalization was unsustainable, with liabilities of $100bn on an 
equity dropping from $2.3bn to $400m over that month. Because immediate 
liquidation of LTCM’s securities would have led to a significant and 
systemic drop in market prices, the New York Fed orchestrated a $3.6bn 
recapitalization and buy-out of LTCM by the major American investment 
banks in September 1998.
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from being traded on exchanges, proscribed their 
standardisation by statute in favour of regulation by 
trade bodies, and even excluded the statute itself as 
a basis for legal challenges to swaps.°Ò Consequently, 
swaps did not have meet any of the requirements of 
more formal insurance (a sector regulated by statutory 
bodies)—in particular, the requirement that the seller 
have adequate capital to service the default payment. 
e result of this sectorial activism was threefold: the 
increasing systemic centrality and interconnectedness 
of financial intermediary institutions in providing 
credit in general, the lowering of the price of credit 
swap arrangements which reduced its net cost, and the 
expansion of credit beyond any limitations imposed 
by reserve requirements. 
e mid-s financial crisis was a direct conse-
quence of the expanded role and systematicity of the 
intermediary-led systematisation of credit in which 
the role of Credit Default Swaps () was crucial. 
Invented by JP Morgan in ­, a  is a form of 
insurance against default on a loan and the consequent 
loss of income for the lender.¿Ú e buyer of a  pays 
a premium to a seller to take on an underlying loan 
49. Greenberger, ‘Derivatives’, 5–6.
50. Details of JP Morgan’s invention of the CDS are given in G. Tett, Fool’s 
Gold (New York: Free Press, 2009), Ch.3. Tett notes how, by 1996, JP Morgan 
had persuaded the leading US Federal Reserves to reduce the credit reserve 
requirements of major financial institutions on the basis that the derivatives 
dispersed risk, making any one institution less susceptible to credit default (49).
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in case a ‘credit event’ (such as default) leaves the 
lender carrying the credit exposure. at is, the buyer 
displaces the costs of the default of some designated 
credit to another party, and removes the loan as a 
liability from the buyer’s balance book. If there is a 
default, the seller of the  takes possession of that 
credit and the buyer receives compensation equal to 
its stated cost. In this eventuality, the buyer of the  
gets reimbursed for the underlying loan—the insur-
ance against default—and the seller pays to take the 
credit off the buyer’s hands, leaving the seller with a 
double cost: the unpaid debt itself and the payout to 
the buyer. In case of no credit event, the seller receives 
the premium payments to maturity. In short, the credit 
risk is hedged. e  is similar to insurance in case 
of loan defaults, except that (i) the seller of the  
holds the risk of credit default without holding the 
credit itself; (ii) the seller can sell the protection without 
capital reserves to compensate the buyer; and (iii) the 
buyer need not have any ownership claims over the 
underlying loan nor any direct insurable interest in it. 
ese latter positions are ‘naked’ s, the buyer and 
seller constructing the swap around a ‘reference bond’ 
that is owned by neither party of the swap, doing so 
in order to speculate on the reference bond’s financial 
viability. Without any ownership requirements, one 
underlying can be the reference bond for multiple 
naked s. Despite the evident credit risks of such 
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structures, financial establishments and regulators 
supported the development of the naked  market, 
again in the interest of increasing liquidity for the 
reference bonds: the increased number of sellers and 
insurance-like structures against credit defaults enabled 
a greater number of credit event risks to be bought, 
and also greater flexibility (and therefore efficiency) 
in the market for risk, increasing the overall size—now 
meaning the credit exposure—of the market. 
To return to the introductory comments above, 
then, the  financial crisis was generated by the 
‘credit event’ of defaults on s, the underlying of 
which consisted of interlocked mortgages, the latter 
being by far the largest credit market in the  and . 
e amplification of this latter credit default by naked 
 derivatives which themselves could not be set-
tled—the financial intermediaries not having to provide 
capital reserves to do so—explains in part the size of the 
crisis;¿ its systemic nature is a result of the interlocking 
of credit by financial intermediaries via swaps, exposing 
51. Greenberger notes that though only three percent of the notional 
amount of a swaps transaction is at risk as credit exposure, ‘a credit default 
swap’s insurance-like aspects mean that if a default is triggered, the entire 
amount of the sum guaranteed is at risk’ (‘Derivatives’, 11)—which is why 
the diminishing of the size of the derivatives markets from its ‘face value’ to 
its credit exposure, as in the introductory comments above, is not always 
warranted. Combining the lower estimate of $35tn of outstanding CDSs 
in September 2008 with three percent of the rest of the remaining swaps 
market ($565tn), Greenberger arrives at a total sum for the credit exposure 
of the swaps market alone at the time of the financial crisis, wryly adding 
that ‘even using the most conservative figures for the sake of argument, 
$52tn is a very large figure’—equal to world GDP that year. 
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the credit risk thereby built into the financial system as 
distributed, uncontained, and without adequate capital 
backing. e result: systemic default. Furthermore, the 
deregulation of the  sector in  stripped out 
its supervisory containment and capacity to prosecute, 
making it, in the words of the chair of the  in , 
a ‘regulatory black hole’.¿§ 
.. :   
is rudimentary exposition of the derivative mecha-
nisms leading to the  financial crisis provides some 
operational explanation of its causes and outlines the 
material conditions for the two Lessons identified in 
the introduction. Yet this is not sufficient in itself to 
address the questions posed by the analysis of capital-
power: What mutation in modern power-rationality, if 
any, is instituted by finance-power? And to what extent 
is capital-power’s constitutive financiality instantiated 
by these facts of financial operation, whose magnitude 
and global systemicity became explicit only in  as 
an incontrovertible problem of power determination 
for the modern state settlement? To address these ques-
tions a formulation of the logic of finance is required 
that at once schematises its variety of practices and 
instruments in relation to the constitutive financiality 
of capital-power, and also delineates their common 
52. Christopher Cox, cited in Greenberger, ‘Derivatives’, 10.
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power ontology with respect to state formation. As 
will be seen, that determination is directly instantiated 
as pricing.
e distinctive feature of all derivative structures, a 
feature explicitly demonstrated by forward and futures 
contracts, is that they are constructed and traded on 
the basis of a price differential. Trading strategies also 
exploit price differentials—across markets in arbitrage, 
but also in time across one market for hedging. At the 
simplest level of derivative construction, the delivery 
price of the forward contract (K) anticipates the future 
price of the underlying asset (St); more complex deriva-
tive structures take other factors into account (option 
cost, cashflow dynamics, etc.). e primary question 
for derivative pricing, then, is how the delivery prices 
K are set for derivatives, given that they can only 
be anticipations of future eventualities that must be 
unknown at the time the price is set but which, per 
the doctrine of market rationality, are nonetheless 
supposed to determine the asset price. e answer is 
straightforward but wholly counterconventional. It 
is not that markets set the delivery/exercise price but, 
as with Means’s administered prices, that the contract 
constitutes the price differential between delivery and 
strike prices at a specified future moment in time. 
Or, in another, equivalent formulation: the contract 
defers the trade of the underlying in order to insti-
tute the price differential and, conversely, the price 
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differential specified by the forward contract is simul-
taneously a deferral of the exchange of the underlying 
asset. Put schematically: the forward contract defers 
exchange to constitute a price differential for an under-
lying asset in time or across markets, just as its positing 
of that differential defers immediate vending of the 
asset. A deferred differential, a differentiating deferral: 
différance, in Jacques Derrida’s terminology.
Taken out of its native philosophical element, Der-
rida’s term and its logic serve here only to crystallize 
the operational constitution of derivative pricing. In 
formal terms, this logic is as follows: as noted, dif-
férance combines difference and deferral. Each term 
is constituted by the other: difference here is not a 
difference between already established positive terms 
(A and B) that assumes their presence, which is, for 
Derrida, the metaphysical mistake of Western thought. 
Rather, différance emphasises ‘one of the two themes 
of the Latin differre’ in a way that the more conven-
tional ‘difference’ does not: namely, ‘the action of 
putting off until later, of taking into account, of taking 
account of time and of the forces of an operation that 
implies an economic calculation, a detour, a delay, a 
reserve, a representation—[in short]: temporization 
[temporisation]’.¿¬ Constituted by their différantiation, 
53. J. Derrida, ‘Différance’, in Margins—of Philosophy, tr. A. Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 1982 [first delivered 1968]), 8, for this and the 
next two quotes. Translations here and elsewhere are slightly modified. 
Temporization looks to capture the sense of delaying or time-passing rather 
Collapse 8.indb   688 27/11/2014   15:40
Malik—Ontology of Finance
689
differentiated terms ‘detour’ through one another to 
establish their quasi-positive but necessarily incomplete 
determination, a deferral of their self-identification that 
is a delaying or spacing (espacement) of any alleged 
selfpresence to itself, an ‘itself’ that therefore never 
arrives as such. e differentiated terms are only ever 
quasiestablished because of the constitutive deferment 
of their distinct identities (qua plenitudinous presence). 
‘e a [of différance] comes more immediately from 
the present participle (différant) and brings us closer 
to the action of “differing” that is in progress [emphasis 
added], even before it has produced an effect that 
is constituted as different or as difference’. Deriva-
tives constitute price differentials precisely according 
to this différantial logic of temporization, which is 
no less their operation: the delivery or exercise price 
is not the price as and when the contract is drawn up, 
and without the noncoincidence of the delivery price 
with the strike price there could be no derivative but 
only spontaneous vending. Addressing the différantial 
constitution of the present, Derrida remarks that ‘an 
interval must separate the present from what it is not 
for it to be itself, but that interval which constitutes it 
as present must also in the same blow divide the present 
than the general order of time (temporality). e ‘economic calculation’ 
Derrida mentions in this quotation is in the general sense of the term of 
a dynamic configuration of interdependent diverse and varied elements, 
not any specific determination of monetary or fiscal economy such as, here, 
finance capitalism.
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in itself’.¿° Substituting ‘price’ for ‘the present’, the 
identical scheme holds for the derivative: an interval 
must separate the price of the underlying from what it 
is not (that is, the delivery price) for the derivative to 
be itself, but that interval constituting the derivative 
(as distinct from exchange of the underlying) divides/
defers/detours the present of the derivative between/
across its signing and maturity. Consequently,
différance is what makes the movement of the deriva-
tive market [Derrida has ‘signification’] possible only 
if each element that is said to be ‘priced’ [Derrida: 
present], appearing on the stage of price [presence], 
is related to something other than itself but retains 
the mark of a past element and already lets itself be 
hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future 
element. is trace relates no less to what is called 
the future than to what is called the past, and it 
constitutes what is called the present by this very 
relation to what it is not.
For Derrida, that trace of différance is the necessar-
ily ineffable temporising constitution of the present; 
here, in the dimension of finance, it is the derivative 
contract. e identification of its logic takes a further 
step with the substitution of price for ‘space’ in the 
elaboration of the temporising trace: ‘constituting 
54. is and the next two quotes: Derrida, ‘Différance’, 13.
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itself, dynamically dividing itself, this interval is what 
could be called pricing [Derrida: spacing]; the becom-
ing-price of time or the becoming-time of price’. at 
is, the ‘interval itself’ is the derivative qua pricing 
contract: the becoming-price of time or the becoming-
time of price. In short, derivative pricing is différantial; 
or, derivatives are a différantial pricing.¿¿ It is not that 
55. Samuel Weber proposes a religiohistorical deconstruction of 
money as credit-implement in the view of the 2008 crisis in Geld ist Zeit: 
Gedanken zu Kredit und Krise (Zurich-Berlin: Diaphanes, 2009; English version 
available at www.complit.u-szeged.hu/images/weber_-_money_is_time.
pdf). Weber’s hybridisation of money, temporization, and modern finance 
as inheritor of a (Max) Weberian Protestant ethic in order to spiritualise 
the determination of finance (as a secularized perpetuation of Protestant 
Christianity, per Walter Benjamin’s half-thesis on capitalism) is discarded here 
for reasons stated in n.24 above. More salient is Brian Rotman’s identification 
of the deconstructive conditions of finance in the proliferation of ‘xenomoney’ 
of offshore American currency—Eurodollars—that precipitated the exit from 
the Bretton Woods monetary regime in August 1971 when the US took 
the dollar of the goldpeg that had anchored the post-war Euro-American 
settlement (Signifying Nothing: e Semiotics of Zero [New York: St Martin’s 
Press, 1987]). For Rotman, the inconvertibility of money to anything outside 
of itself leaves it ‘signifying’ only in relation to future states of itself, including 
the ‘purely financial dynamics’ of futures currency markets (93–96). Rotman 
identifies such endogenously constituted signification with Derrida’s excision 
of a ‘transcendental signified’ as condition for the sign opening the space of 
language qua world of floating signification. e identification is however 
at best only analogical for Rotman, a ‘structural morphism’ (103). e 
contention of the present essay, however, is that while the size, growth, and 
intensity of modern derivatives markets were monetarily facilitated by the 
removal of the gold barrier (as recognized by Milton Friedman in his 1971 
paper sponsored by the founders of the Chicago futures market and dedicated 
to legitimating its establishment [MacKenzie, Engine, 145–48]), the Derridean 
logic is directly that of the derivative contract and its market operationalisation; 
and then is it the truth of money qua creditory relation (see §11.3 below). 
e latter truth is espoused by Modern Money eory, for which the 
common establishment of creditory basis of money, as its ‘unit of account’, 
is uniquely a state operation, its fiscal sovereignty: see É. Tymoigne and L. 
R. Wray, ‘Money: An Alternative Story’, in P. Arestis and M.C. Sawyer (eds.), 
A Handbook of Alternative Monetary Economics (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006).
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the derivative records a price movement against a 
calibrating price—a theorization which, as will be seen, 
dominates their institutional practice maintaining as 
it does the supposed secondariness of derivatives to 
pricing in the ‘real economy’—but that it instantiates/
implements the intervallic differentiation characteristic 
of différance in terms of pricing. Here temporization 
is the condition for speculative accumulation. 
e proposed identification is not, however, total. 
Derrida follows Levinas in extending the past of the 
trace into an absolute past, an alterity that is constitu-
tive of the present, but irrecuperable to any self-present 
and hence irremediably anterior to it. Such a past is a 
necessity because the différantial constitution of the 
present is a logically anterior condition to presence 
and therefore temporally precedes it. e trace qua 
derivative contract is, by contrast, only the finite and 
instituted différantial organization of pricing, organ-
ized and utilized for capital accumulation without the 
sacrality guaranteed by the absolute past. Furthermore, 
while presence-constituting différance is a general 
metaphysical condition corroding any paradigm privi-
leging or presupposing presence as its condition—for 
example, in the Western tradition, (phenomenological 
and psychoanalytical) consciousness, semiotics, ideal-
ism, empiricism, etc.—derivatives are but regional 
manifestations of différantial price-constitution. In par-
ticular, if ontology in the Western tradition presumes 
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presence as its condition and term, derivatives are not 
preontological (that anteriority being one of Derrida’s 
primary claims for différance); rather, their ontology 
consists of a binding and enforceable contract that 
is constituted by statute. at is, the institution of 
derivatives is the constitution of price différantiation.
..   
e logic of derivatives qua différantial pricing is that 
of their institutional construction. e schematic form 
of différantial pricing just presented consequently 
facilitates several praxical implementions of capital 
accumulation. ough some of these configurations 
may affirm the différantial organization of pricing as 
such, others effectively delimit it by coding it in abne-
gating formats. ese various historical-institutional 
determinations of derivative pricing are advantageous 
to the present analysis because they give a specific 
shape to the schematic account of the constitutive 
logic of derivatives just outlined, thereby enabling both 
that logic and those particular configurations to be 
analytically and politically situated rather than taken 
for granted. In turn, the power-ordering of capitaliza-
tion as constructed (which is not yet to say constituted) 
by finance will then be able to be similarly situated.
ere are four stages in the demonstration of the pol-
itics of différantial pricing: ­. Its standard account, in 
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which derivatives are but speculative tracking descrip-
tions of the price-development of a referent external 
to the derivative—an anticipatory constative model of 
exogenous pricing that commences from the present; 
. Its constitution of complex modes of intrinsically 
temporal and social binding of the present in which 
the necessary uncertainty and ignorance of the future 
takes priority, instituting a sociorational ordering of 
risk in which all price determinations are continually 
revised; ·. As a wholly endogenous pricing and opera-
tionalisation of an unprecedented mode of betting, in 
which derivative pricing refers only to its own market 
in a counterperformative act that makes explicit the 
occasional condition of its exogenous reference and of 
the ‘real economy’ for price and capital-power; . As 
absolute, when the endogeneity of différantial pricing is 
extended to exogenous pricing processes external and 
putatively ‘primary’ in relation to derivative markets. It 
is with this last step that the derivatives pricing opera-
tions of financial markets are articulated with the a 
priori financiality of capitalization. With that final step, 
the identification of the specificity of capital-power’s 
reordering of power is made explicit—not only in the 
conceptual-philosophical determination of price tem-
porization, but also in two praxical renditions: firstly, 
that derivatives are a new kind of wager; and, secondly, 
that the key technical term ‘price volatility’ indexes the 
ontology of derivatives pricing within and beyond its 
Collapse 8.indb   694 27/11/2014   15:40
Malik—Ontology of Finance
695
institutional operations. As will be seen, each of these 
coextensive determinants of pricing—temporization, 
the wager, volatility—undergo substantial modification 
in the course of the analysis, because modern financial 
institutions inaugurate unprecedented modalities and 
practices of each, not just reordering power in the 
state-finance nexus as they do so, but actually recon-
stituting it.
.  :  
 -- 
Markets for financial rather than commodity derivatives 
have been massively operationalised since their institu-
tionalization with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
() and Chicago Board Options Exchange () 
in ­–·, almost contemporary with Derrida’s theo-
retico-philosophical identification of the logic of diffé-
rance. As mentioned, the  could only be sanctioned 
by the Illinois regulatory bodies if futures trading was 
not a form of gambling, a stipulation which required 
settlement by delivery of the underlying rather than 
cash.¿À CME executives obviated the injunction with 
a three-pronged response: firstly, the underlying could 
be delivered if it was anyway a financial object such as 
foreign money in currency trading (Deutschmarks to a 
56. e institutional history in this section paraphrases MacKenzie, Engine, 
Ch.6.
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trader’s German bank, for example), as advocated by 
the  (a market that was historically inaugurated 
precisely by the flexible exchange rates consequent 
upon the decline of the fixed-rate Bretton Woods 
system), or a market in stock options, the certificates 
of which could in principle be delivered to the trader, 
a route preferred by the . Secondly, legitimating 
the proposals through personal and political-academic 
validation, eagerly provided by Milton Friedman at 
the University of Chicago; and, thirdly, formalising 
the pricing process in order to remove the guesswork, 
characteristic of gambling, as to what unknown future 
prices will be. is formalisation was developed by 
Fisher Black and Myron Scholes from the late ­s, 
and mathematically extended by Robert C. Merton in 
the early ­s. Even though it is highly restricted in its 
assumptions and applicability, the Black-Scholes-Mer-
ton () equation has been the orthodox, integrally 
acknowledged, and massively operationalised pricing 
model of derivatives markets since the inauguration 
of the modern derivatives exchanges.¿Ì at institu-
tional consolidation has been warranted specifically 
by the formalisation’s determination of derivatives 
as constative predictions of price movements exog-
enous to the derivative, for which the price that the 
57. MacKenzie, Engine, Ch.5 presents a nuanced appreciation of BSM’s 
theoretical development of precedents formulated by Louis Bachelier in 
1900 and Edward O. orp in the 1960s, as well as the contingencies leading 
to its institutional innovation and ramifications.
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derivative is written is an initial boundary condition. 
e putative predictability of options price move-
ment—that is, as ahead of but secondary to the ‘real’ 
movement of prices happening elsewhere—was thus 
key to obviating the statutory objections to the politi-
cal institution of derivative exchanges. e follow-
ing schematic overview of the  equation not only 
serves to explicate the standard options pricing model, 
allowing its countertheorization to be better located; it 
also directly exposes the praxical instantiation of the 
standard economic doctrine of modern capital-power 
in its ordering of différantial pricing and temporization. 
Each aspect of the exposition informs the other: the 
countertheory of price being established here proposes 
that the standard ratio of pricing is in fact vitiated by 
the very financial operations that are supposed to be 
constituted by it, doing so, as will be demonstrated, 
even beyond the confines of institutionalised deriva-
tives markets—that is, at every instance of pricing, 
e assumption of  is that price is a variable 
measure of what wares are worth to their users.¿Í 
58. In the technical terms of marginal utility theory, value is derived from 
‘the utility that an individual derives from the consumption of a quantity 
of a particular good […] determined by his or her subjective assessment 
of the pleasure, or satisfaction, derived from consumption’, its price being 
given by the monetization of that exchange (J.E. King and M. McLure, 
‘History of the Concept of Value’, preprint from International Encyclopedia 
of the Social and Behavioural Sciences [Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming], 6, 
www.business.uwa.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/2478883/14-06-
History-of-the-Concept-of-Value.pdf). Inaugurated by Jevons, Walras, and 
Menger in the early 1870s, and institutionalized in Western Europe and 
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Meaning that prices are measures—that is, descriptors—
of changing conditions external to prices themselves 
over time (what Means called ‘market prices’). How-
ever, derivatives prices explicitly factor the uncertainty 
of future prices into the pricing calculation as their 
precondition—no gains or losses could be made with 
a derivative if the delivery price could be guaranteed. 
According to this account, future prices are at best 
calculated guesses constructed from the known price 
at the time the derivative contract is made. ey are a 
constative anticipation of the price development of the 
underlying (exogenous to the derivative’s pricing) in 
the US a generation later by Pareto, Marshall, Böhm-Bawerk, and others, 
marginal utility theory forms the basic premises of Neoclassical doctrine by 
formulating price setting as a dynamically constituted equilibrium through 
exchanges made by a subjectively-constituted referent whose ‘desires’ are 
exogenous to the market (namely, the utility of the good to the consumer 
who is maximising their utility outside of the market itself). e utility of 
a particular item qua subjective demand for it tapers out with increasingly 
ready availability while, on the supply side, artificially high prices on readily 
available wares can always be undercut by rival suppliers. Equally, scarce 
goods are highly priced because their scarcity makes them more desirable 
to a consumer wanting to maximise her or his utility qua consumption, 
and so each such good requires the consumer to exchange her or his other 
wares having less marginal utility in order to acquire the good with greater 
marginal utility (the bartering of many ubiquitous goods for a small number 
of precious items is a basic example of this exchange). e market is then 
dynamic and flexible, changing according to the interests of the consumers 
and quantitative provision of wares until equilibrium is reached as prices 
meet demand. Adaptable as the theory is to changing situations and needs 
of consumers and provision to determine price-setting, its presumptions—
the utility-maximising consumer for whom exchange is but barter in 
however attenuated a fashion—contrast starkly with Nitzan and Bichler’s 
formulation for which the luxury good is a luxury only because it is highly 
priced, irrespective of its use-value, production costs, or—as will be seen in 
§10 below—even its exchange ‘value’.
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the period up to expiration.¿Ò e insurmountable yet 
structuring difficulty of this formulation is that such 
anticipatory pricing is in each instance only a reckoning 
with the ‘next step’ of a price development that is in 
fact unknown. e problem is resolved by formulating 
différantial pricing as a stochastic process, for which 
the fluctuations of a particular element of the system 
cannot be predicted (in this case, the ‘next’ price of the 
underlying; in physics, paradigmatically, the position or 
velocity of an individual particle in a gas). e account 
of aggregate systems-development given the ‘random 
walk’ of its elementary units places two stipulations on 
its formalisation: that succeeding states of elements in 
the system are discontinuous from preceding condi-
tions, and that the future states of the system cannot 
be exactly predicted but only described probabilistically, 
meaning a statistical determination of the path devel-
opment of the system both in its individual elements 
and in aggregate. Such processes require a calculative 
model distinct from Laplacian systems, for which the 
59. Although the BSM formula is the paradigmatic model for this regime 
of pricing, the operationally equivalent Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) 
binomial tree is the more widely-used formalisation (J.C. Cox, S. Ross, and 
M. Rubenstein, ‘Option pricing: A simplified approach’, Journal of Financial 
Economics,  7.3, 1979, 229–63). Option price movements in this model are 
calculated by a discrete-time branching (a ‘lattice’) of probabilities of 
prices increasing or decreasing at a certain time increment. Each resulting 
probability is a new node for the further calculation of price movements. 
Consequently, a¶er a few iterations, several branches in the probability tree 
can lead to a given price. While the paths actually taken by the option can 
only be specified upon expiration, the increasing or decreasing probability 
of price movement gives the trader a predictive range of routes.
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path development of every element in the system can 
be directly predicted if the initial conditions are known, 
as in Newtonian mechanics. 
e first stipulation of ‘memoryless’ path develop-
ment is known as the system’s Markov property, which 
means broadly that the system’s past does not influence 
the operations and dynamics of its current state;ÀÚ the 
second stipulation is characteristic of Wiener processes 
(a¶er Norbert Wiener, cybernetic pioneer), the best 
known of which is Brownian motion of particles. Tak-
ing market pricing as a Wiener process, the uncertainty 
of the actual movement of a price in the future is 
rendered as a probability—a bounded and calculated 
anticipation—which, by necessity of its mathematical 
modeling, can only go up or down by a certain bounded 
percentage at ‘the next step’ given the initial price. 
us the trader exchanges contracts on the basis of 
probabilities that say nothing about the past or future 
in fact or in principle. e anticipation of price move-
ment, the measure of changing ‘market forces’, is both 
memoryless and, given its unpredictability, futureless. 
60. For example: the boiling point of water remains the same under constant 
external conditions irrespective of whether it has previously boiled or been 
frozen or neither; similarly for the next coin toss, dice throw, or spin of the 
roulette wheel, if they are not loaded. Or, in the standard caveat of financial 
funds, ‘past performance is no indication of future results’. Put otherwise, 
knowledge of any state of a Markov process is adequate for knowledge of 
its history because that history presents no further information than the 
present provides. As Hull notes, the Markov property is then a weak form 
of market efficiency in that for the latter the present price of an equity or 
stock captures all the information contained in the record of past prices and 
the market (Options, §12.1).
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It is only the present probability of what the future 
might be, a calculated ‘perhaps’ which bears all the 
information of the system’s history. is then is the 
reduction of différantial pricing that was necessary 
in order to operationally distinguish options pricing 
from gambling, the latter being explicitly predicated 
on the present ignorance of the future.
e salient feature of Wiener processes for the 
construction of the  model is that the system equa-
tion is composed of two parts, one representing the 
linear development of the system in time, a dri¶ rate 
that in finance is the normal rate of return, the second 
containing a random term indexing the stochastic 
yet bounded ‘memoryless’ condition of the system’s 
development. In its standard formation, this second 
term is provided by a random coefficient drawn from 
within the standard deviation of a regular probability 
distribution (a limitation that is not considered overly 
restrictive because, even if the next step of the random 
variable is unknown, it is nonetheless bounded). is 
random term is called the variance of the system, and 
indexes its ‘noise’ against the standard growth rate. 
Expressing the random walk of the variable more use-
fully as a function of a continuous time variable (in 
which the dri¶ rate of the system is expressed) requires 
the index of its constrained randomness to be given by 
its volatility.À Volatility is, for example, the measure of 
61. Following the mathematical derivation, the variance of the standard 
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the uncertainty of returns from investment in a given 
stock. It is nontrivial in magnitude, since the effect of 
volatility upon price can sometimes far exceed that of 
the dri¶ rate over a given time. And it is nontrivial in 
the formulation of : securing an acceptable level 
of return requires the reduction, if not the elimina-
tion, of the volatility intrinsic to the very formula-
tion of the price development as a Markov process. 
Given that the derivative price is determined to be 
strictly exogenous to the price of the underlying, the 
 formula structures a portfolio that cancels out 
volatility by combining a long/short position on the 
price of the underlying (usually equity stock) with a 
position on an option on that underlying such that the 
volatility of one offsets that of the other.À§ at is, the 
formula engineers a return on the portfolio at its dri¶ 
rate, which is the risk-free rate of return of the market, 
by hedging the price of the underlying against the 
price of a derivative based on it, a process called ‘delta 
hedging’.À¬ e linking of the two prices and respective 
deviation of the probabilistic determination is the square of volatility. See 
Hull, Options, §13.4 for mathematical account of volatility.
62. For a mathematical derivation of BSM see Hull, Options, §13.6
63. e Efficient Market Hypothesis, summarised in Eugene Fama’s 1970 
formulation that ‘prices always “fully reflect” available information’  (cited 
in Mackenzie, Engine, 65), follows directly from marginal utility theory: 
all market-makers use the available information to trade with one another 
leading to a unique market price. Price thereby reflects an equilibrium that 
is a ‘rational’ settlement and disrupted only by further new information. e 
risk-free rate of return is a result of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
developed in the 1960s, in which risks on items of a stock portfolio arriving 
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volatilities is not entirely arbitrary, in that each price 
is ‘affected by the same source of uncertainty: stock 
price movements’.À° 
It is intrinsic to the Wiener process that the solu-
tions to the equation change with time and also with 
the initial conditions of the primary variable, in this 
case the spot price of the underlying. Consequently, 
(i) the solution for the price process of the derivative 
changes with the price development of the underly-
ing, and (ii) the delta hedge portfolio is only valid for 
theoretically infinitesimal (but in practice very short) 
durations; furthermore, (iii) the  model can only be 
constructed if idealized stable background conditions 
and parameters are assumed, though these are infeasi-
ble in practice.À¿ But given these severe constraints, the 
at their respective equilibrium prices are counteracted by diversifying the 
scope of the portfolio (Mackenzie, Engine, Ch.2). e ‘risk-free’ portfolio 
is therefore the stock portfolio with the greatest diversity: the market itself 
(excepting disruptions to the market as a whole). It follows that higher 
returns than the market average require portfolios with greater risk—at the 
limit, the price movement of just one stock. In Mackenzie’s words, CAPM 
is ‘finance theory’s canonical account of the way stock prices reflect a 
tradeoff between expected [emphasis added] return and risk (in the sense of 
sensitivity to overall market fluctuations)’ (Engine, 28).
64. Hull, Options, §13.5
65. Including: stable borrowing costs (i.e., constant background interest 
rates), no transaction costs, no dividends during the lifetime of the security 
(which payout will have repercussive effects on returns on the option), no 
trading of the securities, no arbitrage opportunities (no external advantage 
or pressure for monetary reasons), and that trading is continuous (Hull, 
Options, §13.5)—none of which in fact hold. Later developments of the 
BSM equation allow several of these constraints to be relaxed. For a broad, 
technically informed dismissal of BSM as institutionally and theoretically 
underdetermining more practically viable precursors (such as orp and 
Bachelier) thanks to its misguided Neoclassical and therefore idealised 
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‘equal and opposite’ construction of the portfolio in 
the  model means that the position of the portfolio 
at the end of a short enough time period can suppos-
edly be known with certainty: it is the expected rate 
of return of the combined positions in the underlying 
and the option. And given the expected rate of return, 
the model and its stipulations can be manipulated to 
find the right price for options so as to secure a risk-
free return over short-enough periods irrespective of 
the risk class of the underlying. By excising volatility, 
the  portfolio generates returns at the market rate 
independently of what the underlying is, i.e., inde-
pendently of the risk preferences of the trader; so it 
lowers the barrier to riskier underlying assets, thus 
diversifying and consolidating the market in these asset 
classes. Such ‘risk neutrality’ is a strategic articulation 
of the anticipatory model of pricing in the  regime. 
anks to the probabilistic standardization of pricing 
in options markets—quite distinct, then, from betting 
and its ineliminable risk—the institutional effect of  
has been to operationally legitimate the establishment 
of the  and to increase the size of the options 
markets. Furthermore, in its risk-neutral coupling 
of options market with those of their underlying, it 
also enabled an increase in the size of the underlying 
financial markets too.
determination of pricing, see E.G. Haug and N.N. Taleb, ‘Option traders 
use (very) sophisticated heuristics, never the Black–Scholes–Merton 
formula’, in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 77 (2011), 97–106.
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Ineliminable Volatility
e  anticipatory pricing equation and its con-
comitant risk neutrality presume the stability of the 
background conditions—an idealization which is not 
only operationally false but which in any case is theo-
retically constrained to the vanishingly small timespans 
for which the delta hedge portfolio is valid (i.e., until 
the ‘next step’ in the random walk of the spot price). 
Over any ‘extended’ time in which the spot price 
changes ‘unpredictably’, as it must do according to 
the initial assumption of the model, different solutions 
to the  equations are required. Consequently, the 
proportion of derivative securities to the underlying 
in the portfolio needs to continually change in order 
to maintain risk-neutrality. at continued recompo-
sition of the portfolio, known as ‘dynamic replica-
tion’, follows the price development of the underlying 
in order to maintain both the risk-neutrality of the 
portfolio and also the removal of volatility from its 
return. Yet the development of the portfolio through 
dynamic replication, which also prices the option com-
ponent on each iteration, conveys the quasi-random 
price movement of the underlying—the very volatility 
that the  portfolio is constructed to excise. Two 
methods make volatility apparent a¶er its theoretical 
elimination in the  model: the historical record of 
the asset price and the method of implied volatility.ÀÀ 
66. Hull, Options, §13.12.
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Aggregate implied volatility represents asset price vola-
tility as it is manifest through the price development 
of different options based on a single underlying; a 
method that permits the price of one option to be used 
to calculate the price of another option based in the same 
underlying asset. 
e simultaneous occlusion and manifestation of 
volatility from the  regime does not necessarily 
present a problem in practice: priced in time rather 
than as a punctual theoretical formulation, the price 
volatilities of the underlying and the attendant option 
are indexed by the dynamic replication of the  port-
folio. But the theoretical quandary is insurmountable: 
even though volatility is the very condition for the 
recomposition of the  portfolio, its formulating 
equation proscribes any explicit determination of price 
volatility, rendering it unobservable within the terms 
of that formula and preventing the causes of volatility 
from being established within the limited determina-
tion of those solutions.ÀÌ In fact, implied volatility is 
of primary significance in determining derivatives in 
terms of différantial pricing, as can be drawn out by 
reformulating the preceding result: the requirement 
for constant iteration of the  equation implies 
that volatility is generated not by factors external to 
the financial market, but rather by the trading itself.ÀÍ 
67. Ibid., §13.13
68. With regard to stock prices, see K. R. French and R. Roll, ‘Stock return 
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But if, in this model, the price volatility of the underly-
ing informs the corresponding option’s volatility, and 
if the  portfolio is constructed in order to remove 
volatility effects, then, contrary to the primary assump-
tion that  relies only upon the constative (because 
exogenous) pricing of the underlying, the volatility 
of the price of the underlying is in fact endogenous to 
its market, as then is the option pricing. Furthermore, 
since the delta hedge portfolio is composed of both 
the underlying and the option, volatility in the option 
price requires trading in the underlying, generating 
volatility. 
Options pricing in the  model does not then in 
fact refer to an exogenous price. Rather, pricing is con-
stituted endogenously to both the derivatives market 
and that of the underlying, which are now interlinked.ÀÒ 
Options pricing Is itself also a market ‘force’, as is pric-
ing of the underlying in its own market. e  regime 
of option pricing as constative or merely anticipatory 
variances: e arrival of information and the reaction of traders’, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 17:1 (September 1986), 5–26. With regard to volatility of 
stock prices, systemically observed to ‘be negatively correlated with lagged 
[unexpected] returns’, see D. Avramov, T. Chordia, A. Goyal, ‘e Impact of 
Trades on Daily Volatility’, Review of Financial Studies, 19:4 (2006), 1241–77. 
Avramov et al’s thesis that such asymmetric volatility is ‘governed by the 
trading dynamics of informed traders and uninformed traders’ is extended 
to the futures market and confirmed in J. Kittiakarasakun, Y. Tse, G.H.K. 
Wang, ‘e impact of trades by traders on asymmetric volatility for Nasdaq 
100 index futures’, Managerial Finance, 38.8 (2012), 752–67.
69. As confirmed and compounded by indices of implied volatility such 
as the CBOE VIX that then enables the pricing of volatility as itself an 
underlying for derivative construction. 
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of exogenous price movements starting from the initial 
price and hence calculable qua probability cannot then 
be maintained other than by its static and therefore 
highly constrained determination. at anticipatory 
model provides only the instantaneous composition 
of the delta-hedge portfolio, a falsification of the pric-
ing process of both options and the underlying that 
is consequent upon that regime’s presentism. Evidence 
that the  model is wrong is empirically provided 
by ‘volatility smiles’ and skews: within the modeling 
parameters of , the price of a vanilla option only 
increases linearly with its volatility, and the implied 
volatility should be independent of expiration and 
strike price; yet, since the October ­ stock market 
crash, prices have taken nonlinear paths in all three 
regards.ÌÚ at such curves are manifest a¶er the ­ 
70. Specifically, charting implied volatility against strike price yields a valley-
like curve whose turning point is the at-the-money option (that is, options 
whose delivery price is the spot price of the underlying), a curve known as 
the volatility smile. More systemically, the implied volatility of at-the-money 
options is also observed to be slightly lower than options in- or out-of-the-
money (those with delivery prices respectively above or below that of the spot 
price, netting a gain or loss). Furthermore, implied volatility of an option 
changes not just with the strike price but also with expiration, meaning that it 
is better charted as a volatility surface with a horizontal reference plane having 
the axes of expiration and strike price. Different markets have different typical 
curves. Mark Rubinstein was among of the first to model the volatility surface 
using the CRR formalism he codeveloped (‘Implied Binomial Trees’, e 
Journal of Finance, 49:3 (July 1994), 771–818) while Bruno Dupire formalized 
the volatility smile in terms of BSM in the same year (‘Pricing with a smile’, 
Risk 7 (1994), 18–20), but such ‘one factor’ models have since been shown to 
have severe limitations. A multifactor formalism for the development of the 
volatility surface in conditions where arbitrage across markets is not possible 
is developed in T. Daglish, J.C. Hull, and W. Suo, ‘Volatility surfaces: eory, 
rules of thumb, and empirical evidence’, Quantitative Finance, 7.5 (2007), 507–24.
Collapse 8.indb   708 27/11/2014   15:40
Malik—Ontology of Finance
709
crash but not before indicates that the pricing process 
is not memoryless: a past event structures all subsequent 
processes in the system. Bearing a constituting past, 
options pricing does not observe the Markov property, 
which is not only the condition for the probabilistic 
determination of anticipatory pricing, but also for the 
 model tout court. Furthermore, nonlinear implied 
volatility paths again suggest that volatility is gener-
ated by conditions endogenous to markets, including 
derivative markets—a result leading to the argument, 
elaborated further below, that if volatility arises from 
within the price process itself, then derivatives pricing 
has to be distinguished from traditional determinations 
of betting, in which gains or losses depend on a referent 
external to the wager itself. 
For now, however, the minimal result is that options 
pricing is neither anticipatory nor merely constative. 
More emphatically—and this is what will move the 
analysis from the dimension of derivatives as insti-
tutional financial operators to the dimension of the 
power-rationality of capitalization’s financiality—
implied volatility manifests the différantial logic of 
derivative pricing, which is exorbitant to the presentist 
determinations of the  regime. Instantiating dif-
férantial pricing and its temporization in fact, the 
institutional praxes of  misidentify and constrain 
that logic within the stasis of the calculable ‘maybe’ 
of anticipation: price development as probabilistic. 
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Standard financial praxes thereby proscribe the com-
plete account of their own operation as both logically 
predicated on and operationally constituting the vola-
tility (and its pricing) that they institutionalise—that 
is, an account of price as more than merely constative 
of conditions and ‘forces’ acting elsewhere. Given 
the dominance (in theory and pecuniary magnitude) 
of these standard financial praxes, what is theoretico-
politically exigent is a countertheorization of différan-
tial pricing that does not presume either the present 
price as the basis or inauguration of the pricing process, 
nor the constitution of price as exogenous to its own 
institutional process.
.  
Key elements of the required countertheory are pro-
vided by the sociological accounts of finance markets 
given by Donald MacKenzie and Elena Esposito.Ì 
Both propose that derivatives markets are not consta-
tive but performative—in MacKenzie’s words, ‘an 
engine not a camera’—because derivatives pricing 
is shaped by the fact and method of pricing itself, 
rather than exogenous factors such as the vicissi-
tudes of the underlying prior to pricing. MacKenzie’s 
mainly historical-institutional account identifies two 
71. MacKenzie, Engine, and E. Esposito, e Future of Futures: e £me of 
Money in Financing and Society (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011 [Italian: 
2009]).
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salient regimes of performativity for options markets. 
e first is ‘Barnesian perfomativity’ (a¶er Barry 
Barnes’s sociology of science) in which economic 
processes and outcomes transform to better fit the 
theoretical model, in a ‘self-validating feedback loop’:Ì§ 
consequent on the establishment of the  and wide-
spread use of , ‘the financial markets changed in a 
way that made the [] model’s assumptions, which 
at first were grossly at variance with market conditions, 
more realistic’.Ì¬ at ‘realism’ was undone (most 
intensely in the ) by the October ­ crash, a¶er 
which the persistence of regular volatility skews meant 
that ‘no analysis now finds the [] model to fit the 
observed pattern of prices of options well’.Ì° Such is 
the second regime of performativity for which ‘the 
practical use of finance theory sometimes undermines 
the market conditions, processes, and patterns of prices 
that are posited by the theory’.Ì¿ e ‘undermining’ of 
72. MacKenzie, Engine, 19.
73. Ibid., 256.
74. Ibid., 202.
75. Ibid., 24. More specifically, while options markets still deploy offshoots 
of the BSM model for pricing, the risk-management of option pricing now 
accommodate the ‘wild randomness’ of discontinuous jumps in pricing 
and volatility that such models gave rise to but can not theorise. Risk-
management in this second regime of performative pricing requires an 
increase the ‘margin requirements’—the initial price of the option deposited 
with the exchange—so that ‘catastrophic events’ do not force further selling 
of options and exacerbate price volatility. It also requires a shi¶ from the 
assumed normal distribution of the BSM model, in which outlier ‘extreme’ 
events in the tails of the distribution are unlikely, toward the Lévy family 
of variable distributions with thicker tails, developed in relation to finance 
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the conditions and results occasioned by and for the 
very theory that constitutes them more exactly marks 
out its ‘practical’ use in this second regime as being 
counterperformative: pricing takes place against the con-
stative determination of pricing. For Esposito, distinct 
from MacKenzie in her adoption of a Luhmannian 
systems-theoretical approach, such counterperforma-
tivity is not an episodic occurrence of financial pricing 
but rather, and in fact, the primary characteristic of 
such markets: derivatives markets are necessarily and 
intrinsically set to run against their theoretical models 
because volatility is endogenous to pricing itself.ÌÀ In 
Esposito’s terms, the volatility of derivatives markets 
indicates how the future stipulated by the derivatives 
contract ‘is unpredictable because it is produced by 
the very present that tries to predict it’.ÌÌ As implied 
volatility indicates, the probabilistic anticipation of 
price development is vitiated in its very instantiation 
because derivative pricing shi¶s the price away from 
the magnitude it putatively predicts as an exogenous 
referent. In short, derivatives markets constitute prices. 
To understand how and why requires a more detailed 
exposition of Esposito’s argument, which has the 
by Benoit Mandelbrot, for which the standard requirements of statistics 
such as standard deviation and variance can be infinite, meaning that while 
the techniques developed on the basis of such models are probabilistic 
nonetheless ‘standard statistical techniques evaporat[e]’ (Ibid, 108ff.).
76. For the ‘wild variation’ of the market destroying its regular statistical 
distribution see Esposito, Future, 148–51.
77. Esposito, Future, 128, emphasis added.
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advantage of leading back to the articulation of the 
institutional financial operations of derivative markets 
in terms of pricing qua temporization, which will in 
turn be the basis upon which the particular determina-
tion of finance-power can be made.
Ùme is the leading category in Esposito’s theory 
of derivatives pricing because for her derivatives are 
complex time relations fabricated by institutional 
methods of social organization. Specifically, derivatives 
mobilise the distinction between the present future, 
which is ‘our current anticipation of the future’, and 
the future present, or the ‘present that will become 
actual in the future’.ÌÍ What is traded on derivative 
exchanges is not the future given (the then unknown 
strike price of the underlying) but the present risk of 
that price against the delivery price.ÌÒ Derivative pricing 
consequently refers ‘to the present way of seeing the 
future, not to the unknowable future that will come 
about later’.ÍÚ It is constituted in the ‘management’ of 
the price movement between present future and the 
future present. What is managed qua pricing is the 
78. Esposito, Future, 23–4. ere is similarly a past present that is the 
present as it was in the past but is now passed and inactual. 
79. Terminological caution is needed here: what Esposito identifies as 
‘risk’ is called ‘uncertainty’ in finance markets; see Esposito, Future, 36n.26. 
Standard finance theory follows Frank Knight’s 1921 distinction between 
futures that are measurable/containable (risk) and those that are not 
(uncertainty). See Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Mineola, NY: Dover, 
2006 [1921]).
80. Esposito, Future, 151; emphasis added.
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convolution of the uncertainty of the strike price in the 
future present anticipated as a present future. And what 
is priced as volatility in derivatives markets is not then 
the variability of price at expiration stemming from 
the present—as proposed in the  model—but the 
uncertainty of price given the present inactuality of the 
future present. at is, derivative pricing makes explicit 
in the present the relation to an inactual and necessarily 
uncertain future present—as a present future. As such, 
it indexes the core characteristic of time in Esposito’s 
systems-theoretical method, namely that because they 
are never (the) present, the ‘past and future are never 
given, but become actualized as horizons of inactual-
ity for a present that does not last’.Í In the general 
pragmatic terms of systems theory, a relation such 
as the management of price movements between the 
present and the future constitute ‘the unity of actuality 
and inactuality’ which is time. Ùme, on this account, is 
always system-specific, in that the maintenance within 
the present of past and future presents depends entirely 
on the structure, organization, and capacities of any 
given system.Í§ Derivative pricing and its volatility are, 
in short, constructions of time. 
81. Ibid., 21. 
82. e outline of time presented here condenses and quotes from the 
salient argument in Esposito, Future, Ch.2, especially 21–8.
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e specifics of this broad determination can be deter-
mined against the general systems theory of time-
relation presented by Esposito. Summarily:
—Ùme is specific to a system, ‘produced in order to 
organize its operations and make them more complex’ 
by incorporating the inactual past and future presents 
into its present actuality. As this paradoxical unity, the 
present is the primary manifestation of time.
—Because the ‘time binding’ that is the relation 
between the actual and the inactual depends entirely 
on the system in question, there is no absolute,  
‘objective’ time.
—Rather, the pragmatic incorporation of inactuality 
into the present enables the system ‘to structure its 
present operations’ in view of that inactuality. Ùme 
therefore permits the complexification of a system to 
a degree greater than its actuality allows (as with debt 
in regard to fiscal conditions, for example). 
—anks to time, the actual and the inactual inform 
one another, albeit asymmetrically; through anticipa-
tion of the inactual and unknown future in the pre-
sent, and by organising the actual present in view of  
the future.
—Generally, ‘time allows the system to separate itself 
from its own operations and its situation, linking it 
with other (past and future) situations in a complex 
framework of connections’ that attest to and acknowl-
edge its contingency amongst other possibilities.  
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e ‘possibilities’ of a system—its unactualised 
states—are only theoretically and practically available 
to it because of its time qua relation to the inactual. 
—In particular, the revision of plans for the future and 
reconsideration of the (once future) present is the 
‘internal reflexivity of time’. Operators in a system 
with time know that they can make decisions for 
an anticipated future which, while itself unknown, 
permits ‘the freedom to decide differently once that 
future has become present (a present they will have 
contributed to and where they know how to inter-
vene)’. Such is the ‘flexibility and freedom’ granted 
by time. Emancipation is a time relation.
—e freedom of time for an operator in a system is 
the freedom to choose ‘in a non-random way’, and to 
re-choose in view of the consequences of the preced-
ing choices. Similarly, the past offers a selectivity of 
remembrance: ‘everything could be possible, but only 
some possibilities come about, and these condition 
the possibilities that are made available for the future’. 
—Ùme’s unity is asymmetric: the past present can 
only be understood for what it was and wasn’t (qua 
condition and projection to the future that is now 
present) in its future, while the future present con-
tinues to be strictly unknown but can be anticipated 
and prepared-for. Furthermore, operations in the 
future condition the future but do not determine it; 
past operations do determine their future, which is  
the present.
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In these terms, systems have freedom qua possibilities 
constructed via their relations to inactualities of its 
present state. 
Esposito’s theory of derivatives pricing as counter-
performative exemplifies this general theory of systems 
time and freedom of future revision. As options in 
particular demonstrate, derivatives build in revis-
ability of trading the underlying at expiration into 
their contract. Trading of the options contract on 
derivatives markets ‘allows one to make decisions 
today that affect the way the future will be, while 
preserving the freedom to decide one way or the other 
when this future will be present’.Í¬ As opposed to 
the  model, in this case derivative pricing is not 
constative with regard to an exogenous referent of that 
process. Rather, it refers to the ‘contingency of future 
events’ not only as regards the strike price, which is 
ostensible (exogenous) content, but primarily as a 
reflexive (endogenous) consequence pricing itself as 
a mode of time engineering. at is, the reflexivity or 
revisability of derivative pricing means ‘that future-
oriented expectations and decisions [on price] affect 
what will become present in the future’.Í° Taking the 
modality of the ‘maybe’ up to their expiration, deriva-
tives ‘leave the indeterminacy of the future open, and, 
83. Esposito, Future, 105.
84. Ibid., 127.
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at the same time, produce it with their decisions’.Í¿ 
Generating indeterminacies upon which they sub-
sequently act, derivatives are counterperformative. 
Consequently, these indeterminacies are not random 
(within the parameter of the standard deviation of 
a normal distribution, as the  model stipulates); 
rather, they are structured by the ‘minimal continu-
ity’ of derivatives pricing in the present, a pricing 
which is predicated on the contingency of revision.
Derivatives are in general thereby devices of arbi-
trage in time.ÍÀ As an endogenous process, the reflex-
ive measure of the necessary uncertainty of pricing 
movement in the present is given within the terms of 
that pricing system itself: it is volatility, the index of 
the presence of inactuality in present actualities. And 
it is priced. What volatility measures in its pricing is 
the uncertainty of price given pricing as a time relation. 
’s presentist and therefore static and anticipatory 
determination of derivatives pricing proscribes the 
time relation qua unity of actuality and inactuality 
that is derivatives pricing from explicitly entering price 
determinations. It instead reproduces the time relations 
that derivatives are (vectored qua pricing) only as an 
implicit a¶ereffect of its probabilistic formulation.
85. Ibid., 105.
86. Ibid., 117.
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Risk Order
is partial result marks the way to the political-eco-
nomic determination of derivatives in terms of différan-
tial pricing. However, the logic of différance imposes 
important modifications upon the theorization of such 
pricing as counterperformative. Crucial to this rede-
termination is the irreducible sociological dimension 
of the time relation in Esposito’s account, in which it 
is a corollary of her determination of risk: ‘all forms of 
time binding have social costs, because they […] also 
bind the opportunities and perspectives of all other 
operators’.ÍÌ at is, since the agents bound in and 
by the system’s time relations can avail themselves of 
the systemic contingency of revision, the possibilities 
inherent to a system with time are not only those of its 
capacity in toto but are distributed differentially across 
elements of that system, in this case the market consti-
tuted of participants in the pricing system. Ùme bind-
ing thereby constitutes possibility and limitation with 
regard to others, which is to say that it constitutes social 
binding as such, which is in each instance organized 
and comprehended as the norms of a given social order. 
Contrary to traditionally-ordered societies, for which 
norms are determined according to the constraints 
that have determined and stabilise the present on 
the basis of the selectivity of the past, social binding 
87. is section mainly paraphrases Esposito, Future, 30–35 from which all 
quotations are taken unless otherwise noted.
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constituted in view of the inactuality of the future 
stipulates a reflexive and revisable relation between 
the actual (present) and inactual (past and future). 
at is, social binding qua time binding requires the 
revision of social norms. Esposito illustrates by way of 
an example: ‘the reflexivity of time introduces a future 
contingency into the present that cannot be bound […]. 
How can one accept the production of s (even if it 
is legal) if one cannot dismiss the possibility that […] 
they produce unpredictable genetic damages?’ Such 
damages are a future uncertainty, necessarily indeter-
minate in the present yet indexed in it as a risk—now 
meaning the uncertainty of the future in the present. 
Consequently, the necessarily social dimension of 
time binding complexifies the actuality and rationale 
of social organization—the available justifications of 
social norms—because the latter are subject to the 
revisability of the present in view of the future. Ùme 
is not a background through which revision of social 
norms is undertaken; it is that which imposes the neces-
sity of the revision of norms in societies constituted 
with a view to ordering for future uncertainties. It 
constrains social orders to effectuate their norms in 
their contingent and future-facing contemporaneity. 
As such, societies of reflexive time-binding are defi-
nitionally modern. What is characteristic of them is 
that ‘the current constraint, which should [qua norm] 
neutralize future uncertainties […] comes to depend 
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on these same uncertainties’, making the ordering itself 
uncertain in its binding and ‘depriving the [social order 
of the] very meaning of normativity’. 
e coeval constitution of social and temporal 
uncertainties that is modernity is, then, ‘a general-
ized condition of uncontrolled exposure to future 
contingency’. Given that its norms are contingent 
and are apprehended as such, any such ‘society at risk 
(Risikogesellscha¤)’ has weak social bonds; it is flexible 
and adaptable, risk-rich.ÍÍ To be modern means having 
no stable and binding criteria to guide actions, either 
now or in the future. Apparently stable solutions (for 
example, savings as a secure reserve for money) may 
lose out on gains elsewhere (the growth of equities 
markets), but the latter make the gains they do because 
they present a greater risk than the former. A stable 
judgement on what to do in the present could only 
be made in the future, not the historically organized 
actuality of the present. But the future is inactual and 
itself unknown, which is why all judgements now 
are themselves only risks. at judgements are made 
on condition of a necessarily inactual and unknown 
future and suppose their revision, such that there is 
no certainty as to what may come to be a gain or a 
loss, security or damage, is what Esposito calls ‘the 
rationality of risk’—a rationality constituted by the 
88. Risikogesellscha¤ is better known in translation through the influential 
work of Ulrich Beck as ‘risk society’.
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double necessity of an ignorance of the future and the 
insufficiency of the past to guide judgements made in 
the present.ÍÒ
e rationality of risk does not however disable all 
criteria for judgement. Even though norms as such 
are deprived of any final authority and legitimating 
sanction, the rationality of risk nonetheless generates 
a ‘recursive, circular and revisable’ quasi-order of 
89. Esposito, Future, 105 for ‘rationality of risk’. is dynamic construction 
of reason is homologous to Robert Brandom’s ‘strong semantic inferentialism’ 
(SSI) that provides the basic schema of neorationalism. With Brandom, SSI 
is a sufficient condition of conceptual contentfulness because inferential 
relations ‘alte[r] our commitments and entitlements in ways that depend on 
what is a reason for what’, meaning that the basic operation of reason is the 
revision of extant propositional content (Reason in Philosophy [Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009], 13 for the quote; all emphases are 
added, Brandom’s own emphases being removed throughout.) Moreover, 
for Brandom reason is primarily deontological because ‘judging and 
acting—endorsing claims and maxims, committing ourselves as to what is 
or shall be true— […] mak[es] ourselves subject to assessment according 
to rules that articulate the contents of those commitments’ (33). Kant calls 
these rules ‘concepts’ but Brandom identifies their more general discursive 
applicability as being primarily the norms to and for which those making 
inferences are responsible. at responsibility distinguishes the ‘exercise of a 
distinctive kind of consciousness’ that is ‘sapient, rather than merely sentient, 
consciousness[,] or awareness’ (9). Moreover, concept formation qua 
normative rationality is not sui generis to the thinking subject as rational self 
(Kant) but also social (Hegel), involving extant histories and nonratiocinative 
languages (Ch.3). Like SSI, then, risk rationality is a necessary and chronic 
socially constituted revision of norms ‘consisting in practically knowing one’s 
way about in the inferentially articulated space of reasons and concepts’ (9) 
according to the ‘bindingness’ (33) of the norms actively and provisionally 
established by the reasons intrinsic to that recursive process rather than past 
or future conventions. In the risk-order, the ‘inferentially articulated space of 
reasons’ is specifically determined as calculative yet open-ended time-binding. 
Consequently, neither reason nor (anthropological) sentience nor then 
price are established epistemological terms but come to be known and have 
traction on social norms thanks only to their respective rational revisions. 
However, for reasons presented taken up in n.133 below, such an alignment is 
only hypothetical or formal but is in fact incompatible.
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binding uncertainties. at quasi-order is the ‘mini-
mal continuity’ of sociotemporal binding, a binding 
‘between the contingency of time and the contingency 
of observers’ that is enough to form decisions and give 
the capacity for control, revision, and correction ‘in a 
non-random way’. Control not over what the future will 
be as such (per planning), but control as the construc-
tion of possibilities for the future ‘without knowing or 
having to know’ whether those possibilities will come 
to pass. Disestablishing social norms while constructing 
a binding social reality predicated on uncertainty and 
constitutive ignorance, the rationality of risk requires 
and fabricates increasingly ‘complex forms of time 
management’. Derivatives markets epitomise such 
complexity by ‘allow[ing] one to make decisions today 
that affect the way the future will be, while preserving 
the freedom to decide one way or the other when this 
future will be present’.ÒÚ Specifically, by constructing 
a deferral of the vending of the underlying in view of 
taking advantage of changes in price once that contract 
is made and others react to it, the derivatives trader 
‘buys contingency (i.e., the freedom to decide otherwise 
starting from the decision taken today)’. Derivative 
prices are set not primarily in relation to the underly-
ing or to other market-exogenous conditions, but by 
expectations and indexes of price movement. 
90. Esposito, Future, 105.
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For Esposito, whatever quasi-order persists in the 
rationality of risk is ‘governed by reference to the 
uncertainty of the behaviour of others’, given that 
their uncertainty is also attributable to the horizon of 
a future that is inactual to them. Not only do judge-
ments and actions take place within the constitutive 
ignorance of reflexive time-binding but, for that reason, 
‘observers do very well in observing each other because 
the world is not a primary given […], but comes into 
play when one observes what and how other observers 
observe’.Ò In Esposito’s systems-theoretical account, 
such ‘second-order observation’ is the primary char-
acteristic of modernity: it is ‘the only form of reality 
still viable’ in modernity, in which ‘descriptions of the 
world change the world described’.Ò§ e ‘minimal 
continuity’ of reflexive time-binding and counternor-
mative social binding resolves for Esposito into the 
constructivism of reality constituted by and as the 
integrated sociology of second-order observation that 
is antithetical to conventionalism. is broad construc-
tivist determination of the quasi-order of societies at 
risk—of the risk order (the term is not Esposito’s)—is 
the general sense in which all judgements and observa-
tions in the risk order are necessarily counterperfoma-
tive. As modern practices of complex time-binding, 
derivatives markets are counterperformative per se, and 
91. Ibid., 104.
92. Ibid., 93.
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not only when those markets lurch into crises (as Mac-
Kenzie holds); and they are systems of second-order 
observation.Ò¬ Consequently, financial markets are not 
directed to or organized for the ‘satisfaction of needs’ 
insofar as these are external to market determinations. 
Rather, they require
the abandonment of any reference to a given external 
world, even in the form of the discourses about the 
difference between investment (which should operate 
in the real economy) and speculation (which should 
be a mere financial transaction), where the second 
should refer sooner or later to the first. Otherwise 
we have to deal with a pathological development, 
93. e account of second-order observation paraphrases and quotes from 
Esposito, Future, 102–4, unless otherwise noted. As Esposito notes (Future, 
Ch.5, n.28) second-order observation is a variant of John Maynard Keynes’s 
beauty contest model in which contestants in a newspaper prize choose the 
six publicly selected ‘prettiest’ faces out of a hundred. Rational agents do not 
select according to their own preferences but according to those that they 
think popular opinion would select (e General eory of Employment, Interest 
and Money [New York: Harcourt Bruce, 1964 (1936)], Ch.12, §5). Keynes 
characterised the professional investor of his time as having reached ‘the 
third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average 
opinion expects the average opinion to be’ in a ‘battle of wits to anticipate 
the basis of conventional valuation a few months hence’. In this, financial 
interests in markets are distinct from the medium-long term investment 
characteristic of enterprise, the ‘social object’ of which ‘should be to defeat 
the dark forces of time and ignorance which envelop our future’. Against 
this injunction, second-order observation as Esposito derives it complexifies 
Keynes’s recursive rational-model further because (i) the observer includes 
the knowledge that she or he is observed by others as well as observing them, 
and (ii) the second-order observer is also attentive to the risks and volatility 
of price movement, thereby including counterconventional combinations in 
their time-binding calculation (Future, 11).
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with a crazy economy, with gambling and a total 
lack of control.
Supposing that investment is badly (if at all) served 
by speculative finance would lead to the criticism of 
the latter as a ‘casino capitalism’; a gambling without 
constraint or external reference that is destructive 
of the production that should be its true purpose. 
is is a commonplace criticism of financial markets, 
o¶en accompanied by the complaint that risk ration-
ality is distinct from calculative-predictive rationality. 
e former has no clear results or direct and known 
consequences; nor does it have any rational or social 
normative core, only the construction of possibilities 
that countermand the actuality in which they are con-
ceived. Systems-theory constructivism obviates such 
criticisms of finance in favour of comprehending the 
ways in which ‘the financial economy binds itself and 
its operations, not to a correspondence with an alleged 
given world’. On this basis, the risk-rationality of finan-
cial markets is not that of production or of ‘the real 
economy’ (exogenous referents for those markets) but 
rather and only that of risk—that is, the possibilities 
fabricated by the system for its own counterperforma-
tive development via emancipation from extant norms. 
And such risk has two dimensions to it: generally, what 
are instantiated in the present are the uncertainties of 
the unknown future, a making-ignorant of the present 
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and its constative determinations; and specifically, per 
instance of pricing, counterperformative pricing gener-
ates profits from ‘bucking the trend’ of the market as 
a system of second-order observation.
Such countermanding possibilities cannot be con-
ceived on the basis of the actuality of the present alone, 
vitiating the very condition for the probabilistic account 
of price development in the anticipatory model of . 
Consequently, to reiterate the argument of endog-
enous counterperformative pricing from another angle, 
derivative pricing is constitutive of price movement, 
and instantiates its own ‘ignorance’:
[P]rice movements always produce surprises that 
would not arise if there had been no speculation 
about the future in financial markets. e future 
projections to which operators are oriented are cor-
rect and incorrect at the same time. If done well, 
they anticipate the way the future would have come 
about if there had been no attempt to foresee it. In 
this sense, they sabotage themselves.Ò°
Prices necessarily go in unexpected directions because 
their anticipations (in the future present) are necessar-
ily wrong—and only by virtue of the anticipatory price 
(in the present future). at is, as well as factors exog-
enous to the pricing system and trade in the underlying, 
94. Esposito, Future, 128.
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pricing as such generates volatility. Implied volatility 
is for Esposito an effect and measure of the reflexivity 
of the risk-order itself, with the underlying as a quasi-
arbitrary heuristic device to facilitate that measure.Ò¿ 
e succinct formulation is that implied volatility 
‘indicates the prevailing opinion on the prevailing 
opinion’. e elaborate version is that, as a measure, 
volatility is an observation of the systemic dynamics 
of second-order observation. Such an observation is 
not external to second-order observation but is itself 
an endogenously generated manifestation of second-
order observation that estimates its own effects on the 
pricing mechanism that it is—yet another instance of 
the recursive revisability of such systems. As such, and 
because it is itself priced and traded on derivatives 
markets (enabling gains to be made while the markets 
for the underlying derivative make losses), implied 
volatility explicitly demonstrates the reality of the 
financial risk-order. It is an endogenously constituted 
measure of the rationality and constructedness of the 
system in and by which it is manifest. What is impor-
tant in this result is that volatility is ‘not a datum’; 
rather, ‘it refers to the future’, to the inactuality that 
constitutes the uncertainty of pricing qua risk order. 
For Esposito, this means that volatility measures only 
‘what the changes in the expectations of the operators 
95. Ibid., 139.
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about these movements are’ and affecting the latter as 
part of its reality.ÒÀ
Esposito’s systems-theoretical account of derivatives 
pricing surpasses the constraints of the  model, 
positively capturing price volatility as a direct and 
necessary effect of pricing via the notion of coun-
terperformativity, exposing that derivative pricing 
instantiates the kind of minimal continuity between 
time binding and social binding typical of risk-order 
societies. In short, it shows that risk ordering is intrinsic 
to derivatives pricing. In these terms, the  model 
is a mistaken because unilateral determination of 
the integrated sociotemporal constitution of price. 
A more complete account of derivative pricing requires 
that it be apprehended as at once a political economy: 
the market endogeneity of derivative pricing is at 
once a complex form of time management and as 
such a complex form of social organization. It is this 
injunction that returns the overall argument back to 
Nitzan and Bichler’s contention that capitalization 
constituted via pricing is a political economy of accu-
mulation; but three further steps need to be taken in 
order to make the two otherwise divergent theories of 
pricing congruent. 
Firstly, the immanent sociality of pricing for Espos-
ito is restricted to traders as the second-order observers 
who make up the market, and does not extend to the 
96. Ibid.
Collapse 8.indb   729 27/11/2014   15:40
COLLAPSE VIII
730
entire and universalisable social complex that is for 
Nitzan and Bichler the purview of price as organis-
ing term for the ‘single quantitative architecture’ of 
capital-power. In view of the latter, the endogeneity 
of the political economy of market pricing must be 
extended beyond the confines of its immanent social 
determination. Secondly, Esposito’s entire theorization 
revolves around the primacy of observers and their sys-
tematic intradetermination of price. is sociological 
determination accords with the Neoclassical paradigm 
in supposing traders’ subjectivity as the condition and 
term of analysis, as indicated by Esposito’s reliance 
on G.L.S. Shackle’s theorization of the uncertainty 
of economics for the economic agent who relies upon 
her or his imagination in entrepreneurial endeavors.ÒÌ 
e argument of counterperfomative pricing is anti-
realist not just because of this assumed primacy of 
the sociosubjective dimension, but also owing to the 
theoretical basis of its constructivism: for Esposito, 
the volatility of pricing demonstrates that the reality 
of the derivatives market is indifferent and detached 
from any referent exogenous to the derivatives mar-
kets: (i) volatility does not refer to a reality beyond 
the system of observation, and (ii) even when it seems 
to (with, say, the movement of prices putatively in 
relation to an underlying), that exteriority qua real 
97. See for example J. L. Ford (ed.), £me, Expectations and Uncertainty in 
Economics: Selected Essays of G.L.S. Shackle (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990).
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is in fact predicated on the (system of) observation 
in its ontology, semantics, and rationality. As such, 
volatility in this account is an index of what Quentin 
Meillassoux has influentially called ‘correlationism’, 
verging here on idealism.ÒÍ By contrast, for Nitzan 
and Bichler, all market entrepreneurs follow the logic 
of differential accumulation that is capitalization’s 
98. Correlationism as Meillassoux defines it for noetic cognition is 
not to be confused with the various correlations of derivatives pricing 
structures, not least because the latter are derived on the basis of normalised 
probability calculations whereas noetic-cognitive correlation is the putatively 
ineliminable subjective structuring condition of knowledge, as instantiated 
by second-order observers. For Meillassoux the noncorrelational real, the real 
beyond thought that it yet comprehends, can only be determined by rational 
thought to be entirely contingent—that is, without cause or reason—meaning 
that the real of thought is only the contingency of the fact of thinking, 
which contingency of the real is therefore its absolute condition (A¤er 
Finitude, tr. R. Brassier [London: Continuum, 2008], Ch.3). Consequently, 
it is Meillassoux’s noncorrelational realism that is schematically analogical 
to the dyadic contingency of abstraction and revision structuring the 
underlying of derivative structures even though its content is directly 
contrary to it. On the basis of the anticipatory pricing model, Meillassoux’s 
‘Principle of Insufficient Reason’—that the unique and supreme necessity for 
thought of the absolute contingency of the real means that nothing of the 
real is necessary, including physical laws—can be characterised as rational 
thought’s determination of the real as having the Markov property of 
memorylessness. But the analogical coherence of the two schema should 
not belie their substantial divergence: while anticipatory financial models 
of speculative pricing delimit the contingency of the price of the underlying 
by probabilistic normalization, for Meillassoux the absolute contingency 
of reason prevents the establishment of an upper-bound or circumscribed 
set of possibilities necessary to establish probabilistic calculation 
(A¤er Finitude, Ch.5). 
For a relatively nontechnical introduction to financial correlations and 
their central role in the structuring of the collateralized risk portfolios 
central to the 2008 financial crisis, despite recognition of their theoretical 
failure as well as that of delta-hedging in the ‘correlation crisis’ of May 2005, 
see P. Triana, Lecturing Birds on Flying: Can Mathematical eories Destroy the 
Financial Markets? (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009), Ch.4.
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dynamic reordering. Determined by that logic, price 
is ‘a calculable measure’ that is systemic, ordering, and 
external to the subjective observation and action which 
it shapes.ÒÒ Taking up Esposito’s words about implied 
volatility, then, price ‘has its own objectivity to which 
one can refer’, one that overdetermines the trader’s 
subjectivity: the objectivity of its market-endogenous 
constitution. As Esposito proffers in passing, it is 
necessary to deduce
a form of rationality that includes the volatility smile 
and its consequences for markets. According to this 
rationality, paper markets are not unreal, and their 
operations are (o¶en) not irrational at all. We should, 
however, find out what kind of reality and what kind 
of rationality are at stake.ÚÚ
In terms of the systemic objectivity of pricing, such 
rationality and reality are those of capital accumula-
tion’s finance power, but now determined as an objective 
risk order. e systemic objectivity and logic of capital 
accumulation then require a noncorrelationist theory 
of derivatives pricing that accommodates both the 
endogeneity of market making and the sociosubjective 
dimension mandating Esposito’s constructivism. Such 
a realist theory of pricing is at once also a theory of its 
99. Esposito, Future, 140. 
100. Ibid., 151.
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rationality, the latter term incorporating the dimension 
of both power (from Nitzan and Bichler) and risk 
(from Esposito). e required theory is therefore a real-
ist ontology of price qua rational risk order of capital 
accumulation. As will be seen, it is this ontology that 
permits the specific determination of finance power. 
irdly, Esposito’s ‘pragmatic’ theory or practice 
of time qua freedom upon which the theory of risk is 
constructed supposes and requires that the present is 
only actual and the future wholly inactual, the two 
remaining firmly distinct. In this theory, any derivative’s 
price is the price of ‘today’s risk’, risk in the ‘present 
future’, strictly distinct from a ‘future present’. Implied 
volatility is for her ‘the projection of the future from 
the considered present’, and risk the anticipation of the 
inactual future present as a distinct present future.Ú 
Consequently, even if derivative pricing qua différantial 
temporization is partially comprehended within the 
constructivist account of derivatives markets qua the 
reflexivity of time binding and the risk order it inaugu-
rates, the differential organization of that pragmatism 
(and its counterperformative freedom) remains an 
attenuated if complex and recursive form of presentism. 
As such, it is inadequate to the différantial organization 
of derivative pricing that is the mechanism for the rela-
tion between the actual and the inactual in Esposito’s 
theory of present pricing of risk as ‘management’: 
101. Esposito, Future, 139.
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if ‘the future is not the present future or the future 
present, but the difference between the two’,Ú§ then the 
pricing of risk by derivatives ‘manages’ the future qua 
inactuality in the present. e present/pricing is then 
no longer present to itself, but is deferred from itself qua 
futurity. What is deferred from the present in pricing 
risk is the future: the uncertainty and inactuality that 
the present maintains. Equally, risk is the present mani-
festation of future uncertainty and, as such, displaces 
the actuality of the present into an inactuality within 
the present. Possibility, the freedom occasioned by the 
distinction in kind between actuality and inactuality in 
time binding, is then granted by différantial temporiza-
tion. But différantial temporization also immediately 
constrains possibility, not because of the limitations 
of the given actuality of the present but because the 
constitutive imbrication of future and present means 
that the future present is not wholly distinct from the 
present. at is, possibility and the freedoms of the 
present are constrained because the deferral of the 
present future from itself opens to the future present 
in the present (which intrinsic condition is also why 
there can be a present future at all). In the complexity 
of the partial indistinction of present and future that is 
the temporization of both, possibility cannot be wholly 
distinguished from actuality; freedom qua possibility is 
granted by the circumstances of the present. e real of 
102. Ibid., 127.
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derivative pricing is its actual-inactual temporization, 
a liberation from the present in priced risk.
Given the minimal continuity of the integrated 
sociotemporal binding that is risk order, the three 
redeterminations of derivatives pricing remarked here 
are coextensive: the real of différantial pricing is that of 
the noncorrelational real of endogenous pricing in its 
systemic and objective logic of differential capitaliza-
tion. Elaborating the three redeterminations of risk 
order in reverse leads to the explicit formulation of this 
comprehensive identity of the real of derivative pricing, 
which is in fact finance power in its dual dimensions of 
financial operations and the a priori of capitalization. 
.  
e price of an asset in capitalization is only a finan-
cially formulated magnitude of anticipated earnings. 
e contention here is that derivatives pricing dilates 
and makes explicitly manifest the process of that for-
mulation and, insofar as the underlying asset is only a 
contingency upon which that process is occasioned, its 
primacy for capitalization. While constraints may be 
imposed on derivatives construction by jurisdictional 
authorities regulating contract law, such pricing con-
struction is anyway constructed qua legally-binding 
arrangement. Consequently, regulatory regimes per 
se are not an external obstacle to the structuring of 
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derivative pricing, but an implement determining 
its construction. Put otherwise, derivatives construc-
tion and therefore pricing is variable without intrin-
sic or necessary determination as regards either the 
mobilisation of the price differences it constitutes or 
its time-binding. Limitations imposed on derivative 
construction are wholly contingent and malleable (via 
changes in regulation, or the invention of alegal or 
quasilegal derivatives structures—or both, as with the 
invention of swaps), structuring pricing by constrain-
ing their pathways in a dimension that is endogenously 
constituted, differentiating, and universalisable thanks 
to the contingency of its abstraction with respect to the 
underlying occasions. e variability of derivative pric-
ing is only ever realised in locatable and circumscribed 
contracts specifying particular pricing conditionality 
and temporization structures. 
Exotic options are an operational index of the 
indefinite variability of derivatives pricing, yet they 
are constrained by the requirements of the currently 
prevailing standard model of capitalization. But this 
standard determination, while dominant, is not neces-
sary. eoretically, the liberation of business from 
its industrial determination by derivatives pricing 
(to adopt Veblen’s terminology) is a dynamic power-
ordering that is simultaneously more extensive and 
more intensive than the geospatial and industry-based 
business variants of differential accumulation to which 
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Veblen remains bound and from which Nitzan and 
Bichler draw their analysis. It is more extensive because 
the ‘single quantitative architecture’ of price, coupled 
to the risk-rationality of derivatives pricing—as a claim 
on earnings that are explicitly unknown, inactual, and 
constituted by a futurity that is in principle uncon-
strained—means that financial pricing and claims on 
earnings can extend transhistorically from the present 
in which the contract is written to any moment in 
spacetime, including all futurity, indefinitely (if the 
legal structures are durable enough). And it is more 
intensive because, to put the preceding point the 
other way around, derivatives pricing is endogenously 
constituted, meaning that the in-principle universal 
extension of price is operationalised (i) across time (at 
whatever scale), and (ii) in relation to an underlying 
that is therefore fungible, a contingent conditional for 
the organization of power qua price. Combined as 
two aspects of the one instantiation of power-ordering, 
the universal fungibility of the underlying in deriva-
tives pricing has its systemic correlate in the universal 
fungibility of pecuniary assets in the dynamic reorder-
ing of capital-power—which can, for this reason, be 
determined as a risk order.
e theoretical consequences extend to the con-
ceptual schema of derivatives pricing, in so far as their 
in-principle indefinite variation requires a significant 
divergence from Derrida’s determination of the logic 
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of différance, the elaboration of which requires a last 
brief return to phenomenology. Unlike Husserl, for 
whom there is but one single presence even though the 
lived present as such is an ideal and never any factual 
lived presence, for Derrida the present is necessarily 
different from itself, the living present being no less 
the simultaneity of the lived present idealiter (which 
is infinitely deferred from being manifest as such) and 
realiter.Ú¬ e infinite différance constituting the ideal 
present takes place in the finitude of the real present. 
e logic of différance is thereby exempted from the 
opposition of finitude and infinitude. Furthermore, 
because the ideal lived presence is no fact of lived 
presence, its only manifestation is in fact the absence 
of a lived present: death. Transposing the logic of diffé-
rantial temporization to the constitutive structuring of 
derivatives pricing, Derrida’s summary of the relation 
between the factual lived present and its supposed 
ideality finds its direct analogue in taking the payoff 
and (where it happens) the exchange of the underly-
ing at maturity not as the terminal point at the outer 
103. J. Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s eory 
of Signs, tr. D. B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 
[1967]), 99ff. For Derrida, the différantial constitution of the living present 
in Husserl’s phenomenology is instantiated by the deferral of the ideality of 
that living present (and that of the pure thought Husserl also relies upon) 
as it is by the non-ideal present which is no less the living present in fact. 
e living present is different from/to itself (ideal, factual) and is the fact 
of its deferral. e Ideal living present—what the living present truly is 
for Husserl—never appears in fact. It is a Kantian ideal, infinitely because 
constitutively deferred from the presence that it ‘is’, a present that is then 
necessarily different from itself.
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limit of the contract (its ‘expiration’ as the terminology 
for options has it), but rather as one of its intrinsic 
constitutive and structuring features:
only a relation to the expiration [Derrida: ‘my-death’] 
could make the infinite différance of pricing [pres-
ence] appear. In the same blow, compared to the 
ideality of the positive infinite, this relation to the 
expiration [my-death] becomes an accident of empiri-
cal finitude. e appearance of infinite différance is 
itself finite. Consequently, différance, which is noth-
ing outside of this relation, becomes the finitude of 
the derivative [life] as an essential relation with its 
expiration [oneself and one’s death]. Infinite dif-
férance is finite.Ú°
at is, the in-principle indefinite variability of différan-
tial pricing, including its expiration, is always manifest 
in the ‘empirical finitude’ of its pricing, which is the 
theoretical corollary to the volatility smile: maturity/
expiration, which is the constitutive deferral of dif-
férantial pricing, is but one variable amongst others 
in pricing. In philosophical convention: the tempori-
zation of différantial pricing up to and including its 
termination is immanent to pricing.Ú¿ 
104. Derrida, Speech, 102.
105. Once constituted, derivatives markets can be conceptualized as a field 
of immanent differentiation, for which Deleuzian categories and dynamic 
schemata provide productive theorization especially of the dual deployment 
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However, the analogy is not a complete one. e logic 
of différantial pricing diverges significantly from Der-
rida’s deduction of différance from phenomenological 
consciousness for two reasons:
­. Death and the absolute past are distinct from any 
living (self-)presence of a consciousness because of the 
unity and inexchangeability of that consciousness;ÚÀ 
whereas there is no such constraint on the différan-
tial pricing of derivatives. In general, a derivatives 
contract can be terminated before maturity/expi-
ration (for example, with American-style options). 
e purported exchange of the underlying required 
for the structure of the particular derivatives contract 
and, historically, to distinguish derivatives trading 
from gambling, is only a conditional term providing 
of the actual and inactual, the latter being translated in Deleuzian 
convention to the virtual, which together compose the real—the latter being 
contrasted for Deleuze to the possible. See B. Lozano, Of Synthetic Finance 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2015) and Elie Ayache’s characterisation of the 
market a ‘pure becoming’ (e Blank Swan [Chichester: Wiley, 2010], 39). 
Such accounts however presume and neglect the constituting deferral of 
the strike price or expiration at maturity as ordering term of the forward 
contract, ordering it instead as an inactualized virtuality of the market and 
thus susceptible to the criticisms put to Esposito’s systems-theorization and 
the BSM regime, upon which such theorizations tend to depend. Jakob 
Arnoldi hybridises Deleuzian and systems-theoretical notions of the virtual 
as a space of calculative probabilities distinct to the possible in ‘Derivatives: 
Virtual Values and Real Risks’, eory Culture Society 21:23 (2004), 23–42.
106. e condition of the unity of consciousness is not limited eidetic 
phenomenology. at consciousness has a primary unity is proposed in 
cognitive neuroscience by omas Metzinger, e Ego Tunnel (New York: 
Basic Books, 2009). Ch.2, and for semantic inferentialism by Robert 
Brandom (Reason, Ch.2), for whom it is a condition of philosophy and 
sapience (see n.133).
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the terms for the contract’s payoff and determining 
its market price. e time to expiration is, in other 
words, but one variable among others in the finite 
construction and pricing of the derivative and its 
trading. Consequently, the endogenous différantial 
pricing of any particular derivative, constructed in 
its finitude thanks to its contractual boundedness, 
is intrinsically imbricated with its market pricing, 
which is its exchangeability in advance of its matu-
rity. In distinction to Derrida’s phenomenological 
commitments, the finitude of the différantial tempo-
rization of the derivative contract is constituted in 
its exchangeability. 
. Since this means that the market is not outside 
of the endogenous construction of derivative pricing, 
a derivative’s expiration/maturity is one variable in the 
more general revisability of derivatives market pricing 
and their concomitant contingeny. is is to reiterate 
once again that derivatives are constituted in the institu-
tions of différantial pricing (derivatives markets); but 
it also makes explicit that the finite temporization of 
pricing is necessarily imbricated with market trading. 
e contingency of revision characteristic of deriva-
tives pricing supervenes on the terms of the contract’s 
expiration, which determine its finitude. Consequently, 
if the expiration and payoff are but variables of dif-
férantial market pricing, the temporization of pricing 
is not constrained by its finitude qua termination of 
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the derivative at expiration/maturity, but rather by its 
termination qua marketisation. is is the condition 
and structure of speculative finance, now distinguished 
from investment by operationally prioritizing market 
pricing qua the contingency of its revision over its 
termination in relation to the underlying (meaning the 
provision of liquidity outside of the market upon expi-
ration/maturity). Moreover, because of the priority of 
the contingency of revision for différantial pricing, the 
only constraints for market speculation are regulatory, 
rather than stemming from a putatively ‘real economy’ 
external to it. But because such regulations and the 
institutionalisation of pricing that they permit and 
impose are themselves as constructed, variable, and 
subject to the contingency of revision as the pricing 
mechanisms they regulate, unlike death for the living 
consciousness the speculatively organized constraints 
of derivatives pricing are not uniquely determined but 
somewhat arbitrary.
Combining these two partial results, the specula-
tively-organised termination of the derivative via its 
marketisation means that différantial pricing is consti-
tutively indefinite in two regards: firstly, the derivative 
can be traded at any point up to its expiration; and, sec-
ondly, its price varies with the derivatives market, not 
just that of the market of the underlying. Constituted 
and instituted in the finite but also variable contractual 
terms of any particular derivative, the price variability 
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of différantial pricing is therefore intrinsically indefi-
nite. In this it diverges from the logic of différance 
established in Derrida’s deconstruction of phenom-
enological consciousness, for which infinite différance 
is finite and the différance of the lived present of con-
sciousness is in ‘an essential relation’ to its finitude qua 
the unique termination that is its death: not only is infi-
nite différance finite for derivatives, finite différance is 
also indefinite. 
e two dimensions of variation for différantial 
pricing—the price-setting schedule of the finite because 
bounded contract, and its market price variability and 
trading—are constitutive of one another: the indefinite 
price-variability depends upon the variable finitude 
of the contract (its expiration, the payoff schedule, 
amongst other conditionals) and the speculatively-
organised variations in what a derivatives contract 
might be are constructed with regard to their indefinite 
market variability, not the payoff. is integrated 
dual variability of the derivative contract with its 
pricing constitutes the operational terms of the deriva-
tive’s price-endogeneity in its intrinsic contingency of 
revision, which is here designated as the plasticity of 
the derivatives contract. In practice, and to reverse-
engineer the argument, the plasticity of the deriva-
tive is the condition for the indefinition of derivative 
pricing without which there could be no operative 
market qua contingent repricing of derivatives, the 
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bounded pricing structures and schedules of which are 
fabricated in view of that constitutive and endogenous 
indefinition. Or, again, market pricing and trading is 
the operational manifestation of derivatives’ intrinsic 
operational contingency of revision. 
at derivatives are constitutively rather than sec-
ondarily speculatively organised in their own markets 
is demonstrated by the ‘closing out’ of positions. While 
futures contracts require the buyer to take delivery of the 
underlying asset at the expiry date, a trader speculating 
or hedging on the futures market can exit the contract 
by executing exactly the opposite trade to the initial 
one, doing so at any time prior to the latter’s maturity. 
e trader then has a long and short position on the one 
trade, resulting in no net position at maturity. While the 
position is then ‘flat’ and the delivery of the underly-
ing need not be made, the trader can still make a gain 
or loss—or, more likely in the latter case, circumvent 
anticipated greater losses—in futures prices over the 
period. e vast majority of futures contracts are closed 
out, with delivery of the asset being ‘relatively rare’.ÚÌ
107. Hull, Options, §2.1. 
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Illustration
e strike price for a futures contract in URB maturing in three 
months is ¿Úlcu per share. A speculator takes a short position for 
ÚÚ shares, locking in revenue of ¿ÚÚÚlcu at maturity (excluding 
transaction costs).
A¶er two months, the delivery price of URB shares at expiration 
is anticipated to be °Ìlcu at maturity. e trader anticipates a gain 
of ¿Ú− °Ì = ¬lcu per share, or ¬ÚÚlcu on the contract, provided all 
the shares are immediately bought at °Ìlcu at maturity.
e speculator guarantees such a purchase by going long on 
ÚÚ URB shares priced at °Ìlcu with the same expiration date as 
the original trade.
e trader then has a ‘flat’ position regarding the asset, trade in 
one position cancelling out the trade in the other, yet gains ¬lcu 
per share by closing out the deal. 
If the spot price on maturity looks like it will be greater than the 
delivery price (say ¿§lcu), the trader with the short position looks 
to lose ¿Ú−¿§ = −§lcu per share on the futures contract. 
Closing out the deal by going long with a strike price of ¿§lcu 
gives more certainty to the net loss of §ÚÚlcu, rather than taking 
the risk of an even greater effective loss by the anticipated rising 
price of URB stock. 
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at more than one position is taken on the same 
asset (and by the same trader) inflates the nominal 
size of the market beyond its actual credit exposure. 
is explains in part the operational causes for the 
sizes of the financial markets that underpin Lesson 
Two in the introductory comments above. In terms 
of the general theory of capitalization, that Lesson is 
instructive as a practical demonstration of the liberty 
derivatives markets have with regard to the parochial 
statutory limitations imposed on them at the historical 
inauguration of the  in Illinois. Closing out makes 
it quite explicit that the delivery of the underlying is 
but a jurisdictional requirement to be circumvented—
one that is historically fundamental but operationally 
trivial. It is one among other requirements structuring 
the early derivatives markets and which, rather than 
containing them by imposing a relation to the under-
lying, expanded them by liberating the endogenous 
plasticity of derivatives pricing.
 .  :  
    
Closing out operationally demonstrates that the libera-
tion of différantial pricing from its exogenous referent 
is tantamount to the delivery price of the underlying 
being identified as a conditional within the derivative 
pricing process rather than as being rooted in the 
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markets of the underlying. is deracination from 
exogenous markets is imposed, first, by the endogene-
ity of différantial pricing, which proscribes the exog-
enous referent from being anything but a variable of 
the finite temporization constructed by the derivative 
contract. And it is also imposed because, second, capi-
talization per Nitzan and Bichler is organised through 
price qua ownership claims and derivative contracts 
are only juridicofinancial constructions which build 
in and make explicit the variability of the price over 
the duration of the contract. at is, the price of the 
underlying as object of capitalization on derivatives mar-
kets is determined not on the basis of prices exogenous 
to those markets, but on the basis of the plasticity of 
the construction, temporization, and market pricing. 
at plasticity is the real of derivative pricing. Conse-
quently, the distinction between derivatives markets 
and gambling is both operationally and constitutively 
rescinded, as the institutional and regulatory develop-
ment of the derivatives markets demonstrates. What is 
less directly evident from that history of institutional 
practices, however, is that while derivatives markets 
have in more or less attenuated ways formally observed 
the distinction from received constructions of gambling 
for regulatory reasons, they have also inaugurated and 
massively operationalised an unprecedented mode of 
the wager. 
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Derivatives pricing cannot be identified with conven-
tional notions of gambling, in that the standard wager 
depends on an exogenous referent that is uncertain 
at the time the wager is made (archetypically, the 
throw of the dice) from which occasion the wager 
itself (as an if-then payout conditionality) is distinct, 
and which it cannot affect without vitiating the very 
meaning of the term (archetypically, loading the dice), 
a schema designated here with the term extrowager. 
In the extrowager the gambler is constituted by her 
or his necessarily limited knowledge of an inactual 
future occurrence, a subjective manifestation of the 
inadequacy of finite epistemology to ontology. In these 
terms, the anticipatory  regime attempts to bypass 
the constraints of the extrowager (the prohibition of 
gambling), while observing them (the constitutive 
exogeneity of what is priced to the pricing process 
itself). e contention here is that, in formulating 
options pricing as an extrowager, as derivatives typi-
cally are, the  regime apprehends and domesticates 
the realist constitution and ontology of the wager 
inaugurated by derivatives markets. is domestication 
is reiterated in another format by Esposito’s systems-
theoretical account of derivatives pricing process as a 
sociosubjective construction. Furthermore, however 
prevalent and institutionally dominant such accounts 
of derivatives pricing may be, the latter is distinct in 
kind to the extrowager because of the constitutively 
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endogenous operation of différantial pricing and its 
concomitant indefinite plasticity. To be exact: 
—It shares with the extrowager the exogeneity of the 
underlying as condition of the derivative’s pricing 
process. 
—Yet différantial pricing is distinct from the extrowa-
ger in that the former is an endogenous operation 
with an indefinite plasticity until expiration for which 
the conditional exogenous referent is operationalised 
as only a contingent abstraction of the pricing process. 
Derivatives pricing is conditional upon whether the 
set conditions at expiration will transpire or not, and, 
if so, what the payoff will be.
—e price of the derivative itself as well as (indi-
rectly) the spot price of the underlying at delivery 
are themselves then priced in their markets (and its 
pricing is itself priced in the volatility markets); that 
is, any instance of derivative pricing is a wager placed 
not just in an indefinite betting process but also on it.
—Derivatives markets pricing is thereby akin to odds 
lengthening or shortening on a bet according to what 
other bets are placed. However, while the price of 
odds changes for the extrowager according to what 
other bets are placed, its changing odds and prices are 
always in reference to the exogenous circumstances 
conditioning the payout. 
—In contrast, what is unprecedented about derivatives 
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pricing is that its plasticity explicitly subordinates 
that external determinant for pricing to its own pro-
cess, such that the market refers to the changing 
prices operationalised via that market. 
—What is priced by derivatives markets, then, is the 
pricing process itself. Unlike the extrowager, deriva-
tives pricing is an infrawager, for which the terms at 
expiration are not externally determined conditionali-
ties but only parametric constraints. 
Displaced to the activities of traders, the processual 
and referential endogeneity of pricing is what Esposito 
calls second-order observation. Its determination qua 
infrawager, in contrast, explicates différantial pricing 
as an impersonal institutional fact, rearticulating its 
counterperfomativity in terms of the objective dimen-
sion of price. It is the real of derivative pricing not as 
a sociology of derivative pricing but as the ontology 
of all betting as a pricing process. Because the refer-
ent of the extrowager is the assumed condition and 
terminus of the wager, it proscribes identification of 
the endogenously constituted conditionality of the 
derivative pricing process as well as the contingency 
of abstraction with the underlying. is mistake is the 
consequence of a more or less implicit correlationism, 
the error of which is in fact exposed and operationally 
negated by the explicit manifestation of the infrawager 
in derivative pricing. Put the other way around, the 
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operational and practical exposure of the infrawager 
by derivatives markets is the historically unprecedented 
liberation of both the wager as such and of price from 
their assumed historical and theoretical subordination 
to exogenous terms that are not, in fact, conditions 
of pricing. 
Commencing instead from the ontology of the 
infrawager, as the logic of pricing requires, it is, in 
Elie Ayache’s formulation, ‘easiest to withdraw’ the 
underlying ‘from underneath the contingent payoff 
and subsequently to claim that contingency is absolute 
and no longer derivative on that state’.ÚÍ at is, the 
derivatives contract is not predicated on the under-
lying but entirely on the indefinite plasticity of the 
infrawager—including the price at expiration, which 
is only a structuring parameter. us the real of the 
infrawager, manifest and institutionalised as derivatives 
pricing, consists solely in its twofold contingency: the 
contingency of abstraction (the universal fungibility of 
the underlying) and the contingency of revision (the 
indefinite plasticity of différantial pricing). Establish-
ing that the infrawager is the endogenously-constituted 
and -referencing real of derivatives pricing provides 
the basis for the final steps to complete the present 
argument; namely, to generalise the determination 
of pricing beyond the specific institutional practices 
108. E. Ayache, ‘e Turning’, in Wilmott Magazine, June 2010, 45, www.
ito33.com/sites/default/files/articles/1007_ayache.pdf.
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of derivatives markets to price as such (its intensive 
aspect) which, per Nitzan and Bichler, is the single 
universal architecture of capitalization (its extensive 
aspect). e two imperatives for this comprehensive 
theory of price are, firstly, that it specify the articula-
tion of finance in its practical dimension (institutional 
operations of capitalization via ownership claims) with 
financiality (the a priori of capitalization); and conse-
quently, that the theory of price advanced must also 
provide a specific determination of finance power and 
thereby the primary characteristics of the state-finance 
nexus and its cogency (however riven and incoherent 
it may be in theory). It is Ayache’s theorization of 
pricing that advances the generalisation of pricing 
required here, thanks to its positive determination 
of pricing as such as instantiating contingency qua 
absolute futurity, thereby (to go beyond the terms of 
Ayache’s own argument) specifying the mode of time 
binding of capitalization not in the dimension of its 
sociology but of the real of price that is its ontology.
­.  
ough Ayache’s argument is not directly that of the 
infrawager, his principal contentions are congruent 
with it, namely (i) that forward contracts have no 
price process shadowing a succession of prices out-
side of the derivative itself. Predicated instead on the 
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contingency of the underlying as its real, (ii) the price 
process given by the stochastic model and its elabo-
rations are ‘eliminated’. Consequently, (iii) the only 
reality derivatives prices have is that of the long/short 
position as the contract is re-entered (or not) every 
day the market is open, and no less (iv) at expiration. 
Ayache’s claims follow from the observation that the 
real of the derivatives pricing process in the present is not 
the ‘path’ of différantial pricing, which is the dynamic 
actualisation of its temporization. Rather (and this is 
what Ayache adds to the determination of the real of 
derivative pricing) ‘what exists today’ for the forward 
contract (here a metonym for the derivative structure 
in general) ‘are contingent claims, paying ­ or . […] 
[B]oth belong to the world now and also to the world 
“taking place”’.ÚÒ In addition to the contingency of 
abstraction that is the universal fungibility of the 
underlying of the forward contract, the derivative 
is also contingent in that it posits a speculative ‘as-
yet-unknown’ eventuality. at eventuality does not 
preexist the contract but is fabricated by it; the contract 
constitutes it in its inactuality and unknowness. e 
two outcomes are the ‘branches’ of two different reali-
ties only one of which will be actualized at expiration 
because of the contract. It follows that the derivative 
contract is, in Ayache’s terms, always a ‘contingent 
claim’. e contingency identified by Ayache is one 
109. Ayache, ‘Turning’, 41; emph. added.
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that the derivative constitutes and inaugurates and, as 
such, can be designated as its thetic contingency.
 What this third contingency of the derivative consti-
tutes is its deracination, not with regard to the underly-
ing (from which the derivative is deracinated by the 
contingency of abstraction) but rather the deracination 
of price itself in the pricing process: it posits that ‘the 
world is actually what it is in reality’—the derivative 
has a particular price in fact—‘except that it could have 
been different’—only one of the contingent inactuali-
ties is actualised, the other remains inactual.Ú etic 
contingency is the necessary prerequisite of derivatives 
pricing, in that ‘the contingent claim is only conceived 
as the written formula that it is (pay $­ if S is greater 
than K,  otherwise)’, and also that the endogenous 
variability of pricing in the infrawager supposes price 
not to be a fixed given but, precisely, revisable. Inau-
gurated and instituted by the derivatives contract, the 
thetic contingency of pricing is endogenous, real, and 
absolute for it. 
is requires a revised determination of différantial 
pricing. e thetic contingency of différantial pricing 
means that:
110. Ayache, ‘Turning’, 36.
111. e quote is from E. Ayache, ‘e End of Probability’, Wilmott Magazine, 
October 2010, 41, www.ito33.com/sites/default/files/articles/1011_ayache_0.pdf.
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—Derivatives are not just a counterperformative time-
binding of the present and the future in which the 
deferring and displacing of the present into the future 
prevents the actuality of the present from being 
constituted as clearly distinct from the inactuality 
of the future. 
—What is to be added to that determination of deriva-
tive pricing qua temporization, is that the constitu-
tive futurity of the différantially organised present 
of risk pricing is that of the splitting of the future 
payoff—that is, the thetic contingency inaugurated 
by the derivative contract. 
—at eventuality is endogenous to the pricing pro-
cess, absolute yet presently unknown. e only rela-
tion to it in any present is speculative. 
—e time-binding of derivatives pricing is conse-
quently a constructed relation of the (thereby deraci-
nated) present to the contingency of the split future, 
which will be both actualised and (with the eventual-
ity that does not transpire) inactualisable. 
—e logical a priori of the derivatives contract 
in the present is the absolute futurity of its thetic 
contingency.
—at is, to vector Esposito’s formulation of the risk 
order across the dimension of the real of pricing: the 
inactual dimension of the present of pricing (risk) is 
ineliminable, even in any future present. e present 
can never be determined as a full actuality, not even in 
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the future present; what is real to derivatives pricing 
is an absolute future that it endogenously constitutes. 
e future present is therefore itself susceptible to 
revision in the way Esposito describes, as integral 
to a social binding permitting the future revision of 
decisions made today, but now with regard to the real 
of the infrawager. e logical a priori of the contract 
in the present is the absolute futurity of its thetic 
contingency. Consequently, the deferral of derivatives 
pricing is not that of a durational extension of the 
present (that would be the anticipatory formulation) 
but an irreconcilable and endogenous splitting of the 
present. at thetic, futural contingency occasioned 
in the present is the precise sense in which pricing is 
necessarily counterperformative: it is the positing of 
a future supervening on any continuity of the present, 
a futurity that is absolute for différantial pricing. In 
Ayache’s words, the thetic contingency of the forward 
contract is the ‘real thread of the future’ in the present 
qua pricing, up to and including its payoff.§ 
As the absolute of derivatives pricing, thetic contin-
gency is the truth of its counterperformativity. Conse-
quently, three preceding determinations of derivative 
pricing need to be revisited, the third of which is taken 
up in the next section.
112. Ayache, ‘Turning’, 41.
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Anticipatory pricing. Future prices cannot ever be pre-
dicted or anticipated, because the delivery price qua 
conditionality structuring the derivative ‘collects as one 
writing the two branches of the alternative incompat-
ible in actual reality’. at is, the pricing process is 
inaugurated by positing a split futurity that then not 
only refutes but also vitiates the possibility of antici-
pation qua extension of the present.¬ Which means 
that anticipatory models of actual price movement, 
including but not restricted to , are only retrofit-
ted elaborations, provided at maturity, of how the 
strike price was supposed to have been reached. e 
counterpossibilities to the actual price development 
of the derivative are, qua probabilities, only idealized, 
retrofitted reconstructions of a futurity; while once 
real in their inactuality, they were never actualised. 
Such counterpossibilities are a consequence of the 
absolute futurity of différantal pricing: just as the 
future present of différantial temporization is itself 
revisable because it too is constituted by the absolute 
thetic contingency of the real of the infrawager, so 
the past that determines the present as its actual yet 
revisable future is itself saturated with the unactual-
ised eventualities of the past, of yet-other-futures for 
the past that are not the present from which they are 
apprehended. ese past inactualised eventualities are 
only fictive idealizations in that they have not in fact 
113. Quoting from Ayache, ‘Turning’, 41.
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been actualized and, unlike future inactualities, they 
remain perennially inactual given that actuality turned 
out to be the present from which they are surmised. 
at is, they are only possible, never real. Furthermore, 
with derivatives pricing,such past inactualities cannot 
be predicated on an absolute past in counterpoint 
to its endogenous absolute futurity because, being 
logically predicated on that futural contingency and 
historically inaugurated by the contract, the a priori 
of the pricing process cannot precede it in time. Or, 
as Ayache puts it, the anticipatory articulation of the 
price process always and necessarily comes ‘a¶er reality, 
not before’.° Inversely, mistakenly presuming that 
derivative pricing takes place against a stable time 
background rather than instituting a temporization 
of contingent futurity, the probabilistic calculation 
of price development assumes that ‘possibility pre-
cedes reality and that the different possibilities facing 
the world become realized as time passes’.¿ As such, 
retrospective-anticipatory pricing regimes—which take 
derivatives pricing to be strictly secondary to price 
movements and actualities elsewhere—repudiate the 
futural contingency that is the real of derivative pricing.
114. Both quotes in this paragraph are from Ayache, ‘Turning’, 37.
115. is is not to refute any and all manifestations of probabilistic 
formulations of pricing of contingent claims. Ayache supports the ‘episodic’ 
deployment of probability and stochastic control in the trader’s daily market 
interventions (‘Probability’, 42).
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Volatility. Previously designated as volatility, the endog-
enous thetic contingency of derivative pricing can 
now no longer only be rendered by its ‘implied’ deri-
vation by which, recall, it can only be reconstructed 
consequent to its preclusion by the constraints of 
anticipatory pricing models (), or as an effect of 
the reflexivity of derivative markets as a risk-order 
(Esposito). Rather, volatility is the absolute of deriva-
tive pricing: there is no derivative pricing without 
the splitting of the real of price into unknown actual 
and inactualisable futures; without, that is, a futural 
contingency that, in the endogeneity of the derivative 
market pricing, is instantiated in the indefinite plastic-
ity of the infrawager. at contingency of revision is 
however actualised only by virtue of the operations of 
derivatives markets: the actuality of derivative pricing 
is, precisely, its price, instantiated nowhere else but 
in the dedicated market of the particular derivative. 
Consequently, ‘the reality of the whole market worms 
its way into every attempt that possibility undertakes to 
precede the real’.À e real of derivative pricing is then 
endogenously constituted and actualized in its plastic-
ity as a marketised futural contingency. While this is a 
familiar result, reiterating in other terms that derivative 
pricing is volatile because it is counterperformative, 
the formulation advanced here makes explicit that 
the ontology of price qua différantial temporization 
116. Ayache, ‘Turning’, 49.
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is necessarily predicated on an absolute futurity. at 
is, what is realized in every instantiation of derivative 
pricing is a volatility that is absolute for it. 
e thetic contingency of an ineliminable futurity 
that splits the present—the absolute futurity inaugu-
rated in différantial pricing—is the real of derivative 
markets. e innocuous account of the derivatives 
market as ‘the place where contingent claims get 
prices attached to them’Ì—a put must be met by a 
call, a short position by a long position—is a prel-
ude to the comprehensive determination of market 
operationality as the endogenously constituted mate-
rial occasion—the institution—by which the futural 
contingency of derivative pricing is actualised and 
manifest with each reiteration of pricing. As condi-
tion of the plasticity of derivatives pricing, the market 
is the material topology—more exactly, given that 
in the technical vocabulary of the market, the put 
option is said to be ‘written’, it is the toposcription—of 
the absolute volatility that is the actualisation of the 
futural contingency of derivative pricing. A number of 
equivalent formulations follow: necessarily instantiated 
in the derivatives market, the futural contingency of 
derivatives pricing requires its dynamic yet metastable 
toposcription, meaning that ‘only the market preserves 
contingency in the present’;Í or, as Ayache puts it 
117. Ayache, ‘Probability’, 42.
118. Ayache, ‘Turning’, 43. 
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elsewhere, the market is ‘the medium of contingency’.Ò 
Emphasising the endogeneity of pricing, ‘the market is 
its own source of contingency’;§Ú emphasising instead 
the absolute volatility instantiated by that institutional 
toposcription, market pricing can be characterised as 
a ‘technology of the future’.§ 
To be clear, and to draw the argument back to the 
broader political economy of derivatives markets: the 
‘preservation’ of contingency by derivatives markets, 
its technology, is necessarily contrary to stability. e 
ontology of these market institutions is predicated on 
119. Ayache, ‘In e Middle of e Event’, in R. Mackay (ed.), e 
Medium of Contingency (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2011), and ‘e Medium 
of Contingency’, Pli 22, 2011, 62–87. While market pricing is a medium of 
contingency, following Nitzan and Bichler it is also at once the medium of 
power. e implied codetermination of contingency and power via price 
is explicated in §11.1 below. e subordinate point is that, determined 
as these mediations, finance theory is a variant of media studies. Vogl 
similarly proposes that finance demonstrates the general characteristic of all 
media, that they ‘communicate themselves in their operation’ as well as the 
communicated ‘content’, in this case because the control over the contingent 
future sought by finance is betrayed by the ‘time-critical processes’ that 
finance markets are (‘Taming Ùme: Media of Financialization’, tr. C. Reid, 
Grey Room 46 [Winter 2012], 82). However, Vogl’s argument obviates the 
primacy of volatility in the pricing of risk and, following Keynes, also 
predicates the contingencies generated by market pricing on time distinct 
to the ‘control’ of price. Ayache’s and Esposito’s otherwise divergent theses 
are, rather, that the temporization of market pricing is constituted by the 
latter’s contingencies. at is, the market is a medium of contingency and 
consequently a medium of time qua futurity. Still opaque, however, is what 
that futurity is with respect to both the contingency and power it posits, and 
this is what §11.2 below elaborates.
120. Ayache, ‘Turning’, 49.
121. E. Ayache, ‘e Next Question Concerning Technology. Part 1: e 
Significance of Dynamic Replication’, Wilmott Magazine, June 2007, 33 [www.
ito33.com/sites/default/files/articles/0703_nail.pdf].
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the absolute volatility (thetic contingency) and indefi-
nite plasticity (contingency of revision) of derivatives 
pricing that together constitute such markets as risk-
orders. Locating the instantiation of pricing identifies 
the market as the sociotechnical condition—the institu-
tion—for the contract-exchange that determines price 
on each occasion. Ayache literalises that condition as 
the trading pit for options, whereas Esposito notes 
that derivatives markets are, amongst other markets, 
now geospatially ‘distributed […] as a ubiquitous form 
of calculation and reasoning’, in accordance with the 
weakening norms of jurisdictional authority in the 
geospatially attenuated institutional forms of the risk-
order.§§ Furthermore, and to begin the redetermination 
of the contingency of abstraction that will be taken up 
more fully in the next section, since derivative pricing 
is liberated from any intrinsic or necessary relation to 
the underlying, and given that there is no ‘cause’ for 
the contingency of pricing outside of the endogenous 
pricing process, for Ayache that contingency is instanti-
ated primarily by the existential participation of the 
derivatives trader in the pit who, in Badiousian fashion, 
is subjectivised by its eventhood§¬—a singularisation 
effected, without standing in complete contradiction 
to Badiou’s philosophy despite the theoretical-political 
incongruity with it, as a personalized embodiment 
122. Esposito, Future, 69.
123. Ayache, Blank Swan, §4.3.1–2.
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of the second-order observer who is Esposito’s sys-
temic agent. But such determinations are again epi-
phenomenal and inadequate precisely because they 
are subjectively organised rather than determined by 
the logic of differential capitalization. Against such 
correlational determinations, the real of différantial 
pricing that is the absolute volatility of the infrawager 
must rather be apprehended in terms of its impersonal, 
socio-institutional ontology. Taking up that injunction, 
as the next section does, provides the argument for 
determining the ontology of price in general to be the 
real of derivative pricing, a result that in turn permits 
the operational and a priori dimensions of finance to 
be coarticulated without subreption.
.   , , 
at volatility is the absolute of derivatives pricing 
does not revoke the delivery price as a constitutive 
conditionality for that process. ere can be no deriva-
tives pricing without the delivery price as a structuring 
parameter. Moreover, in Ayache’s formulation, only at 
the expiration of the derivative pricing process is ‘the 
contingent claim really derivative on its underlying 
because its price is then settled and rigorously equal 
to that function of the underlying called the payoff’.§° 
at is, maturity/expiration is the one point at which 
124. Ayache, ‘Turning’, 45.
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derivative pricing is convertible to the price of the 
underlying asset, a moment conventionally called 
the valuation of the contract and thereby of the pric-
ing process. In Ayache’s terms, valuation is when the 
‘underlying’ of the derivative transfers from the paper 
on which the contract is written to the asset, a figura-
tive articulation of the conversion of the endogenous 
plasticity of the pricing process to its determination by 
the price of the exogenous referent in its own market, 
a determination cashed out as the payoff. Valuation 
is the completion, exhaustion, and conclusion of the 
pricing process. 
Because valuation is determined by the difference 
between the delivery price and the strike price at 
expiration, the former being a static structuring con-
ditional of the pricing process while the latter is also 
set in the market of the underlying asset, it seems 
that valuation is an external, structuring boundary 
condition for derivatives pricing. e institutional 
distinctions between derivatives markets and those of 
the underlying assets (when the latter are nonfinancial) 
confirm the exteriority of valuation to the plasticity of 
derivatives pricing. Yet price volatility is operationally 
generated by activity in any market, including those 
trading assets to which the derivatives refer (§´ above) 
and, theoretically, determined as it is by the difference 
between delivery and strike prices, the valuation of a 
derivative is precisely what is itself priced and varied 
Collapse 8.indb   764 27/11/2014   15:40
Malik—Ontology of Finance
765
by derivative markets. As such, valuation is an internal 
boundary condition to the derivative pricing process 
even as it conditional on the price of the underlying 
asset in its own market. e valuation of the underlying 
is, as Ayache puts it, ‘dictated by the programmatic 
character of the payoff schedule’.§¿ 
At best, then, valuation is determined on the one 
side in relation to the price of the underlying in its 
own market or, on the other, by an internal boundary 
condition for derivatives pricing. e two sides are 
constitutively and institutionally distinct and, as such, 
the determinations of valuation are in opposition. But 
they are not incoherent or contradictory; nor can the 
ambivalence of valuation be settled by a more exacting 
analysis. In Derridean terms, valuation is a supplement 
to derivatives pricing, a term held to be outside of the 
derivatives pricing process but structuring it as a condi-
tioning origin, principle, or terminus, yet which in fact 
is only stipulated as an extrinsic determination by that 
process (for example, for Husserlian phenomenology, 
the lived present is a supplement of what is in fact a 
differentially constituted present). at supplementary 
condition is what permits différantial pricing to be 
subordinated to the anticipatory regime of pricing, 
which is premised on valuation; and what permits the 
infrawager that is the real of price to be correspond-
ingly determined as an extrowager, in which the real 
125. Ibid., 47
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of pricing is its exogenous referent (in the case of 
derivatives, the price of the underlying asset). Equally, 
however, if derivative pricing is instead predicated on 
the infrawager and its différantial logic as its real, as 
has been established here, then the supplementary 
condition loses its prerogative over the pricing process 
and must instead be determined in terms of its real. 
To anticipate the next steps of the argument, and 
without confusing the specific meaning of derivatives 
valuation with the generality of value as such, what this 
‘supplementless’ determination of valuation means is 
that (i) value is in every case an exogenous cipher for 
pricing, and that (ii) price is in every instance predi-
cated on its absolute volatility, including the price of 
the underlying in its own market. e argument on 
value follows from that on price, which is itself a gen-
eral theory deduced from the comprehensive theory 
of derivative pricing:
—Valuation is the conversion of the derivative at expi-
ration/maturity in its own market to another market 
in which the underlying is priced. In valuation, the 
pecuniary magnitude of the derivative contract payoff 
is exchanged in its equivalence qua price for the asset 
in its own ‘primary’ market. 
—‘Equivalence qua price’ across markets supposes the 
commonality of price for both the derivative and the 
asset as pecuniary magnitudes. And because value 
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is the conventional term for the conversion point of 
one market to another via price (as discussed further 
below), price itself then being determined as a value 
because of its exogenous referentiality across markets, 
‘valuation’ is the appropriate conventional term to des-
ignate this moment in the derivatives pricing process. 
—e valuation of the derivative and therefore of the 
underlying asset is, however, at once priced by the 
derivatives pricing process itself and, qua volatility, 
modified by it. Furthermore, valuation cannot be 
recused from derivative pricing without mistakenly 
limiting derivative pricing to the standard format 
of the extrowager—an extrojective circumscription 
that is in any case proscribed by the logic of the dif-
férantial constitution of the infrawager, according to 
which the identity of terms cannot be preestablished.
—at is, if valuation is an exchange predicated on 
prices, this now means that the putatively exogenous 
referent of the derivative’s valuation—the price of 
the underlying in its own market—is not in principle 
distinct from price as it is constituted by différantial 
pricing. If it were so distinct, derivative pricing would 
be inequivalent to price in the markets for the under-
lying, vitiating valuation in particular and derivative 
markets in general, as well as fracturing the ‘single 
quantitative architecture’ of pricing in capitalization. 
—For this reason, valuation as the conversion point 
from one pricing process to another is constituted by 
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and manifests the two contingencies—thetic (absolute 
volatility) and revisability (plasticity)—of derivative 
pricing. As such, and as already noted, valuation is 
an internal structural conditionality of the derivative 
pricing process. But ‘internal’ now indexes only its 
institutional formats: the exchangeability of deriva-
tive pricing with prices outside of derivative markets 
via valuation means that the infrawager is the struc-
tural and ontological condition of price per se; and 
the absolute volatility of derivative pricing is the 
absolute of price within and outside of derivatives 
markets. 
—e price of the underlying is thus institutionally exter-
nal to derivatives markets, but constituted in their logic.  
Or, inversely, derivative pricing exposes and makes 
institutionally and operationally manifest the general 
condition of pricing as such. Extending outside of 
the specific institutions of derivatives markets to 
the fact of price as such, the différantial ontology of 
derivative pricing is the real of price per se.
On the basis of that general theory, Ayache’s char-
acterisation of the absolute volatility of derivative 
pricing, that the ‘written and material character of the 
contingent claim repeats that value is in fact unset-
tled and that it could have been different (i.e., it is a 
price)’ holds even for prices outside of the derivative 
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markets.§À More broadly, it is intrinsic and necessary to 
the valuation of derivatives that all prices ‘could have 
been different’ because any price means that another 
price could have been given thanks to the plasticity 
and absolute volatility of pricing. 
Value
ough this means that price is in general predicated 
on the real of derivative pricing that is the infrawager 
and its dyadic contingency, the supplementary deter-
mination of valuation persists in the primary sense 
informing the term ‘valuation’: that price reflects value 
(or, at least, it should). As noted above, the value 
of derivative pricing is its payout, occasioned in its 
putative exchange for the (price of the) underlying, at 
which point the derivative pricing process vacates the 
operating logic of the infrawager and converts into a 
mercantile exchange; as the terminology for options 
has it, derivatives and their markets expire when they 
are exchanged for the underlying asset. More gener-
ally, value is the exogenous determination of pricing 
which, in the standard determinations of Neoclassi-
cal and Marxian doctrine, also anchors it—the very 
same conversion of pricing that was operationally 
imposed by the regulators of the early . Formally, 
the argument against the priority of value over price 
follows quickly from its différantial logic: what is 
126. Ayache, ‘Turning’, 45.
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conventionally supposed as the condition and referent 
of price is in fact constituted and deconstructed by 
the latter. Price deconstructs value, and that decon-
struction is explicitly manifest in derivative pricing. 
Substantially, the endogenous constitution of price 
qua infrawager means that the value-referent of price is 
not established on the basis of circumstances external 
to the relevant market such as trade, scarcity, demand, 
use, labour, or any other determinant external to pric-
ing, all of which beg the standard economic question 
of how these heterogeneous nonpecuniary conditions 
and specificities can be commonly calibrated via pecu-
niary magnitudes.§Ì As closing out and the universal 
127. In obviating even the means of means of production as a prerequisite 
of pricing, this result goes farther than Ian Steedman’s conclusion that ‘in 
general, profits and prices cannot be derived from [Marx’s] ordinary value 
schema’ but rather only from the ‘physical schema’ of physical production 
and labour costs’ (‘Value, Price and Profit’, New Le¤ Review I.90, March-
April 1975, 78). Marxist criticism of Steedman’s argument focus on the 
formal idealizations of the static model of production Steedman inherits 
from Piero Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (1960). 
While Steedman and Saffra both present NeoRicardian critiques of Marxian 
value-theory, recuperating the division in kind between price (exchange, 
distribution) and value (production, labour), with Steedman dispensing 
with valuation as a necessary mediation between labour and price, the 
claims of the main argument here correspond more to Samuel Bailey’s 1825 
criticism of David Ricardo’s derivation of value on the basis of labour rather 
than in terms of exchange alone. 
For Marxism, all such results can only be errors: Marx’s primary theoretical 
contribution is the synthesis of production/labour and distribution/
exchange with his labour theory of value in Capital 1: that theory is not an 
account of the generation of value by labour alone (Ricardo’s thesis) but 
of labour as an abstract social form constituted by exchange determined 
in its universal instance by money. Bailey’s thesis is that such exchange is 
the common term of value. As I.I. Rubin remarked in the 1920s, given the 
dialectical unity of labour as a social form (exchange) and concrete action 
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fungibility of the underlying make explicit, the opera-
tion and dynamic of price in derivatives markets are 
(labour), any separation of its aspects is only a mistaken hypostatization 
of its comprehensive constitution (‘Abstract Labour and Value in Marx’s 
System’ tr. K. Gilbert, Capital and Class 5 [Summer 1978]). Rubin’s 
resolution however also throws up its own difficulties on how exactly values 
then change between the input and output of a production process, and 
how they are converted to prices. e latter is known as ‘the transformation 
problem’ and was addressed by Marxist theorists countering Steedman’s 
result by insisting mainly on the intratemporality of value-development and, 
with regard to price, the dialectical integration of value via the commodity 
form, constituted on the one hand by labour in its concrete instance (as 
the yet-to-be-realised form of value, its substance in Hegelian terms) and, 
on the other, by exchange (as the realized form of value or, per Hegel, its 
appearance), with money as the (universal) abstract equivalence of value in 
general (see in particular E. Mandel [ed.], Ricardo, Marx, Sraffa [London: 
Verso, 1984]; G. Carchedi, ‘e Logic of Prices as Values’, Economy and 
Society, 13.4 [November 1984]; A. Freeman and G. Carchedi [eds.] Marx 
and Non-Equilibrium Economics [Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996]; and A. 
Freeman, A. Klimam, J. Wells [eds.] e Value Controversy and the Foundations 
of Economics [Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004]). 
While the argument of the main text here is congruent with the Marxian 
criticism of both Bailey and Ricardo as wrongly restricting the formulation 
of valuation to either exchange alone or labour alone, it also diverges from 
Marx’s explanation of valuation in general as the dialectical integration of 
these determinants in the commodity-form. What is instead proposed here 
is that valuation is but pricing in its exogenous conversion. Contrary to 
what Marx takes from Ricardo, labour then has no particular privilege in 
constituting value; and contrary to what he takes from Bailey, exchange 
only involves values as exogenous referents for the mobilization of prices 
that set the market, not as the ontogenetic condition of prices. On this 
basis, the extension of valuation to the ‘physical schema’ of production is 
not only theoretically trivial, it is necessary: if labour is value-constituting 
it is not because it is simultaneously constituted by the general social form 
of value in exchange and concretely constitutes value in particular. Rather, 
labour is value-constituting only because it is priced. Moreover, with 
regard to exchange, it is on this basis that market exchange at whatever 
scale (from individual bartering or obligation) has to be taken as a modality 
of pricing rather than the latter developing from the former (as per Adam 
Smith). Constituting valuation with regard to labour as a primary category, 
as Marx(ism) does, not only misapprehends valuation and therefore what 
labour is (the prevalent mistake of political Marxism), it also explains how 
and why dominant capital-power is not thereby troubled.
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overtly liberated from these exogenous determinations 
irrespective of whether they are cast subjectively (in the 
Neoclassical paradigm) or objectively (in the Marxian 
paradigm). 
In other words, given the contingency of abstrac-
tion as a condition of price in relation to value, price 
in general is not an epiphenomenon or overcoding of 
values that preexist it, nor an order of marketisation 
imposed upon them. Rather, in the condition of capi-
talization, price is the precondition of valuation. at 
is, the condition for the variability, transformation, 
and equivalence of value—the intrinsic mobility and 
multiplicity of values synchronically or diachroni-
cally—with regard to price is not value, but pricing. 
As such, price has no intrinsic value. And because value 
has no basis outside of the pricing process determined 
as the infrawager constituted in its triadic contingency 
(thetic contingency together with the contingencies of 
revision and abstraction), value has no intrinsic value.§Í 
Value is not then a condition or necessary limitation 
on pricing and therefore on capitalization, as a real 
other to them, but only one of the assigned variables of 
128. e three main ideas of Nietzsche’s later philosophy from the period 
of composing the Zarathustra book (1880s) onwards—the will to power, 
the revaluation of all values, and the eternal return of equivalences (as an 
idiomatic translation of ewige Widerkehr des Gleichen)—can then be identified 
as variants of the deconstruction of value by price. In rendering the 
transmutation of valuation in terms of the philosophico-religious traditions 
of moral value-formation and their modern weakening, Nietzsche correctly 
identifies the determination of modernity in non-financial terms yet, for that 
reason, largely misapprehends its constitutive elements.
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the real of price, a real exposed as such by derivatives 
market operations. On the contrary, value is but the 
exogenous determination of price, the conversion of 
one pricing process to others or to what lies outside 
of price altogether. As such, and as both Marxism and 
Neoclassical orthodoxy stipulate, value subtracts the 
contingency of abstraction from the triadic contingency 
of price in general, now meaning that value is not only 
a reduction of pricing to the dyadic (thetic and plastic) 
contingency characteristic of the infrawager but also 
that, since price, valuation extends the structure and 
contingencies of the infrawager outside of price and 
in other terms. 
e formal result above is thereby substantially 
confirmed: assuming the supplementarity of value as 
the basis of pricing, price deconstructs value. In the 
condition of capitalization, value (commonly identified 
with the qualitiative) is a financial term in principle 
and in fact (it is quantitative). Derivatives pricing 
exposes, institutes, and operationalises price as the 
differential variability of value in general, but without 
delimitation by an exogenous referent, and thus as a 
valueless process. Equally, the variability of reference 
characteristic of value, which is indefinite because 
value has no intrinsic value, is the condition made 
explicit and exact as ‘abstract pecuniary magnitudes’ 
in a universalisable ‘single quantitative architecture’ 
organized by and for capitalization: as price, that is, 
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for which valuation and what is valued (whether or 
not it is opposed to price, for example as use-value) 
are only functional occasions for the instantiation of 
a capital-power.§Ò
 
e Arkhéderivative
at a price ‘could have been different’ even once it 
is set and a value given, and that values (are liable 
to) change are demotic articulations of the general 
theory of price advanced here: that price is constituted 
in the triadic contingency of the abstract infrawager. 
Implicit in the commonplace of price contingency, 
and now fully exposed, is that, rather than prices 
arising from exogenously-derived valuation, values 
129. Confirming from a completely obverse aspect one of the primary 
theses of communization theory, that because labour is constituted by 
the value-form, contrary to orthodox Marxian praxes which vectors class 
struggle via labour organization the only viable exit from capitalism 
is rather the (theoretically organised) abolition of labour, establishing 
in its stead ‘immediate social relations between individuals’ (Endnotes, 
‘Communisation and Value-Form eory’, Endnotes 2, April 2010, endnotes.
org.uk/en/endnotes-communisation-and-value-form-theory). In terms of 
the logic of the main text here, and to preview later developments, such 
a claim is a perfectly symmetrical abreaction to the strictly endogenous 
constitution of pricing, and thereby abets finance-power from a putative 
‘outside’. Communization is consequently a politics entirely compatible with 
now-prevalent finance-power, reconstructing in other terms the exclusion 
of anthropological interests from the endogeneity of the infrawager— 
if, that is, communization is in any way a politics: the evacuation of power-
price determinations in the ‘immediate social relations between individuals’ 
abolishes the futurity and calculative risk of abstract sociality by which, as 
argued below, politics is constituted, proposing instead a countermodern 
ethical relationality. Or, as Endnotes themselves affirm, the ‘radical politics’ 
of their conclusions are in fact strictly and wholly ‘anti-political’.
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are variable by virtue of their price-ontology. Nitzan 
and Bichler, Esposito, and Ayache each formulate 
variants of this primary thesis. Nitzan and Bichler 
note that price as the elementary unit of capital-power 
cannot be established because both the anticipated 
earnings and the future normal rate of return for the 
asset, meaning that the basic discount price formula 
can not in fact be known. Accordingly, the price of 
capitalization in the present, which orders industry, is 
always and necessarily speculative, variable (plastic), 
and contingent (abstract) and thereby permit differ-
ential accumulation—that is, they are administered 
prices. For Esposito, derivatives pricing is a particularly 
complex and advanced form of sociotemporal bind-
ing that determines the present as revisable (plastic), 
maintained primarily with regard to the inactual and 
unknown future (absolute volatlity), a condition typi-
cal of the risk-order constituting modernity in general. 
And for Ayache, referring to the contingency of the 
definite uncertainty of the absolute volatility of price 
explicitly posited by derivative pricing (thetic con-
tingency), each price ‘successively repeats the whole 
genesis of price’.¬Ú 
Each is however only a partial and circumscribed 
determination of the general theory of price accord-
ing to which price as such, and value a¶er it, are 
constituted by and instantiated as différantial pricing 
130. Ayache, ‘Turning’, 42.
Collapse 8.indb   776 27/11/2014   15:40
Malik—Ontology of Finance
777
wherever and however spontaneously they happen. 
Furthermore, the ontology of price, which is the general 
and realist theory of the ‘genesis’ of price repeated 
by each price, is explicitly materialized, institution-
alized, and operationalised qua derivatives in their 
markets. But, to return to the organizing caveat in the 
introductory comments above, if the financial opera-
tions of derivatives markets are empirical-institutional 
manifestations of the ontology of price per se, the two 
dimensions referred to—institutional practices and 
ontology—cannot be directly identified: for all of their 
transnational systemic integration, derivatives markets 
are a parochial set of institutional constructions for 
capital accumulation via complex ownership claims 
formulated via specific juridical-financial contracts; 
on the other hand, the ontology of price as such is 
the a priori of pricing in every instance. Following 
Derridean convention, wherein the writing that is the 
logically a priori condition for speech, though it may 
be historically posterior to speech, is demarcated from 
the historical manifestation of writing by designating 
the a priori an ‘arkhéwriting’, the conditional pri-
macy and priority of the derivative for price as such 
is here designated the arkhéderivative.¬ e term is a 
131. ough it is not named as such, arkhéwriting is at the core of Derrida’s 
Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (tr. J. P. Leavey (Lincoln, 
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1989 [1962])), §VII, esp.89), in which 
a modality of writing is identified as the historical and logical condition 
of science. at derivation is rehearsed in Chapter Six of Speech and 
Phenomena, where arkhéwriting is explicitly named (85, translated as 
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theoretically-organized construction articulating and 
exposing the two dimensions of pricing via one other, 
integrating them without direct identification. 
at the operations of financial markets are consti-
tutively predicated on the ontology of price is a trivial 
consequence of identifying the arkhéderivative. e 
non-trivial corollary is that financiality, the a priori 
of price in capital power, is also predicated on the 
arkhéderivative. e arkhéderivative is then the a priori 
of the political economy constituted by the ontology of 
price. at is, the arkhéderivative is not only manifestly 
and explicitly operationalised by finance markets for 
capital accumulation, it is also the ontology of every 
instantiation of capital-power. As regards the former, 
it is not just the fact of price but also the ontology 
of price that is made explicit and operationalised by 
the complexities of the time-binding of derivatives 
pricing. As regards the latter, the arkhéderivative is 
the ontological a priori of capitalization, as political 
‘protowriting’), becoming a primary thematic in Of Grammatology as an 
explanans of the constitutive role of the expressive/extensive dimension 
of signification in the otherwise idealised accounts of structural linguistics 
(tr. G.C. Spivak [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 (1967)]), 
59–61, from which the following quotes are taken). at arkhéwriting 
is the a priori ‘of all linguistic systems’ means for Derrida that it cannot 
be an object in any language nor ‘enrich the scientific [or] positive 
description of the system itself’ as the object of a science. Derrida’s retreat 
to transcendental-empirical or essence-appearances disjunctions at the very 
point that he surpasses them leads to his influential but therefore restricted 
characterisation of writing per se as primarily literary (59), distinct from 
the protoscientific synthesis of the real of writing for which Husserl also 
provides reasons.
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economy in general, and in its each time particular 
instantiation qua price. Financiality is, in other words, 
the power determination of the arkhéderivaitve qua 
ontology of price. 
e complex institutional-practical operations 
of financial markets are integrated with the a priori 
financiality of capitalization by the arkhéderivative in 
the real of price (what could sarcastically be called its 
common-wealth) as its respectively operational (power) 
and constitutive (infrawager) dimensions, and this can 
be stated without making the category error of directly 
identifying them. Conjoining these otherwise disparate 
dimensions of financial pricing, the arkhéderivative 
is the comprehensive realist ontology of finance. In 
particular, thanks to their complex forms of time-
binding, financial markets make explicitly manifest 
and operationalise not just price but also the ontology 
of the instantiation of capitalization in general. e 
irrevocable lesson of the arkhéderivative is that price 
is at once institutionally and constitutively financial. 
.. -: 
e arkhéderivative is the ultimate term in this argu-
ment or the ontology of price, serving as a summarising 
metonym for the various determinations contributing 
to the general theory of price and permitting, by way 
of conclusion, the redetermination of finance-power 
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as a risk-order constituted by price contingency. at 
redetermination is not an arbitrary or parochial issue 
for theorizing the political economy of capitalization: 
if the arkhéderivative is the real of finance in its con-
stitutive and operational dimensions, then derivative 
markets are the truth of market financiality qua the 
dynamic power-ordering of capitalization. Moreover, 
that dynamism is constituted by the triadic contingency 
of the arkhéderivative, generally actualized by the 
universal fungibility of what is priced (contingency of 
abstraction), the variability of price (contingency of 
revision), and the futural absolute volatility of pricing 
(thetic contingency). ese are the primary conditions 
of the risk-order instituted by price; a risk-order deter-
mined now not in terms of the sociology of the markets 
but in terms of the real of price. at risk-order is also 
and immediately a political economy, because in con-
stituting the financiality of price, the arkhéderivative is 
no less the ontology of capital-order. As a consequence 
capital order is necessarily a risk-order.
Distinct from the broad characterisation of moder-
nity as a ‘society at risk’ (as per Esposito’s systems-
theoretical determination) social-institutional order in 
capital power is contingent not because the future is 
uncertain in the present in general (Esposito) but, more 
exactly, because the present of capital power—soci-
otemporal binding—is split by the absolute volatility 
of pricing into the realisation of incompatible futures. 
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Turning now to Nitzan and Bichler’s account, capital 
power is dynamic and transformative not only because 
of the strategically common conflict between capitalists 
(which again would be a sociological determination of 
the political economy of capitalization), but because 
that conflict is itself only possible via pricing because 
the latter is constituted in the arkhéderivative qua the 
dyadic contingency of the infrawager, manifest in the 
standard discount price formula of capitalization as the 
uncertainty of its inactual variables. And because the 
arkhéderivative is the condition of capital-power, the 
absolute volatility of pricing theorised by Ayache per 
force instantiates capital-power. In general, the actu-
alisation of the arkhéderivative’s triadic contingency 
qua price is in every instance capitalization’s dynamic 
and transformative social (re)ordering (including the 
stability and preservation of extant power configu-
rations, for which the only absolute is their futural 
contingency and whose stability thereby needs to be 
actively maintained by repricing). e arkhéderivative 
is the dynamic metastability of the capital-order. 
e triadic contingency instantiated qua price is 
not just one of pricing with regard to other prices 
and value but—precisely because price is the ordering 
schema of capitalization—also the intrinsic contingency 
of the constitution and organization of capital-power. 
It is in other words price that necessitates politics. 
e capital-order, which is a risk-order, is constituted 
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as a political economy. Even if it is a commonplace 
that finance, exemplified by derivatives pricing, is 
necessarily a mode of capitalization qua social order-
ing, the ontological corollary established here is that, 
predicated on the arkhéderivative, social power qua 
capitalization is transformable, mutable, and contin-
gent as a futural unknown.¬§ Such is the contingency 
of revision conditioning the risk-order of finance-power, 
for which (i) the financiality of the arkhéderivative 
‘depriv[es] the very meaning of normativity’ from the 
social order, and (ii) capitalization instead implements 
the continual and nonterminal revision of social order 
via price. Consequently, the only basis for the dynamic 
institution of power in capital-order is capital-power, 
instantiated by price, the logic of which is organized 
by differential accumulation.
It follows that differential accumulation is not a 
norm but a politics, the term now futurally deter-
mined as the normless revision of power qua risk 
(that is, instantiating and capitalising on the futural 
132. Roberto Mangabeira Unger proposes that the modern social order is 
an endlessly plastic and transformable ‘artifact’ by virtue of acknowledging 
society to be constructed by human imagination and creativity rather than 
posited as a given (Z. Cui [ed.], Politics: e Central Texts [London: Verso, 
1997 (1987)], 3–18 and 172–204). at ‘negative capability’ of social 
institutions (contrasted against their extant positive terms) is dedicated 
to emancipating subjective experience from established scripts but is 
however o¶en practically constrained and circumscribed by extant elite 
configurations and ‘entrenched’ social structures. While the latter point 
is uncontentious, in the terms of the thesis of the main text here Unger’s 
proposition psychonaturalizes and thereby cloaks the sociopolitical 
plasticity wrought by capitalization as the prevailing condition of modernity. 
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contingency of price).¬¬ Such politics is a recusal of 
133. is result countermands the political and theoretical adequacy 
of neorationalist doctrine to the modernity it claims to advocate for 
and advance via Le¶ Accelerationism. A short detour into Brandom’s 
philosophy demonstrates why: the consistent and thorough synthesis of 
judgements in Brandom’s ‘strong semantic inferentialism’ (SSI) consists 
of three simultaneous activities (Reason, 36–38): (i) the consistency of 
critical responsibilities ‘requir[ing] judgers to renounce commitment to 
contents that are incompatible to other commitments’ or their consequences, 
because each can ‘serve as a reason to give up the other’; (ii) completion 
via ampliative responsibilities, requiring the judger to accept other 
commitments on the basis of what she or he is already committed to; and (iii) 
the warrant of justificatory responsibilities, requiring the giving of reasons 
for one’s commitments by recourse to prior commitments. e synthesis 
of judgements in SSI results in the transcendental original synthetic 
unity of apperception at the base of Kant’s account of the epistemological 
subject: normative revision integrates (= unity) the endorsements intrinsic 
to inference-making (= synthesis) by the judgement that these norms 
inaugurate (= original) by a sapient being (= apperception). Furthermore, 
these conditions are not just those of judgement but necessarily also of 
what is judged, which is the content of the concept (= transcendental not 
formal logic). is latter objective dimension of the unity of apperception 
constitutes a representational relation to the content of the concept that is 
therefore intrinsically determined by the constraint of consistency, meaning 
that in its rational validity of no one object or subject in its unity can maintain 
incompatible properties (principle of non-contradiction), though two 
different subjects/objects can exhibit the inconsistency between them (45). 
e subjective dimension of such necessary exclusions and consequences are 
its deontic or normative relations (responsibilities and liabilities), and the 
objective corollary is their ‘alethic modal’ relations, meaning that a ‘single 
object just is what cannot have incompatible properties (at the same time). 
at is, it is an essential individuating feature of […] objects [that they] have 
the metaproperty of modally repelling incompatibilities’ (48) as a necessary 
consequence of their having ‘objective validity’ by inference. Hence, rational 
inferentialism necessitates a unified and coherently integrated subject and 
object of judgement that each repudiates incompatibilities. 
Against the homology between reason qua SSI and risk-rationality 
proposed in n.89 above, neither of these two principal conditions of SSI 
holds for pricing in its thetic contingency and the concomitant future-
constituted risk-order, for two reasons: firstly, contrary to the normative 
performativity of rational inference, pricing is counterperformative and 
necessarily goes in the ‘wrong’ direction to any that might be inferred by 
stipulation of an ‘ought’. Secondly, pricing’s absolute volatility is precisely 
and only the positing of a futural contingency qua incompatibilities of what 
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the future will be even once the contingency they construct is settled (the 
price ‘could have been different’). As such, pricing in its absolute volatility 
instantiates and maintains incompatibilities rather than repelling them. 
Consequently, pricing and the risk-order do not comply with the deontic 
constitution of the subject in its orginary synthetic unity of apperception, 
or to the alethic modality of the object’s noninconsistent validity, or to the 
thus coordinated inferential consequences and deontic adumbration. In 
formulating the basic unit of judgement not in the predicative form of <If p 
then q> but in the contingent formulation <If p then q or r or s or …, where 
p is insufficient to determine q, r, s….>, the risk-order vitiates reason qua the 
positive freedom and authority of normative constraints (60). 
In Brandom’s terms, which have an immediate political overdetermination, 
it follows that pricing and the risk-order of capitalization are not rational 
but are conditions of unfreedom (cf. Negarestani, ‘Labor’). But such a 
Brandomian critique of capitalization via pricing is only a doctrinal result, 
one among several consequences to the incompatibility of the risk-order 
with the normative synthetic unity posited by philosophical reason. What 
can also be inferred is: 
• that as a discursive social practice with some rules (the logics of 
differential accumulation and différantial pricing as well as the delimited 
regulatory requirements for markets), the risk-order is quasirational 
precisely because it posits an order that maintains incompatibilities; 
• that risk-rationality is a nonnormative modality of reason, meaning that 
the social order of risk is shaped not by rational norms but by inferential 
processes whose logic surpasses that of the deontic-alethic modalities of 
unified synthetic judgement;
• given the expansion of inferential pragmatics in the risk-order 
beyond Brandomian doctrine, the latter is an unnecessary and limiting 
commitment to philosophical-rational determinations of inference and 
reason. More assertively, the deontic-alethic modalities of incompatibility-
repelling synthetic unity postulated by SSI are undone by the risk-order 
of capitalization, which socially instituted practice constitutes the very 
political modernity of which SSI claims to be the philosophy and moral-
conceptual authority. 
Philosophical adequacy aside, the incompatibility of risk rationality and 
SSI formulates a schema for the politics of normative reason with regard to 
the risk-order, botho f these being taken as practices of revision. Affirming 
SSI, the subjective and objective unity it instantiates as well as its subtending 
normative constraints mean that SSI necessarily counters the construction 
of incompatible inferences characteristic of the risk-order of capitalization. 
But that is to repudiate the primary futurity constituting the risk-order 
thanks to pricing. is repudiation is evident in Brandom’s affirmation of 
Hegel’s configuration of the rational integration of conceptual content by 
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norms which, thanks to the arkhéderivative’s contin-
gency of abstraction, is exacerbated in its scope by 
the universal fungibility of what may be priced (in 
contrast, then, to the typical but restricted referent 
of capitalization—production for Marxism or, in its 
more recent biopolitical overdetermination, ‘life’, or 
for Veblen, ‘industry’).¬° What is indexed here by the 
the process if ‘recollection (Erinnerung)’, which provides a ‘genealogical 
[…] vindication’ of inferential commitments ‘currently being integrated’ (16, 
and Ch.3)—another variant of synthetic unity of reason now with regard 
to the sociohistorical fabrication of discourse which, tellingly, is the way 
that reason ‘is the way [reason] moves forward, by looking backward’ (23). 
Inferential reason is then a synthetic traditionalism at a variety of scales 
and venues—sociohistorical, subjective individual, and objective validity—
all of which will come to be integrated with one another. By contrast, 
asserting the risk-order of capitalization qua generation and maintenance of 
incompatibilities, rationality is not an attribute primarily of sentience but of 
pricing, reason being here determined with regard to the futural contingency 
of temporization. at practice prevents retrospective semantic vindication 
and, concomitantly, the formulation of an original synthetic unity as the 
organizing term of reason or the quasinorms it posits. In terms of SSI, risk-
rationality inaugurates what Meillassoux elsewhere calls the Principle of 
Insufficient Reason not with regard to the insufficiency of the ontological 
causal relation as basis for what happens next that concerns Meillassoux 
(see n.98) but as the constitutive insufficiency of the very establishment and 
construction of semantic-discursive inference-making itself, vitiating the 
‘bindingness’ of any normative construction. 
If, following Brandom, the Enlightenment is the ‘development of secular 
conceptions of legal, political, and moral normativity’ predicated on the 
‘conception of normative positive freedom’ as formulated via SSI in its 
necessary sociohistorical dimension (60)—which is the to-be-vindicated 
philosophy of political modernity according to neorationalism—that 
determination of modernity misidentifies it as the coherent generation of 
retrospectively constituted and integrated semantics rather than the futural 
positing of incompatibilities. As such, the Enlightenment has little if any 
salience for apprehending the risk-order of capitalization.
134. ese determinations are compounded via the recent emphasis on the 
‘precarity’ of life-work and experience in neoliberalism: see M. Lazzarato, 
e Making of the Indebted Man, tr. J. D. Jordan (Los Angeles: semiotext(e), 
2012) and C. Marazzi, e Violence of Financial Capitalism, tr. K. Lebedeva 
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otherwise paradoxical formulation of an order without 
norms that is universal in principle, is that the real of 
capitalization is not constituted materially, normatively, 
or conventionally, but by stable-enough institutions 
positing a contingent yet power-hierarchical relation 
to an indefinite future via price. 
If differential accumulation means that price vari-
ability is the reorganization of power, the redetermina-
tion of capitalization in terms of the arkhéderivative 
means that power is now not only a power over what 
the future may be—the standard criticism that capi-
talism segments the future in favour of those with 
the greatest capital, though since finance-power such 
a segmentation is in fact all that politics is qua the 
power-organization of the future. Predicated on the 
arkhéderivative, power is moreover power over the 
organized uncertainty that price posits in the present 
(thetic contingency). To elaborate: because the real of 
price is the endogenously constituted infrawager, the 
futurity of the arkhéderivative is itself priced as its vola-
tility. As such, the futural thetic contingency of pricing 
is itself subject to the power instantiated on each occa-
sion of price. Consequently, price qua the magnitude 
of power of social institutions is the paradox of the 
magnitude of social power over uncertainty, a measure 
of the size of a futural contingency instantiated by price. 
and J. F. McGimsey (Los Angeles: semiotext(e), 2011). With respect to 
finance-power, precarity is but an anthropological-industrial incidental 
determination of generalised price sabotage.
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Capitalization is thereby determined as a risk-order of 
power not only extensively, across the entire ‘spectrum 
of social institutions’ or ‘societies at risk’, but also 
intensively in each instance of price. Price indexes the 
magnitude of the absolute volatility of power in the 
present. It is not then that risk is to be priced by deriva-
tives markets but, constituted in the arkhéderivative, 
price itself is the magnitude of risk, which is to say the 
magnitude of absolute volatility that is posited in the 
present. It is a measure of the futurity of the present, a 
quantification of différantial temporization. Consequently, 
the political economy of price since finance-power is 
immediately the politics of futurity itself.
Finance-power instantiated via price is therefore 
analytically dual: it is the magnitude of power in the 
holistically organized present of intracapitalist con-
flict and it is the magnitude of the thetic contingency 
of power. For all of the analytical distinction, the 
two determinations are however not operationally or 
ontologically distinct, and for two closely aligned but 
operationally distinct reasons: 
(­) In general, risk is in fact indistinct from all price 
qua power. It is not just that power involves risk, 
such that the greater the power the greater the risk. 
Rather, price is at once the magnitude of power 
and the quantification of the futural contingency 
concomitant with any instance of power, no matter 
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what the magnitude. Price is both the magnitude of 
power and the magnitude of futurity qua systemic 
uncertainty—so price itself is ‘systemic risk’. Since 
price is necessarily determined in regard to capital-
power, every price is intrinsically an occasion of politi-
cal economy, of what, where, and how much power 
over futurity is to be had—a systemic conclusion that 
is effectively dramatised by the size and consequences 
of the credit default that comprise Lesson Two of the 
financial crisis.
() Sectorially, as the toposcription of the absolute 
volatility of price, priced risk is the power magnitude 
of the futural contingency of power’s instantiation. 
Extensively operationalised qua accumulation by 
derivatives markets, priced risk is how one sector 
of the entire spectrum of social institutions assigns 
a power-magnitude to the futural contingency of 
price. In doing so it gives the futural contingency of 
power a power-determination in the present and, at 
once and for that reason, subjects the systemic power-
organization of risk-pricing to the triadic contingency 
of price, which is what is dramatized in Lesson One 
of the financial crisis.
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.. -: 
While the pricing of risk by derivatives markets opera-
tionally demonstrates that they empirically institute 
finance-power as an infrawager, the single ‘abstract 
pecuniary magnitude’ that is price is at once quanti-
fied power (capitalization) and quantified futurity 
(absolute volatility). at duality of price can only 
be analytically (rather than ontologically or opera-
tionally) demarcated: more emphatically, the con-
stitutive ontology of the risk-order is given in the 
unicity of power and futurity via price. Predicated 
on the arkhéderivative as political economy is—as all 
politics is—and taking the power-futurity duality of 
risk-pricing by derivatives markets to be the explicit 
historical-institutional manifestation of that constitu-
tive condition, this section elaborates in theoretical 
terms what the political economy of a risk-order con-
stituted by price entails, providing the basis for the 
more explicitly institutional-sectoral consequences of 
the power organization of the state-finance nexus that 
is taken up in the concluding section.
Operationally, derivatives pricing qua infrawager 
means that prices in derivatives markets are conditions 
for further pricing and also conditional upon them. 
Because of the universal fungibility of the exogenous 
reference of derivatives (its contingency of abstraction), 
and because price is the instantiation of capital-power, 
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the endogenous plasticity of derivatives pricing (its 
contingency of revision) is then primarily the direct 
dynamic reorganization of capital-power on itself 
according to the logic of differential accumulation, and 
only incidentally the reorganization of capital-power 
outside of the pricing process (qua value). Returning 
to Means’s distinction as it is taken up by Nitzan and 
Bichler, pricing primarily with regard to other prices 
is to set administered prices rather than market prices. 
With derivatives markets, it is not that revenues are 
fixed against the variable cost of production, as in 
Means’s industry-based account, but that derivatives 
trading qua infrawager sets prices only on the basis 
of ‘back-calculat[ing] the mark-up [the price of the 
derivative] necessary to realize a rate of return’. at is, 
derivatives are not priced competitively but rather to 
maintain a mark-up, doing so in real-time rather than 
the medium-to-long-haul typical of industrial processes. 
In terms of the arkhéderivative, the infrawager is the 
plastic reorganization of administered prices, and the 
market as a whole is comprised of this price setting of 
the market. But administered prices are set not only via 
their immediate markets but also by the organization 
of the spectrum of social institutions, the general name 
of which, with respect to what Veblen calls industry, is 
sabotage. Consequently, sabotage is a primary charac-
teristic and necessary effect of financial markets. ere 
are two distinct aspects to this conclusion:
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—From the optic of industry exogenous to derivatives 
pricing, the plasticity of the latter is pure sabotage 
because derivative pricing is directly a magnitude of 
endogenously-constituted capital-power. is is just 
to reiterate from another angle the criticism of the 
finance sector’s siphoning of capital, productivity, 
and social reproduction in general.¬¿
—However, the industrial determination of derivative 
pricing is strictly speaking only incidental to the latter 
qua infrawager. e endogenous operationalisation 
of derivatives pricing is primarily the plastic redeter-
mination of prices and therefore of power within the 
price-terms of those markets. Operationalising the 
arkhéderivative, derivatives markets directly redis-
tribute power qua capital accumulation in its own 
terms, rather than those of what, for it, is only the 
incidental condition of historical precedents or needs 
(for example, production or consumption). 
If sabotage is the vitiation of industry because busi-
ness implemented via administered prices diminishes 
social capacity in favour of the price organization of 
power via capitalization, the infrawager of derivatives 
pricing is, in contrast, the intensive determination of 
135. See Lapavitsas, Profiting, 146; Marazzi, Violence, 44-46; and Hudson, 
‘Goldman Sachs’. Nitzan and Bichler complicate the basic assumptions of 
this claim and received assumptions on the global political economy of the 
finance sector in ‘Imperialism and Financialism: A Story of a Nexus’, Journal 
of Critical Globalisation Studies 5 (2012), 42–78, www.criticalglobalisation.com/
issue5/42_78_IMPERIALISM_AND_FINANCIALISM_JCGS5.pdf.
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the operational dynamic of sabotage. It is the sabotage 
of capital-power by capital-power across time and 
markets via price plasticity, an autosabotage. To be 
clear: the intensive autosabotage of capital-power is 
not operationally distinct from its extensive determina-
tion as industrial sabotage; but it is also not reducible 
to the latter, given the explicitly universalising and 
abstracting contingencies of the infrawager qua real of 
price. In its most general determination capital-power 
is not just counterproductive (a ‘negative industrial 
magnitude’); it is also and primarily (as a positive finan-
cial magnitude) its own intrinsic counterpower: the 
autosabotage of dynamic price-setting in its own terms 
which, constituted in the infrawager of the arkhéderiva-
tive, is intrinsic to all price. Price qua capital-power 
is then necessarily its own partial countermanding; 
the very instantiation of capital-power is at once the 
instantiation of its own counterpower, the sociologi-
cal corollary of which is the intracapitalist struggle in 
differential accumulation.¬À
136. e standard reference for the endogenous fragility of economies 
relying on financial intermediaries (primarily banks) is Hyman Minsky’s 
Financial Instability Hypothesis (Stabilizing an Unstable Economy) (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2008 [1986]), Chs. 7–10). Minsky notes that the increasing 
innovation and elasticity of financial instruments by financial intermediaries 
encourages short-term lending and leverage, fuelling economic booms and 
expanding balance sheets for financial intermediaries. Short-term borrowing 
by commercial banks in these conditions are however overextended 
against their nonfinancial assets and also susceptible to market volatility. 
Consequently, and counter to the investment-supporting claims legitimising 
finance, long-term investment undertaken and facilitated by financial 
intermediaries is driven by short-term price movements on unregulated 
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Misfortune and Historicity
e real of price qua power is, in sum, extensive and 
intensive differential sabotage. In its intensive determi-
nation of financiality, price endogenously instantiates 
a power gradient, incapacitating in some respect that 
which it overpowers by outpricing it. at which is 
outpriced is also a term of capitalization, just a lesser 
one. However, if prices set the market then the market 
is the toposcription not only of capital-power qua 
autosabotage but also, at once, of the thetic contin-
gency instantiated on every occasion of price. at is, 
pricing is not autosabotage only in respect of the inca-
pacitation of what is thereby outpriced, in relation to 
other prices in the presently and historically comprised 
capital-order, but also, as elaborated above, in respect 
of its intrinsic thetic contingency whereby the extant 
society-wide organization of power is futurally risked 
to the degree indexed by the magnitude of a particular 
price. While the two counterpowers of the arkhéderiva-
tive—autosabotage and futural contingency—can be 
markets whose instability thereby extends to the entire financial system. 
For Minsky, the endogenous instability of finance is institutionally 
formulate rather than located in the fact of price. Minsky’s hypothesis has 
been extensively taken up in theorizations of the 2008 financial crisis. A 
striking example of this literature discussing the global expansion of the 
dollarised shadow banking system as condition for both the systemic 
reach and magnitude of the 2008 financial crisis, paraphrased in the above 
account of Minsky’s hypothesis with regard to the development of financial 
innovations, is presented in J. Tokunaga and G. Epstein, ‘e Endogenous 
Finance of Global Dollar-Based Financial Fragility in the 2000s: A Minskian 
Approach’, PERI Working Paper Series 340, January 2014, www.peri.umass.
edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_301-350/WP340.pdf).
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analytically demarcated, they are again inextricable 
and mutually constitutive in the ontological unicity 
of finance articulated by the arkhéderivative. In that 
unicity, it follows that price-sabotage risks the mar-
ket. at is, price is simultaneously the power over 
present and futural disestablishments of power, an 
autosabotaging futural contingency of capital-power. 
e several aspects of this unwieldy characterization 
of finance-power—autosabotage, futural contingency, 
and capital—are effectively synthesized by the term 
‘misfortune’, but only if it is taken in this precise sense. 
Instantiated via the misfortune of price, then, capital-
power’s dynamism necessitates the persistent contin-
gent reorganization and revectoring of capitalization, 
a reorientation and contingency in time-binding whose 
direction and gains necessarily cannot be secured.
e determination of the arkhéderivative as a mis-
fortune of power—meaning, to reiterate, an autosabo-
taging futural contingency of capital-power—is the 
comprehensive ontology of the market qua risk-order. 
As such, it is a systemic determination of capital-power, 
providing a diagnostic matrix for its historical develop-
ment. Taking ‘capitalism’ as the name for the holistic 
systemicity of capital-power, the misfortune intrinsic 
to pricing means that there is no necessary or required 
direction, orientation, or identity to capitalism; its 
ordering via price is also the occasion of its contingent 
reordering. e only sociohistorical constraint for 
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capitalization, given its organization by differential 
accumulation, is that one capitalist accumulated more 
capital-power than another, and some sectors against 
all others. But that is only a constraint of its reason, 
not a prescription as to who or what will have the 
greater capacity for capitalization (meaning setting 
larger prices), nor for where and to what capitalization 
will be directed. at is, the duality of price-power’s 
misfortune as regards sabotage and futural contingency 
is the constitutive condition for the sociohistorical 
contingency inaugurated by and as capitalism, thanks 
to which price’s contingencies of abstraction and revis-
ability are preserved across capital-power’s necessary 
social-systemic operation.¬Ì
137. In terms of Aristotelean categories (Nichomachean Ethics, Book VI), 
finance-power is then a tekhné, a process whose ends (teloi) are exogenous 
to that process and which may therefore never be attained by it (example: 
a building may never be completed). Aristotle distinguishes tekhné from 
poiésis, an artificial process with intrinsic ends (example: live music, which 
is heard as it is played), and phúsis, processes which always and necessarily 
have intrinsic ends (nature). e exogeneity of purpose to process in tekhné 
is why in general any technical process can be repurposed, and why in 
particular whatever is repurposed is a technics (including then nature). For 
Massimo Amato and Luca Fantacci, the problems of modern finance stem 
precisely from its operational divergence from its intrinsic purpose, which is 
investment via completed debt promises within given time frames (e End 
of Finance [Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011]). Securitization, intermediation, 
and large-scale complexity have also anonymised finance, vitiating what 
for Amato and Fantacci ought to be the intimate purpose of finance but 
which condition is here recognized as the consequence of its constitutive 
technicity. e emancipation of technics from the modern category of 
energy (which is predicated on work and thereby determines ontogenesis 
via the intrinsic ends or ‘entelechy’ common to phúsis or poésis, a logic 
organising both Marxian and Neoclassical economic doctrine) is proposed 
in S. Malik, ‘Tekhné is Fond of Túkhé, and Túkhé of Tekhné: Energy and 
Aristotle’s Ontology’, Tekhnema 5 (1999), 124–53; an emancipation that 
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Constituted qua finance-power, capitalism is realised 
only in more or less local, more or less large power 
conflicts. It has no necessary operational, social, cul-
tural, or institutional identity, nor (qua différantial 
pricing) any constitutive identity in its logic. Con-
trary to Marxian doctrine, then, internal contradic-
tions do not necessitate its expansion or its demise.¬Í 
Equally, capitalism cannot extinguish or supersede 
itself at a putative conversion point (the reassuring 
myth of singularity).¬Ò e constitutive misfortune 
of financiality proscribes any terminal or tendential 
logic or practice of capitalization, instead advancing 
only increased magnitudes of capitalization (which 
itself requires more complex, integrated, and differenti-
ated forms of social-order qua risk-order). e history 
and future of capitalization is comprised only of the 
interminably tactical, dynamic reorganization of price, 
power, and the ‘entire spectrum of social institutions’ 
along both external and internal vectors of finance, 
the latter having ontological, operational, and politi-
cal precedence. Constituting the identityless increase 
implicitly countermands the DeleuzoGuattarian transcendental energetics 
underpinning Nick Land’s convergence thesis (see n.139). 
138. at contradictions within the capitalist totality drive the territorial 
expansion of capitalist countries via colonial and imperial domination 
is first proposed by Rosa Luxemburg, e Accumulation of Capital, tr. A. 
Schwarzchild (London: Routledge, 2003 [1913]).
139. is is the characteristic claim of Right Accelerationism. See N. Land, 
‘Meltdown’, in R. Mackay and R. Brassier (eds.), Fanged Noumena (Falmouth: 
Urbanomic, 2011 [1994]) and ‘Teleoplexy: Notes on Acceleration’, #Accelerate, 
509–20.
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in aggregate capital-power, enfuturing the present 
in the autosabotage of pricing, the misfortune of the 
arkhéderivative is the historicity of capital-power.
.. -:  
 -  
Price is the measure of the political economy and the 
power over misfortune. e operational toposcription 
of finance-power via the abstraction of the number 
scheme of price markets means that markets are the 
basis for the comparison of finance-power in all times 
and places. Returning then to the contentions of the 
introductory comments above, the power magnitude 
and constitution of derivative markets can be directly 
compared to other organizations of power in terms 
of the ontology of finance—which is to say, by compari-
son of their respective prices. In particular, taking 
up Haldane and Alessandri’s comments in terms of 
finance-power, the threat that the finance sector now 
presents to states is twofold: firstly, if  is a proxy for 
state power in global political economy (for reasons 
to be presented shortly), then for the most part the 
transnational derivatives markets outprice state-level 
, which is to say that, in terms of the power theory 
of price, these markets overpower states even if the lat-
ter have jurisdictional power over them. e political 
and theoretical question of relative powers then has 
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to be recast as a question of whether statutory author-
ity, stemming from state sovereignty, is endemically 
more powerful than finance-power, and sufficiently so 
as to not be overpowered by the latter’s quantitative 
determination. e second identified threat to state 
sovereignty from finance markets is that all juridi-
cal aspects of state power in Westphalian modernity 
are territorially constrained, including the typical 
determinations of what that power is tantamount to: 
the monopoly over violence, guarantor of security, 
popular autonomy, legislative centrality, bureaucratic 
control, the ipseity of authority, the paramount status 
of popular sanction, and so on. Whatever determina-
tion of ultimate power is given to state sovereignty, its 
reach and legitimacy is necessarily territorially limited 
and constrained, particular (up to and including its 
global or extraterrestrial extension, as in some sci-
ence fiction or political theory). As such, it is unable 
to attain the universal extension permitted by the 
‘abstract universality of magnitudes’ constituting and 
actualising finance-power in its price-organization.°Ú 
140. In Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s terms, such quantitative 
abstraction is the primary condition and vector of capitalism’s 
‘deterritorialisation’ as a countervector to the system of capture that is the 
State and its particularising-segmenting codifications (Anti-Oedipus, tr. 
R. Hurley, M. Seem, H. R. Lane [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1983 (1972)], Ch.10, esp. 251–54). Capitalism’s ‘lines of flight’ 
from State territorialization are nonetheless fundamentally constrained 
and ‘reterritorialising’ for Deleuze and Guattari insofar as capitalism is 
axiomatically organized by the commodity form and production for the 
market. at axiomatic is for them the progenitor of capitalism rather than 
invented by it, and requires the historical institutionalization of various 
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at is, the (necessarily universal) geospatial extension 
of finance-power is in principle if not historically in 
fact greater than the (intrinsically particular) power 
of state sovereignty. 
In terms of finance-power, the territorial exorbi-
tance of finance-power to state sovereignty does not 
threaten the latter so long as the capacities of their 
economies and revenues are greater in magnitude 
than the resources of financial organizations. How-
ever, if ‘causality has reversed’ between states and 
financial institutions, as Haldane and Alessandri put 
it, because regular defaults of monarchical loans in 
early institutional capitalism are replaced today by 
organized State forms according to its level of development. Revoking 
the basic Marxian determinations of capitalism’s axiom that Deleuze and 
Guattari adopt, capitalization in the logic of differential accumulation 
can instead be construed as a wholly formal axiom that is operationally 
aterritorial and abstractly constituted (via pecuniary magnitudes) and 
which, in its intrinsically dynamic constitution of intracapitalist conflict via 
the infrawager, is therefore unbound in its overall axiomatic production—
hence, its extensive and intensive universalism. Equally, as discussed in the 
closing sections below, insofar as pricing relies on enforceable regulations of 
money and contract (including the ‘convertible abstract rights’ that secure 
private property [Deleuze and Guattari, A ousand Plateaus, tr. B. Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987 [1980]), 454]), the state 
form is indispensable to capitalism, which means that capitalization is not 
so much the reterritorialising deterritorialization Deleuze and Guattari 
propose as it is an each-time territorially inaugurated deterritorialising. 
‘Territory’ in these formulations is only the limitation imposed by sovereign 
jurisdiction rather than a geospatial factum: any such factum can be 
subordinated to the reorganization of jurisdictional authority and is thus 
not at all intrinsically bound to the figure of the nation-state even if that has 
been its dominant historical configuration. For the specific transformations 
of Westphalian jurisdictional and financial institutional infrastructures to 
facilitate transnational capitalization since the 1970s see S. Sassen, Territory, 
Authority, Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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crises in financial markets requiring state interven-
tions in order to sustain not just that sector but also 
the entire social order, then in terms of finance-power 
this reversal is only a historical transformation: the 
greater power is determined only by which sector 
has the greater price. at aggregate magnitude is 
determined for states primarily by their operational 
capacity and revenues, which is precisely what  
indexes. Furthermore, given that nonfinancially gener-
ated operational capacity and revenues of states from 
production and consumption are again constrained 
in the Westphalian settlement by material and ter-
ritorial factors determined by the inviolable borders 
sanctioned in that regime, the pecuniary magnitude 
of nonfinancially generated annual  for even the 
largest states is necessarily constrained in a way that 
the plasticity of pricing and market-interconnectedness 
of finance are not. e ‘price magnitude’ of finance as 
an operational sector can then in principle be greater 
than that of any state—or, because finance-power is 
endogenously constituted, the sectorial price of finance 
can always be exorbitant to any of its previous levels 
including that constrained by state-level organization. 
e current size and transnationalism of financial mar-
kets is an institutional-historical figure of the hybrid 
configuration of finance-power and state sovereignty, 
the relative sizes of global derivative markets (by credit 
exposure) and state s indicating the approximate 
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equality of their respective finance-powers at the level 
of most of the wealthiest states, and the greater power 
of finance market to the majority of nation-states. 
Which is to say that it is not that power has ‘reversed’ 
between states and the finance-sector over the course 
of modernity, but that while state sovereignty has been 
the toposcription of the largest financial powers in that 
period, that historical condition is now in mutation 
and no longer a historical given. at is, thanks to 
the increasing aggregate price of derivatives markets, 
finance is now relatively more emancipated from the 
primary political configuration of historical modernity 
and, with that, the state-finance nexus is reorganised 
and revectored.
To elaborate this reorganization by way of conclu-
sion: as Nitzan and Bichler remark, the sovereign state 
is but one of the social institutions in the arrangement 
of capital-order, albeit the one that has been most 
dominant in securing the normal rate of return against 
which all differential accumulation is pegged. But that 
congruence between sovereignty and finance-power 
is also countermanded by their typological dispar-
ity. If sovereignty is constituted by the indivisible 
unicity and centrality of its decision as much as by 
the assumed supremacy of its performative diktats, 
in contrast finance-power is constituted by the pri-
macy of its thetic futural contingency, the plasticity 
of the infrawager, and its misfortune. For all of the 
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complexity of the power-misfortune duality of price, its 
quantitative determination in every instance rescinds 
qualitative particularity as the term of power, whether 
that particularity is organized in terms of history, tra-
dition, authority, or the other semantically rich or 
impoverished meanings typically invoked to warrant 
sovereignty (up to and including the transcendentality 
of its theological determination).° Minimally, then, 
finance-power is typologically a counterpower to sov-
ereignty: the primacy and irreducibility of sovereignty 
qua determinant of power is violated by finance-power 
both in principle (quantity and triadic contingency 
against the particularity and the insuperability of 
authority) and socio-institutionally (finance markets 
outprice states). Finance-power threatens sovereignty 
not just because its greater financial magnitude and its 
absolute volatility prevails, but because the splitting 
of the present by price in the contingency of its irrec-
oncilable futurity overpowers the otherwise assumed 
and inviolable authority of sovereignty. 
at threat is manifest, and state sovereignty is 
degraded with regard to the arkhéderivative, when 
states are outpriced by finance markets—as is largely 
the case today, thanks to neoliberal institutional activ-
ism since the early ­s. Exemplified by the inven-
tion of the  and other derivatives markets, the 
141. C. Schmitt, ‘All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state 
are secularized theological concepts’, Political eology: Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty, tr. G. Schwab (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 36.
Collapse 8.indb   803 27/11/2014   15:40
COLLAPSE VIII
804
consolidation and expansion of derivatives markets 
since the ­s not only operationally liberates the 
real of price from nonfinancial determinations such as 
production and material resources (the putative ‘real 
economy’), it moreover concretizes and manifests the 
countermanding of any necessity or finality of value, 
price, or other financial measure, per the ontology 
of price. Consequently, the aggregate price magni-
tude of the financial institutions operationalising the 
arkhéderivative in its own terms are limited only by 
regulatory requirements and the tactical assessments of 
a risk-rationality—a liberation unavailable to modern 
state sovereignty. anks to finance-power, sovereignty 
is no longer the supreme power, but is itself now sub-
ject to contingency. More exactly, the very conditions 
of legislation sanctioning and regulating finance is 
itself now constituted in terms of the contingency of 
finance-power.°§
142. e disambiguation of misfortune is politically and analytically crucial 
here. By an argument similar to Esposito’s, Vogl too proposes that thanks to 
finance capitalism ‘danger and chance have returned in an archaic form, as 
túkhe or fortune’ in contrast to the historically preceding welfare societies 
that sought to ‘tame contingency’ (Specter, 130). Consequently, ‘the 
hazardous whims and caprices (Launen) of age-old figures of sovereignty 
have returned under modern conditions’. e present thesis is precisely 
the contrary: the arbitrariness of sovereignty is anything but contingent 
while the contingency of finance-power is highly risk-rationalised and 
anything but arbitrary. And now the latter dominates the former, further 
obviating sovereign caprice. Which is also why, for all the vast discrepancies 
in wealth implemented by neoliberal policy, it ought not to be designated 
as a neofeudalism (as Hudson or Lazzarato do, for example) nor, for that 
matter, is it the biopolitics that Vogl mistakenly proposes finance to be in its 
‘determining [of] the life processes of a society by a single force’.
Collapse 8.indb   804 27/11/2014   15:40
Malik—Ontology of Finance
805
Ineliminable Statism
What is established here is that, cogent as it may 
otherwise be, the state-finance nexus is riven in its 
power ontology. e argument is not primarily that 
the operational-historical growth of the finance sector 
deprioritises sovereignty in favour of other modes of 
power (a Foucauldian variant of the thesis), or that 
the indebtedness and other financial commitments of 
the state (whether it be monarchical, or a parliamen-
tary democracy, bureaucratic control, autocracy, etc.) 
require it to resort to finance markets to maintain itself. 
Rather, whatever power can be summoned by the state 
thanks to its sovereignty can be (i) determined as a spe-
cific magnitude in any particular instance, and (ii) that 
magnitude is comprised of the aggregate prices it can 
command from jurisdictionally-bounded institutions 
and social organization. e ‘command’ of prices is not 
that of a state-controlled economy, but rather the price 
that the state can raise on the basis of its sovereignty 
(taxation being the obvious example). While this 
injunction practically presumes the hierarchy of social 
institutions and order, the channeling of command 
via price, qua instance of finance-power, necessarily 
imposes a dynamic reorganization of social order. In 
its conservative formulation, this partial conclusion 
proposes that states are committed to their reorganiza-
tion in order to sustain their integral role in the gen-
eral ordering of social institutions by capital-power. 
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is is, to reiterate, not a reordering directed by sover-
eign command, but a political-economic transforma-
tion in which sovereign power has a key, judicious role.°¬ 
And it is this last-mentioned condition that provides 
the more comprehensive formulation of the reorganis-
ing command structure of states in the condition of 
finance-power: that sovereignty is not the theoretical 
or operational basis of political economy nor exempted 
from it, but is institutionally and theoretically deter-
mined by it. is consequence is partially recognized, 
in other terms, in Modern Money eory (), for 
which state sovereignty is tantamount to the authority 
to impose and maintain money as legitimate unit of 
account for creditory relations, generating a demand 
for those units and also destroying them (by removing 
them from circulation) via taxation.°° e immediately 
relevant argument of  is that monetary policy is 
fiscal policy is social policy, and there is no monetary 
economy without state debt (which is therefore a public 
virtue). In terms of the broader argument of power 
typology advanced here, this would mean that state 
sovereignty is nothing but a term of political economy, 
143. See P. Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste (London: Verso, 
2013), 56.
144. See n.54 above, L. R. Wray, Modern Money eory (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2012), Ch. 2, and, for a discussion of the genealogy of MMT, 
‘From the State eory of Money to Modern Money eory’, Levy Economics 
Institute Working Paper 792,  March 2014, www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/
wp_792.pdf; also P. Tcherneva, ‘Chartalism and the tax-driven approach to 
money’, in P. Arestis & M. Sawyer (eds.), A Handbook of Alternative Monetary 
Economics, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 69–86.
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and that, as such, it is not typologically distinct from 
finance in either its institutional operation or ontology. 
Yet if the state is a financial institution, it is the only 
one that fabricates and imposes money on a popula-
tion that must then use it to pay taxes, and it is for this 
reason also a distinct and unique financial institution 
in its sovereign power. Taxation is the state’s premon-
etary but nonetheless financial claim over the power 
organization of social institutions. In terms of finance-
power, taxation is the price of the state—the price of 
monetisation—for the nonstate sector. Furthermore, as 
condition of the monetary arrangement of price, the 
sovereign state is only a subordinated necessity for the 
chronic reordering of complex modern societies qua 
risk-orders. Which is only to reiterate through the mon-
etary dimension of finance-power that sovereignty and 
finance comprise a nexus—modern capitalism—that is 
at once congruent and also internally disparate, but 
is in any case constituted as finance-power. As such, 
the state-finance nexus is a particularly prominent, 
because systemically ineliminable, example of a gen-
eral requirement of capital-power: that finance-power 
maintain institutions in order to advance capitalization, 
including, for example, sovereign jurisdictions with 
the authority to sanction and enforce the contracts 
fabricating derivatives (jurisdictions which in theory 
need not be nation-states). 
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e Political Risk of Futurity
In general, then, finance-power is bound to capital-
order, an organization of power by which greater and 
lesser magnitudes of capitalization can be socially 
implemented—and transformed at every instance 
thanks to the price indexing of that power-ordering: 
price qua misfortune transforms the order of power 
it measures. Constituted by the arkhéderivative, the 
dynamism of capital-power (‘the most dynamic of all 
historical orders’) is not reducible to nor predicated 
on the history or sociology of the capital-order but 
is a result of the thetic futural contingency and auto-
sabotage of price. Capital-power is in other words a 
prevailing risk-order dedicated to the future contin-
gency of the present and, at the same time, to its partial 
incapacitation. Two mutations to primary categories 
of modernity can then be identified, serving here as 
terminal remarks:
Statist futurity. In the political economy of sover-
eignty, statism and even sovereignty itself cannot be 
opposed to futural contingency. On the contrary, in 
the near-equality of aggregate price levels of (neces-
sarily local) states with (necessarily crossbordered) 
derivative markets the state is a particularly privileged 
organization in capital-ordering, but one that now 
has a surmountable price: as noted, because deriva-
tive markets operate across borders, their monetary 
levels are not limited by the monetary constraints 
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that particular states have to observe, an operational-
historical exorbitance that is theoretically warranted. 
And because states are now explicitly priced (if not 
outpriced) sovereignties, they too occasion not just the 
autosabotage of capitalization (which is the standard 
criticism of the state by advocates of the so-called 
‘free market’), but also the thetic futural contingency 
of pricing. To use Ayache’s formulas, the state too is a 
medium of contingency or a technology of the future. 
Dynamic and plastic rather than static (despite 
the etymology, which provides only a lexical rather 
than semantic constraint here), the state as a political-
economic term deposes the inviolability of sovereignty 
in its actuality and also its theoretical-ideological jus-
tifications. e state may be a term of social sabotage, 
but in this it is not typologically distinct from any 
other instance of capital-power (which is why the ‘free 
market’ is an untenable doctrine); it is distinct only 
with regard to its still relatively large size in terms of 
prices it can set, in being an identifiable actor, and 
the authority to explicitly transmit its finance-power 
across all social institutions by law and taxation. As the 
price of monetisation, taxation itself is at once dually 
sabotage (the standard libertarian complaint) and, 
typically, a large power over collective thetic futurity.
Political Reason. Requiring an order yet dynamically 
transforming it without certainty in its thetic futural 
contingency, finance-power observes and instantiates 
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a risk rationality to which even sovereign states as 
prominent modes of power are subordinated. If power 
in modernity is predominantly organized between 
states and capitalists, it has been primarily determined 
across that history according to a risk-rationality. 
is is a history of sabotage in order to accrue power 
via price setting. And it is inextricably also politics, the 
chronic transformation and contestability of power (‘it 
could have been different’) predicated on the definitely 
uncertain future posited each time by price. It is not 
just that politics is inaugurated with each price qua 
instantiation of capital-power, apprehended now as a 
sabotage-contingency duality. Politics itself now means 
not just what the future will be but also the power 
over the magnitude of futural contingency and who 
or what owns it across the entire social order, includ-
ing but not limited to the sovereign state. As such, 
politics is not predicated on the relation to statedom, 
although that, also, is not proscribed. Rather, politics 
is more generally both constituted and determined 
by risk-rationality, which is to say with a view to the 
uncertainties generated by the autosabotage of power 
and the contingencies of abstraction, revision, and 
thetic futurity of the arkhéderivative that splits the 
present from itself. Politics in risk-rationality is then 
occasioned in terms that are not commutative with 
qualitative determinations of authority and command, 
and it moreover rescinds any priority conventionally 
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granted to them—and, with that, it also rescinds reason 
in its sovereignty (if ever there was such) or social 
normativity, maintaining both only so as to reorganize 
the necessary misfortune of price.
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